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 The hypothesis that the meanings of words in natural language have structure has 
been debated among linguists for over three decades.  This dissertation examines two 
resultative suffixes in Pima (Tepiman, Southern Uto-Aztecan), referred to as the passive 
resultative and the possessive resultative, whose properties are relevant for this debate.  
The interpretations which these two resultatives receive support one type of structure 
within the meanings of certain verbs. 
 The passive resultative suffix –s is canonically interpreted as a resultative proper; 
verbs with this suffix typically express the condition which results from an event of the 
type denoted by the unsuffixed verb.  Certain verbs with this suffix, however, receive a 
derived stative interpretation, where the condition which they express need not be the 
result of any event at all.  Other verbs with this suffix receive a perfect interpretation; 
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their meaning is solely that an event of some type has occurred.  Resultative-suffixed 
verbs with these interpretations all lack as an argument the agent which occurs as subject 
of the base verb.  Where the base does not take an agent, however, the suffixed form 
receives one of three other interpretations and the argument structure of base and 
resultative appears identical.  The possessive resultative suffix –kc, in contrast, has a 
more restricted distribution; verbs with this suffix receive either a resultative or derived 
stative interpretation, where the subject of the suffixed verb is responsible for 
maintaining this condition. 
 While several analyses of the Pima resultatives are considered here, the most 
economical analysis of the distribution of interpretations which Pima resultatives receive 
involves monotonically adding semantic components in order to build the meaning of 
both eventive verbs and resultatives.  This analysis is presented within the framework of 
Distributed Morphology, where the semantic components of these verbs are associated 
with a number of abstract syntactic elements.  Since these resultatives are temporally 
stative, an introductory chapter explores what temporal stativity is and what it indicates 
about a predicate; another introductory chapter discusses published analyses of 
resultatives in Chichewa and German, which show several quite different ways that a 




 What is meaning?  How is it best represented?  Is there structure to the meaning 
of words, or is the meaning of a word simply unanalyzable?  These are broad questions 
whose answers are still debated among semanticists (for example, the criticisms of Fodor 
and Lepore 1998, 1999, and the responses of Pustejovsky 1998 and Hale and Keyser 
1999).  While fully satisfactory answers to these questions may require years of further 
research in linguistics, this dissertation provides a detailed examination of phenomena in 
a small number of languages that are relevant for this broader discussion. 
 The primary phenomenon to be investigated here involves what Nedjalkov and 
Jaxontov (1988:7) refer to as a RESULTATIVE: a linguistic object which denotes a state – a 
property, quality, or characteristic – and which is morphologically related to (often 
derived from) a linguistic object whose meaning involves an event or process which 
results in that characteristic.1  Resultatives therefore contrast with better-studied 
phenomena like causatives in that while the meaning of a causative focuses on an event 
which causes some other event or state, the meaning of a resultative focuses on a state 
which results from some other event.  While the relationship between the cause and result 
is similar in both causatives and resultatives, they differ in the choice of eventuality 
which is foregrounded; they often differ in the direction of morphological derivation, as 
well.2  Resultatives, therefore, provide an interesting and relatively under-studied domain 
                                                 
1 Although Nedjalkov and Jaxontov limit their comments to verbs, I use the term 
“linguistic object” here to include cases where resultatives may be phrasal as well as 
single words. 
2 There is unfortunately another use of this term in modern linguistic research –  probably 
a more frequent use, in fact.  RESULTATIVE may also refer to a type of complex predicate 
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in which to explore questions of structure within the meaning of lexical items and more 
complex linguistic units.  Even independent of the broader questions of meaning 
structure, the semantic relationship between resultatives and their bases deserves a 
thorough understanding. 
 The culmination of this dissertation will include a detailed examination of two 
resultative suffixes in the Southern Uto-Aztecan language Pima (or Akimel O'odham, as 
speakers of the language refer to it), a dialect of O'odham.3  These suffixes, when present 
on certain verbs, produce a verb which is a RESULTATIVE in what Nedjalkov and Jaxontov 
(1988) call the narrow sense: it denotes a state that necessarily results from an event of 
the type that is denoted by the base verb.  On other verbs, however, the same suffixes 
produce what these authors refer to as a DERIVED STATIVE: such a verb form denotes a 
state that is not required to result from some event. (Nedjalkov and Jaxontov also use the 
term “resultative” in a broad sense to refer to both resultatives proper – those that are 
necessarily the result of an event – and derived statives.) The properties of resultatives in 
Pima appear best explained by positing a degree of structure within the meaning of 
certain words, a structure which is manipulable within the syntax of the language, and it 
is this structure which is responsible for the different interpretations of resultatives. 
                                                                                                                                                 
consisting of a main predicate, typically a verb specifying an activity or process, and a 
secondary predicate, typically an adjectival or prepositional phrase, which specifies the 
result of that activity (this type of expression is discussed, for example, in Goldberg and 
Jackendoff 2004).  Resultatives in this sense are like causatives in that they focus on the 
activity rather than the resulting state (i.e., they are eventive and not temporally stative, in 
the sense that will be made clear in chapter two), and are therefore different from 
resultatives in the sense of Nedjalkov and Jaxontov (1988) – though whether a predicate 
specifies a result is relevant for the formation of resultatives in the latter sense. 
3 Ethnologue (Gordon 2005) and ISO/DIS 639-3 language code: ood 
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 Before presenting the details of this analysis, however, it is important to set out 
the assumptions within which the analysis will be formulated and delineate the concepts 
that will be relevant.  Since resultatives often pattern like what have been referred to as 
“stative” predicates, the following chapter will survey recent approaches to stativity, with 
the goal of making clear what properties of a predicate make it stative.  A special concern 
of this discussion will also be differences among types of stative predicates, particularly 
whether the properties that make a predicate stative are inherent to that predicate or are 
the result of aspectual modification of a more basic predicate – the difference between 
stative predicates and predicates of states, in a neo-Davidsonian sense.  Chapter three will 
then survey several proposals in the literature which involve morphologically and 
semantically deriving predicates that are stative from those that are not; these proposals 
relate eventive and stative predicates in resultative-like constructions – that is, in a 
derivational relationship which is the opposite of a causative one.  The difficulties in 
extending these proposals to the Pima resultatives will be the primary motivation in 
chapter four for breaking the meaning of Pima verbs into component parts – a component 
expressing an action and a component expressing a state which results from it. 
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2. What does “stative” mean? 
 Terms like “state”, “stative”, and “stativity” have long been used by linguists to 
describe in an intuitive way the properties of certain words or classes of words in 
language.  These terms are also often used in a more formal way by theoretical linguists 
when discussing certain agreement systems, verb classes, or lexical aspect (the latter also 
referred to as event type or Aktionsart).  In fact, the idea that a category of “static” verbs 
(which “stand for states”) could be distinguished goes back, by the citation of Kenny 
(1963), to the writings of Aristotle.  When the term “stative” is used descriptively, writers 
often do not bother to define it, assuming the meaning to be obvious to the reader.  The 
intended sense is frequently that a word or larger predicate which is stative does not 
involve anything “happening” – it does not involve any action, activity (in a non-
technical use of these terms), or change over time.  Although formal definitions for 
stativity have been proposed, such definitions sometimes do not coincide with the 
intuitive use of these terms by other linguists, and in some cases different linguists appear 
to use these terms to describe sets of linguistic objects with different properties. 
 It is therefore important to review the definition (or definitions) of stativity as it 
has been presented in the literature, and to specify how this and other terms will be used 
in the present work.  It is also crucial to understand what it means for a predicate to be 
stative before it will be possible to determine how stative predicates may be derived from 
eventive predicates (i.e., the case of resultatives).  The first section of this chapter will 
therefore discuss the use of the terms “stative” and “stativity” by a number of linguists in 
the tradition of lexical aspect or Aktionsart, and consider what their tests for stativity are 
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truly sensitive to and what they tell us about the linguistic objects under study, 
concluding by clarifying the difference between a temporally stative predicate and a 
predicate that takes a state as an argument (in a Davidsonian sense).  The subsequent 
section of this chapter will consider the views of a number of linguists on subcategories 
within the set of stative predicates and representational differences that correspond to 
these subcategories; this subcategorization will be relevant for predicting the possible 
interpretations of resultatives. 
 Before beginning this review, however, it is important to point out a distinction 
which was implicit in the reference to Aristotle above: a distinction between language 
and linguistic objects on the one hand, and real-world objects and their (not-necessarily-
linguistic) cognitive representation on the other.  This distinction can become rather 
blurred when a Davidsonian semantic framework is adopted, as in this paper, and 
therefore warrants discussion at the outset. 
 Semantic analysis in the tradition of Davidson (1967) claims that eventive verbs 
take at least one argument in addition to those which are expressed as noun phrases in a 
clause.  This argument, which typically is not expressed by phonological features at all, 
corresponds to the event that the verb is meant to communicate.  In this kind of 
framework, the verb read in a sentence like (1)a is represented semantically as a 
predicate with three arguments, as in (1)b. 
(1) a. Evan read a book. 
 b. [[ read ]]  = λx λy λe read'(x)(y)(e) 
Here, the verb read denotes a predicate which takes three arguments: one for the entity 
which is doing the reading, one for the entity which gets read, and one for the event of 
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reading itself.  Another way to view this representation of the meaning of the verb read is 
as a relationship between individuals and events.  In this example, the individuals 
denoted by the name Evan and the noun phrase a book stand in a particular relationship to 
an event of a certain type, namely, an event of reading. 
 This represents the general idea of Davidsonian semantics (or event semantics), 
and although many linguists have adopted a number of changes to Davidson’s initial 
theory, theories of event semantics share at least one strong motivation: introducing 
events as arguments of predicates makes adverbial modification much simpler.  For 
example, a sentence like (2)a can be represented something like what is given in (2)b, and 
not as in (2)c. 
(2) a. Isabel baked a cake in the kitchen with a convection oven. 
 b. bake'(a-cake)(Isabel)(e) ∧ in-the-kitchen'(e) ∧ with-a-convection-oven'(e) 
 c. with-a-convection-oven'( in-the-kitchen'( bake'(a-cake)(Isabel) ) ) 
The representation shown in (2)b captures the entailment relations between sentences 
with and without such modifiers more easily than does the representation in (2)c.  For 
instance, if the sentence Isabel baked a cake in the kitchen with a convection oven is true, 
then the sentence Isabel baked a cake with a convection oven is also true, and the 
sentence Isabel baked a cake is also true.  These entailment relations follow from the 
semantics of conjunction seen in a representation as in (2)b, but are not easy to guarantee 
for a representation like (2)c.  Other entailment patterns involving modifiers are likewise 
more easily explained by positing an event variable. 
 The motivation for choosing a Davidsonian framework, including entailment 
patterns like this one, is discussed in more detail in a number of other works such as 
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Parsons (1990) and Landman (2000), and my intent is not to repeat all of their arguments 
here.  Having explained the basic Davidsonian proposal, what I wish to point out here is 
that most formal accounts in the Davidsonian tradition do not satisfyingly define what an 
event is.4  Further, a distinction is seldom made between events “in the real world” (that 
is, changes is configurations of the external world over time, a concept which becomes 
particularly troubling for “events” which have no associated observable physical 
processes, such as psychological events of remembering or hearing) and events as 
linguistic and cognitive objects – i.e., as the elements which fill these event argument 
positions.  This is not a critical flaw, since for the purpose of studying language, the most 
important relationship is that between linguistic objects and a speaker or hearer’s 
cognitive model of the world; the question of what configurations and changes in the real 
world do and do not correspond to events in a cognitive or linguistic sense is more 
properly the domain of psychology or philosophy rather than linguistics.5 
                                                 
4 This is not to say that they say nothing about what an event is, but that what they do say 
is not completely satisfying.  Parsons (1990), for instance, assumes that an event is 
simply what the gerund of an English verb denotes, whatever that referent may be.  This 
predicts that (other complexities aside) what a gerund may express and what the simple 
past tense of a verb may express should be equivalent.  In any context where a speaker 
may truthfully say John ran, the speaker should also be able to say What happened was 
running, and vice versa; problematically, some speakers may feel that sentences like 
these are not necessarily true in all of the same contexts.  Other authors (Landman 2000, 
for example) have taken up the very sticky issues of distinguishing events from each 
other, especially distinct events which necessarily occur together, such as buying events 
and selling events; this distinction appears to involve more than keeping track of the time 
and location that an event occurs at. 
5 It is not beyond imagination, however, that linguistic data is relevant for determinations 
within other disciplines of cognitive science that, strictly speaking, fall outside the 
domain of linguistics.  An example of linguistic data being used to support conclusions 
about psychology can be seen in Wolff (2003), who notes a correlation between the 
directness or indirectness of real-world causation (presented in a representation of a real-
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 Some authors do, however, address this point.  For at least some authors, the 
events which fill these argument positions are taken to be real-world objects, not 
linguistic or cognitive ones (e.g., Maienborn 2004a); for others, the events which serve as 
arguments of linguistic objects are identical to the events which serve as elements of a 
cognitive model of the world.  If there turn out to be distinct types of events in this 
linguistic or cognitive sense, then it is appropriate for linguistics to explore the properties 
and behavior of verbs (i.e., linguistic objects) as a function of the type of events (i.e., 
cognitive objects) they take as arguments. 
 In fact, the neo-Davidsonian tradition (e.g., Parsons 1990) assumes an ontology of 
event types – or eventuality types, to introduce a term which is not limited just to events – 
extending the idea of an event variable beyond what are non-technically considered to be 
events; within this framework, eventuality arguments may be filled by events or states 
(where “event” and “state” formally refer to objects with specific properties).  The neo-
Davidsonian position is not universally accepted, however, and a number of opposing 
perspectives will be discussed later in this chapter.  If the neo-Davidsonians are correct, 
and stative verbs are to be given a treatment similar to Davidson’s treatment of eventive 
verbs – that is, if stative verbs are to be analyzed as having a state argument in addition to 
their nominal arguments – then problems similar to those associated with events proper 
need to be addressed for states: are the states that fill the state argument positions 
linguistic objects, cognitive objects, or real-world objects?  How is one state 
distinguished from another?  What distinguishes states from events, if both are 
                                                                                                                                                 
world causal interaction) and linguistic structures intended to communicate information 
about that causation (specifically, lexical causatives versus periphrastic causatives). 
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considered possible types of eventualities?6 
 For the purpose of this dissertation, I will use the terms “event” and “state” to 
refer to components of a cognitive model of the world, which I will assume are identical 
to the objects that fill the argument positions of linguistic items.7  I will discuss some of 
the proposed answers to the above questions, but will leave the difficult questions 
concerning their precise nature to future work.  These events and states are by hypothesis 
independent of the language used to communicate things about them, though their 
properties – in particular their temporal properties, as we will see – may affect the 
properties of the linguistic objects they interact with. 
 These cognitive objects are distinct from the linguistic objects that take them as 
arguments, however.  Terms like “eventive verb” and “stative verb” (or sometimes “static 
verb”) may be understood in a narrow sense to refer to the linguistic objects which take 
these cognitive objects as arguments – “eventive verb” = a verbal predicate which has an 
event argument, like bake', and “stative verb” = a verbal predicate which has a state 
argument, like know' (states in this sense are most frequently atemporal relations, 
including spatial relations, or property concepts in the sense of Dixon 1982 – 
                                                 
6 I am following Bach (1986) in using the term “eventuality” in a formal sense as a cover 
term for both events and states in a Davidsonian framework. 
7 Here I differ from Maienborn (2004b), who claims that the consensus of semanticists is 
that eventualities are particular spatiotemporal entities in the real world, and it appears 
that she intends to contrast this with the position that eventualities are elements of a 
cognitive model of the real world.  Her motivation for saying that eventualities are real 
world objects, rather than elements of a cognitive model, appears to be that she believes 
eventualities must be perceptible – a position which prohibits a number of verbs like 
know and resemble from having eventuality arguments.  I believe that taking eventualities 
as cognitive objects is not incompatible with perception of them, but I will not pursue this 
issue further here. 
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characteristics such as texture, color, age, dimension, and so on).  The term “stative” is 
also sometimes applied to any linguistic object (i.e., a word or phrase) which has 
particular temporal properties, not necessarily one that takes a cognitive object of a 
certain type as an argument – for example, the progressive form of any verb is sometimes 
considered to be stative in this latter temporal sense.  The difference between these two 
uses of the term “stative” – one referring to a predicate whose argument is of a certain 
type, and the other referring to a predicate with certain temporal properties – is difficult 
to make for all linguistic items that it has been applied to, however, since the perfect 
definition of a state has not yet been given.  If there is no way to say what can and cannot 
be a state, then it is difficult to prove that any predicate that is temporally stative does not 
in fact take a state as argument; if progressives are temporally stative, how can we 
determine if this is because they take a state as an argument?8 
 We will see in the following section that there are diagnostics which can be used 
to distinguish these two senses of “stative”, though frequently the entire set of diagnostics 
is taken as being diagnostic of stativity without consideration of these two senses.  The 
question of the structure of meaning which this dissertation aims to address involves the 
relation between events and states as cognitive objects (as mediated by linguistic objects 
like verbs), so relations between linguistic objects which do not refer to states – that is, 
                                                 
8 Another example of a problematic case involves the resultant state participles of Kratzer 
(2000), which have traditionally been called perfects.  Although such forms have certain 
properties typically associated with predicates of states (e.g., the Subinterval Property, 
introduced below in (8)), Kratzer analyzes such forms as being stative because of the way 
they relate an event and a time, not because they refer to a state.  Other authors, such as 
Parsons (1990), do analyze perfects as predicates of states (i.e., real world or cognitive 
objects), states which are defined in terms of an event and a time.  Kratzer’s views will be 
discussed further in section 3.2. 
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relations between predicates of events which are not temporally stative and predicates of 
events which happen to be temporally stative – need to be considered separately.  It is 
therefore important to make clear which diagnostics are sensitive to the presence of a 
predicate of states and which diagnostics are sensitive to stative temporal properties of a 
predicate, whether or not that predicate involves any actual state. 
2.1 “Stative” as lexical aspect: temporal property or type of eventuality? 
 The idea that verbs can be divided into a stative and a non-stative class based on 
meaning has been adopted by many linguists.  This distinction has also been argued to 
have a number of morphosyntactic reflexes, from controlling the occurrence of predicates 
in particular syntactic structures (such as the progressive in English) to differences in the 
set of morphemes used to express person and number in verb agreement (as discussed, 
for example, in Mithun 1991) to what O’Herin (2002) claims is a pervasive split in the 
syntactic architecture of the clause (at least in Caucasian languages).  These 
morphosyntactic reflexes may therefore be taken as diagnostic of the stativity or non-
stativity of any predicate. 
 One early proposal which sought to explain the morphosyntactic behavior of 
verbs and adjectives in English by appealing to stativity or non-stativity was made by 
Lakoff (1966).  He proposed that verbs and adjectives were specified by a grammatical 
feature as STATIVE or NONSTATIVE (the determination of the value of this feature will be 
discussed shortly), and that this featural specification was relevant for a number of 
grammatical constructions in English: occurrence in “true” (or “command”) imperatives;9 
                                                 
9 True imperatives have the illocutionary force of a command.  This differs from the first 
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occurrence in true progressives (i.e., not merely nominals or gerunds involving -ing); 
occurrence in pseudoclefts with the verb do or replaced in elliptical contexts by do so; 
occurrence in an infinitival complement of the verbs persuade and remind; occurrence 
with subject-oriented adverbials like enthusiastically, with a purposive adverbial like for 
someone’s sake, and in a clause with instead of.  Examples of most of these tests will be 
discussed in the following subsections. 
 Lakoff’s motivation for proposing this binary featural difference was that many 
verbs and adjectives pattern the same way in all of these constructions; this uniformity is 
predicted if a single feature is responsible for the acceptability of a verb or adjective in all 
of these contexts.  While it is true that verbs and adjectives strongly tend to pattern 
uniformly with respect to these tests, later authors have determined that the behavior of a 
verb or adjective with respect to these tests is not always uniform; other syntactic and 
semantic factors were proposed to explain the patterns in each construction, and Lakoff’s 
claim that a single featural specification was involved in all of them was called into 
question.  Lakoff was careful, however, to formulate his proposal in terms of a 
grammatical feature rather than a semantic one; that is, the grammatical property of being 
STATIVE or NONSTATIVE is distinct from (and need not coincide with) the semantic 
property of activity or inactivity possessed by meanings of these verbs and adjectives.  
The syntactic tendencies associated with this semantic property are empirical facts, rather 
than necessities. 
                                                                                                                                                 
clause of English sentences like Give someone an inch, and they’ll take a mile; the first 
clause is morphologically identical to an imperative, but does not have the force of a 
command.  Such forms instead have the meaning of an implication, as in if p then q. 
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 Unfortunately, Lakoff did not define exactly what the relevant semantic property 
(i.e., activity or inactivity) is.  He noted that “overwhelmingly”, verbs and adjectives that 
have the featural specification STATIVE (as determined by behavior in the constructions 
he discusses) also have the semantic property of inactivity (which is assumed to be 
intuitively understood), and that verbs and adjectives which are NONSTATIVE tend to have 
the semantic property of activity.  He acknowledged at least two classes of verbs which 
were exceptions to this generalization – one which appears to be composed of positional 
verbs like sit, stand, and huddle, and another which includes verbs like remain, stay, and 
keep – all of which are semantically inactive yet grammatically NONSTATIVE.  He 
explicitly noted an absence of forms that are semantically active yet grammatically 
STATIVE.  Since Lakoff’s tests were all phrased strictly in terms of the grammatical 
properties of words in English constructions, however (i.e., with other English words or 
in specific English grammatical contexts, like the progressive or the present tense), it is 
difficult to determine whether languages besides English share precisely the same 
generalization with regard to activity or inactivity that Lakoff proposed for English.  
Nevertheless, cross-linguistic comparison may be loosely made with at least some of 
these constructions (for example, with the language-specific equivalent of English do or 
do so, and with other tests to be discussed in the following subsections), and although 
Lakoff did not observe semantically active but grammatically stative forms in English, 
Guaraní is a language which may contain examples of this type; see Mithun (1991) for 
discussion.  Their absence in English may thus be an accident. 
 Many of the constructions that Lakoff argued display sensitivity to the 
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STATIVE/NONSTATIVE feature are also discussed within a tradition of more articulated 
categories of clausal predicates, where it has become clear that the same factor is not 
relevant for acceptability in all of them.  This is the tradition involving what has been 
called lexical aspect, event type, or Aktionsart, and variants of this categorization have 
been presented by Ryle (1949), Kenny (1963), Vendler (1967), Bach (1986), and many 
others.  Rather than analyze this syntactic behavior as a strictly grammatical phenomenon 
as Lakoff did, many of these authors analyze this behavior as a semantic phenomenon – 
the result of temporal properties of the meaning of these predicates (or the eventualities 
that the predicates denote).  These semantic properties are reflected indirectly in the way 
that the linguistic objects which refer to them interact with other linguistic objects, 
especially morphemes related to tense and grammatical aspect. 
 Vendler (1967) begins a presentation of his lexical aspectual classification with 
the observation that because tense (i.e., temporal relationship) is one of the things that 
verbs are morphologically marked for, time or temporal relationships must be relevant for 
the interpretation of verbs.  Using facts of co-occurrence with temporal adverbials and 
acceptability in grammatical constructions similar to those observed by Lakoff, he 
distinguishes four time schemata which are associated with verbs, which he terms states, 
activities, accomplishments, and achievements.10  Like Lakoff, Vendler distinguishes 
between the linguistic objects and the conceptual objects that he is discussing when he 
says that these time schemata are “constituents of the concepts that prompt us to use 
                                                 
10 Kenny (1963) discusses just three categories of verbs: static verbs, activity verbs, and 
performance verbs, the latter of which appears to be the sum of Vendler’s categories of 
accomplishment and achievement verbs. 
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those terms the way we consistently do” (1967: 98, emphasis added); the linguistic 
objects under study behave in the way that they do because of the temporal properties of 
the concepts they express – i.e., their meaning.  He describes a total of four schemata: 
(3) “…the concept of activities calls for periods of time that are not unique or 
definite.  Accomplishments, on the other hand, imply the notion of unique and 
definite time periods.  In an analogous way, while achievements involve unique 
and definite time instants, states involve time instants in an indefinite and non-
unique sense.” (Vendler 1967: 106-7)11 
Accomplishments extend over an interval of time, ending with a climax or specific end-
point (or TELOS), while activities extend over an interval of time without such an end-
point.  The eventuality described by a sentence like John ran is therefore an activity, 
since the eventuality that is involved does not necessarily have a natural, required end 
point; in contrast, the eventuality described by the sentence John ran a mile, does have a 
natural and required endpoint – the point at which John finishes moving himself over the 
distance conventionally defined as 5280 feet – and is therefore an accomplishment.  
Achievements can be thought of as consisting solely of an instantaneous climax, as 
described by a sentence like John realized his error; states can be thought of as holding 
(i.e., as being true) at a single point of time or an interval of time without a climax or 
natural endpoint, as described by a sentence like John is quiet.12 
                                                 
11 Vendler does not provide a formal structure in which to model time and temporal 
relations.  His use here of the terms period of time and instant is consistent with the 
common assumption that time is homomorphic to the set of real numbers (e.g., Katz 
1995); an instant would therefore correspond to a single point of time, while a period of 
time would correspond to an interval (i.e., a set including all times bounded by an initial 
point and a final point).  This formalization will be discussed further below, though it 
does not matter whether time is taken to be homomorphic to the set of real numbers or 
the set of integers, for instance. 
12 The formalization of these categories in Dowty (1979) includes a formalization of their 
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 The tests proposed by Vendler, Kenny, and a number of others since their time as 
being indicative of states (and by extension indicative of stative predicates) are discussed 
in the following subsections, along with other grammatical and interpretive properties 
which are taken to be characteristic of states or stative predicates.  Note that although 
adjectives (and presumably also nominals and adpositional phrases) may be classified as 
stative or non-stative by some of these tests, most of the tests are applicable only when 
the words or phrases in question occur in clausal contexts.13  In the time since many of 
these tests were proposed, other authors have determined that many of the linguistic 
properties put forth as characteristic of states and stative predicates are actually not 
sensitive to merely the temporal properties of the predicate or its referent.  As was noted 
with regard to the proposal of Lakoff (1966), many other semantic properties are often 
shared by predicates that have stative temporal properties, and it is these other semantic 
properties that the proposed tests for stativity are actually sensitive to.  The tests are 
therefore grouped accordingly.14 
                                                                                                                                                 
temporal properties; in his system, states are the only type of eventuality whose temporal 
extent can correspond to a single instant of time; all other categories require a minimal 
interval of at least two instants (a minimal non-momentary interval).  While states may 
also hold over an interval, they are the only category for which it must also be the case 
that they are true at every subinterval (and therefore every instant) within that interval; 
see the discussion of the Subinterval Property on page 30. 
13 Authors differ over their interpretation of these tests as applying to entire clauses or 
just to verb phrases; the latter would require the clausal subject to occur within a verb 
phrase, since subjects can be relevant for determination of lexical aspect.  The question 
becomes irrelevant if the four-way categorization is understood as applying to the 
eventualities that fill the Davidsonian argument position, rather than to the linguistic 
objects that take those eventualities as arguments. 
14 There are also a number of proposed tests which are not listed here, mainly because 
later authors have concluded that they rest on incorrect generalizations or are not useful 
(as demonstrated by a lack of further discussion).  For example, Lakoff (1966) claimed 
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2.1.1 Diagnostics sensitive to volition or agency 
 The first set of diagnostics appears to indicate the degree of volition or control 
that the referent of a nominal argument – typically the subject – has in the eventuality that 
the predicate expresses.  Since many stative predicates express properties that are open to 
neither volition nor control, the incompatibility of do with many stative predicates in 
these constructions can be ascribed to a conflict in selectional restrictions, rather than a 
conflict in the temporal properties of the predicates (i.e., the verb do places selectional 
restrictions on arguments that conflict with the restrictions placed on those arguments by 
most stative predicates). 
                                                                                                                                                 
that verbs and adjectives marked STATIVE could not be used in either clause surrounding 
instead of (as in 9John wrote a paper instead of building a house, *John wrote a paper 
instead of knowing all the facts, *John heard the music instead of looking at the 
painting); to the extent that this seems to give correct results, it may involve volitionality 
of one or both verb phrases: *John wrote a paper instead of sinking to the bottom of the 
ocean.  Another test is found in Kenny (1963), who claimed that only static verbs allow 
the inference from X has verb-ed to X verb-s (as in John has seen the car to John sees the 
car); this inference does not appear to hold for all stative verbs, however, and it is not 
clear that this is a correct claim.  Vendler (1967) argues that could and would are often 
interchangeable for state terms (and certain achievements), though this is only the case 
for certain involuntary processes (Vendler’s example involves the verb see) where no 
other logically necessary conditions are present.  Lastly, Katz (1995) has argued that 
although eventive sentences support eventive anaphora, stative sentences do not support 
state anaphora (as in 9Smith stabbed Jones.  It happened at noon, but *Kim loved Sandy.  
It was last year.); Mittwoch (2003), however, argues forcefully that there do exist cases 
of state anaphora that are not re-analyzable in terms of fact or proposition anaphora. 
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(4) Tests which are sensitive to volition or agency: 
a. Stative predicates may not occur in pseudoclefts replaced by do (Lakoff 1966, 
Dowty 1979)15 
b. Stative predicates may not be replaced by do so (Lakoff 1966, Dowty 1979) 
c. Stative predicates may not occur in “true” or “command” imperatives (Kenny 
1963, Lakoff 1966, Dowty 1979) 
d. Stative predicates may not occur in the infinitival complement of the verbs 
persuade, remind, force (Lakoff 1966, Dowty 1979) 
e. Stative predicates may not occur with subject-oriented adverbials like 
enthusiastically, deliberately, or carefully (Lakoff 1966, Dowty 1979) 
f. Stative predicates may not occur with a purposive adverbial like for 
someone’s sake or intentionally (Kenny 1963, Lakoff 1966, Dowty 1979) 
 The first two of these tests involve substitution by do or do so.  Eventive 
predicates like read a book are fine in such contexts, as in What John did was read a 
book and John read a book, and Mary did so, too.  Stative predicates like know the 
answer, however, are generally bad in these contexts, as in *What John did was know the 
answer and *John knew the answer, and Mary did so, too.  Unfortunately, these 
diagnostics are as difficult to interpret as the verb do is to analyze.  As a main verb, Ross 
(1972) has claimed that do requires that its subject generally be volitional (thus generally 
animate) and agentive.  Since many stative predicates require subjects that are neither of 
these, the incompatibility of do with many stative predicates in these constructions is 
predicted.  Other predicates which are non-volitional or non-agentive are also predicted 
to be bad; an example of such a predicate is fall off the chair – though since volitionality 
or agency may be a pragmatically-determined factor where potential agents are involved, 
there may be agentive readings of such predicates that are acceptable: ?What John did 
was fall off the chair and ?John fell off the chair, and Mary did so, too. 
                                                 
15 Belvin (1996) concludes that the use of do in pseudoclefts requires that the predicate it 
is replacing be both agentive and non-stative. 
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 There do exist contexts where do may be used without a requirement of volition 
or agency, however, both in pseudoclefts (as in What the machine did was make a lot of 
noise) and in other contexts (such as What was the machine doing?), though do so is 
generally not as acceptable with such predicates (volitionality is generally still required 
for do so, as in ?The washer made a lot of noise, and the dryer did so, too).  The non-
volitional predicates that occur in these contexts express situations or activities (in a non-
technical sense) that require a non-momentary interval of time to unfold, either as an 
intrinsic property or because they involve external or internal change (which by definition 
requires distinct situations at multiple moments of time); note the contrast between What 
the machine did was make noise (requiring a non-momentary interval) and *What the 
flower did was stink (which can be true at a moment of time, as will be discussed 
below).16 
 One proposal discussed in Dowty (1979) is that an abstract predicate DO 
distinguishes stative predicates from many activities (which are semantically most similar 
                                                 
16 Either of these conditions is sufficient for acceptability with do, though motion and 
change themselves require an interval of time.  Many verb phrases which may be 
replaced by do yet which appear to lack motion, change, or volition, do turn out to 
require a non-momentary interval of time for evaluation.  Consider an exchange like 
What was the machine doing?  Nothing.  All it did was just sit there, where sit there is 
presumably a predicate that requires neither volition nor change.  It will be seen below 
that positional verbs like sit require an interval of time for their evaluation, even though 
position on the face of it seems to be evaluable for truth at a single instant of time.  
Another example of a non-volitional predicate being replaced by do is the verb phrase 
break the window in the sentence What the rock did was break the window.  In the 
formalization of Dowty (1979), the change of state which is required for the event 
denoted by break requires a minimum of two moments of time – one at which the 
window is intact, and an immediately following moment at which the window is 
fractured – thus constituting a non-momentary interval.  As the criteria are worded here, 
however, the mere fact that break involves a change is sufficient to make it acceptable 
with do. 
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to statives in that they are atelic and can have significant duration), though he concludes 
that the semantic contribution of DO can at most be something like “unmediated 
controllability” rather than volitionality.17  Interestingly, Dowty (1975) also observes that 
when adjectives pattern like non-stative predicates by such tests, they are always 
associated with a volitional (or more precisely, “controllable”) reading rather than a non-
volitional activity interpretation (compare 9What the student did was be noisy with 
*What the machine did was be noisy), which may be analyzed as an instance of this 
abstract predicate DO which is expressed as the copula.  Whatever the proper analysis 
actually is for adjectives like noisy and brave that can be used in a situation where their 
argument exercises volitionality or control, these adjectives may involve a separation of 
the volitional and stative components in some way that is not possible with verbs.18  
Moreover, while the behavior of many predicates with regard to the diagnostics in (4)a 
and (4)b may be explained in terms of the selectional restrictions of the verb do, this 
explanation will not account for all cases, and a complete explanation will not be found 
until the properties of do (whether there is only one do or whether do represents several 
homophonous morphemes) are better understood. 
 Tests (4)c through (4)f also involve constructions or lexical items that require 
                                                 
17 Rothstein (1999:360), however, suggests that even this characterization is too strong. 
18 Suppose, for instance, that there is a null morpheme which contributes the idea of 
volition in the second verb phrase of What the student did was be noisy, and that be noisy 
itself contributes just the intended resulting state.  If the null volitional morpheme is what 
licenses the use of do in the pseudocleft, then the absence of the possibility of volition (as 
in *What the machine did was be noisy) is predicted to correlate with the unacceptability 
of the pseudocleft with do.  This is similar to the abstract DO proposal of Dowty (1979).  
The contribution of volitionality cannot be associated only with an overt copula, 
however, since there are contexts where volitionality is present without an overt copula, 
as in the prenominal use of the adjective: The intentionally noisy students were detained. 
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volitionality, controllability, or agency – for example, it makes no sense to command 
someone to have a property that they have no control over; thus, ?Know the answer! is 
odd, as are ?John intentionally knew the answer, ?Mary persuaded John to know the 
answer, and ?John knew the answer for his teacher’s sake.  Dowty (1979) cites Lee 
(1971) for these tests being sensitive to agency; non-volitional readings of a predicate 
like fall off the chair are similarly unavailable, as in Mary persuaded John to fall off the 
chair (this predicate in this context can only have a volitional reading), and predicates 
whose arguments are inanimate (and thus cannot be volitional) are likewise unacceptable, 
as in Mary persuaded the machine to be noisy and The machine was noisy for the 
engineer’s sake.  These tests originally appeared to be sensitive to stativity, however, 
since many stative predicates are involuntary.19 
 The latter tests in this section do not involve the verb do, so an explanation for the 
observed patterns in terms of an abstract operator DO is less plausible here.  It might be 
presumed that causation, as well (as indicated in Dowty’s system by a CAUSE operator), 
also implies non-stativity, and so the presence of causation, whether morphological or 
lexical, is sufficient to make a predicate agentive (thus patterning like a non-stative by 
these tests).  While this might agree with the intuition that stative predicates don’t involve 
anything “happening” and that causation does involve this kind of “happening”, causative 
                                                 
19 While these tests have been demonstrated not to indicate stativity, there remains the 
question of why there is so much of an overlap between stativity and non-volitionality, 
non-controllability, and non-agency, that is, why statistically so few predicates, whether 
adjectives or verbs, are both volitional and stative in their temporal properties (as 
determined by other tests for stativity).  While this is an intriguing issue, I will have no 
more to say about it than that volitional predicates – those requiring the input of mental 
energy, in some sense that needs to be refined – require a non-momentary interval of time 
to hold. 
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predicates can, in at least some cases, pattern like stative predicates by some tests.  
Pykkänen (2000) discusses Finnish experiencer-object psychological predicates that 
overtly occur with a causative morpheme, but which nevertheless pattern as stative by a 
number of the tests to be seen in (6) (which are directly sensitive to the temporal 
properties of predicates); she cites English experiencer-object psychological predicates 
like concern, perplex, and bother as parallels.  All verbs which are overtly causative (in 
Finnish) and which pattern like statives, however, are also shown by a number of 
standard tests to be non-transitory or individual level (in the sense of Carlson 1977).  
While it is not clear that the restriction to individual level holds for stative causatives 
cross-linguistically, the relationship between individual level predicates and stativity will 
be discussed further in section 2.2. 
2.1.2 Diagnostics sensitive to duration and telicity 
 The other diagnostics which have been proposed for stativity are directly sensitive 
to certain temporal properties of predicates.  Certain of these diagnostics, however, are 
sensitive to properties that are not unique to stative predicates; rather, they distinguish 
states and other eventualities with certain temporal properties from those eventualities 
that lack them.  The tests in (5) (phrased for English) distinguish predicates which 
express eventualities that are durative (that can last for more than a minimal interval of 
time) and atelic – properties that stative and activity predicates share. 
(5) Tests which are sensitive to duration and telicity: 
a. Stative predicates may occur with durational adverbials like for an hour or 
until I was seven; in such cases, it is entailed that the predicate was true at all 
times during that interval (Vendler 1967, Dowty 1979) 
b. Stative predicates may not occur with telic time adverbials like in an hour 
(Dowty 1979) 
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 These tests distinguish predicates that express states or activities from those that 
express accomplishments or achievements.  Test (5)a distinguishes stative and activity 
predicates from achievement predicates because the latter may not generally be 
predicated over an arbitrarily long interval of time; it is fine to combine a for-PP with a 
stative predicate, as in The door was open for five minutes, or with an activity predicate, 
as in John ran for five minutes, but not with an achievement predicate, as in The vase 
shattered for five minutes.20  Test (5)b distinguishes stative and activity predicates from 
both accomplishment predicates because the latter are telic (i.e., they have a specific 
climax or end-point); compare the stative predicate in ?The door was open in five minutes 
and the activity predicate in ?John ran in five minutes with the accomplishment predicate 
in John drew a picture in five minutes.21,22 
 Interestingly, it is possible for what are sometimes accomplishment predicates 
(corresponding to durative, telic events) to occur with durative, atelic temporal 
adverbials.  The sentence John read the book for an hour is grammatical if John’s reading 
of the book went on for an hour and probably did not culminate in John finishing the 
                                                 
20 Accomplishment predicates are also odd with a for-PP, but not because they cannot 
have duration.  Accomplishment predicates with a for-PP appear to sound odd because 
the adverb is atelic; telic durative adverbs like in five minutes express the same duration 
along with the fact that the event reached its natural climax.  Compare ?John drew a 
picture for five minutes with 9John drew a picture in five minutes.  Predicates which 
allow either a telic or atelic reading, like read a book, are fine with either adverbial. 
21 Apparent counterexamples to this diagnostic such as The child was better in five 
minutes involve a change of state interpretation of the otherwise stative predicate – the 
child became better – and are therefore telic and non-stative. 
22 Achievement predicates are generally odd with an in-PP because they cannot have an 
indefinite duration, not because they are not telic; they are marginally acceptable with 
something like an accomplishment reading, where the duration specifies the length of 
time that elapsed before the achievement took place: ?The vase shattered in five minutes. 
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book; this contrasts with a sentence like John read the book in an hour, which entails that 
at the end of the hour John had finished the book, that is, that the event of reading the 
book had reached its natural end-point.  Facts like these show that, as Vendler (1967) 
indicated, more than one time schema can frequently be used with the same verb – or 
rather, with the same verb phrase or sentence (Dowty 1986) – and that other material in 
the verb phrase or sentence may be consistent with only certain time schemata; in this 
case, the phrase read the book can be interpreted either as an accomplishment or an 
activity, but only one of these interpretations is consistent with each temporal adverbial.  
In this case, the activity of reading (less than the complete) book is a subpart of the 
accomplishment of reading the (complete) book.  It is also possible for a phrase like this 
to receive an activity reading which consists of a series of (complete) book-reading 
events which comprise a larger atelic “meta-event” or plurality of events: although the 
event denoted by John read a book can be an accomplishment, as indicated by the 
grammaticality of John read a book in an hour, a series of accomplishments (i.e., 
complete book-readings) lacks a natural climax, thus constituting an activity.  An atelic 
temporal adverbial may be predicated of this plurality of events even while a telic 
temporal adverbial is predicated of each sub-event, as in John read a book in an hour for 
twenty hours straight.23 
                                                 
23 In languages besides English, the constituent read the book in the telic and atelic uses 
may be marked in other ways such that the time schema is not ambiguous between an 
activity or an accomplishment, for instance by the case marked on the object the book.  In 
the English example with both telic and atelic adverbials, there is no overt marking of the 
repetition of telic events of book-reading that comprise the overall atelic meta-event of 
reading multiple books, though other languages may also choose to mark this overtly. 
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2.1.3 Diagnostics sensitive to the time interval required for evaluation 
 The other proposed diagnostics for stativity which are directly sensitive to the 
temporal properties of predicates involve the interaction of predicates with tense, aspect, 
modality, and discourse-level phenomena.  It appears, however, that while the type of 
eventuality that a given verb expresses does affect a predicate’s behavior with regard to 
tense and aspectual morphemes, other aspectual morphemes which combine with the base 
predicate interact with each other, as well; what has been argued about these diagnostics 
(as discussed, for example, in Katz 1995) is that they are all sensitive to the ability of a 
predicate to be evaluated for truth at a moment of time – a single instant or point of time 
– rather than over a non-momentary interval, which we will see is related to what is 
called the Subinterval Property. 
(6) Tests which are sensitive to the ability to be predicated of a moment of time 
(rather than an interval of time): 
a. Stative predicates may not occur in true progressives (i.e., not merely 
nominals or gerunds with -ing) (Kenny 1963, Lakoff 1966, Vendler 1967, 
Dowty 1979, Katz 1995) 
b. Only stative predicates may occur in the simple present without a habitual or 
frequentative interpretation. (Dowty 1979, Katz 1995) 
c. In narrative discourse, stative, progressive, and perfect clauses (unlike 
eventive clauses) do not advance the narrative time (Katz 1995 and citations 
there) 
d. Stative, progressive, and perfect clauses are taken to hold at the same time as 
the event in an eventive when-modifier, while an eventive predicate is taken to 
follow the event introduced in the when-clause (Katz 1995 and citations there) 
e. Stative, progressive, and perfect clauses show a maximal interpretation with 
time span adverbials, such as last week or Sunday, while eventive clauses do 
not (Katz 1995 and citations there) 
f. Past tense stative, progressive, and perfect clauses may refer to situations 
which hold through the present time, while past tense eventive clauses must 
only refer to events which are completely located in the past (Katz 1995) 
g. A modal with a non-stative predicate must be interpreted deontically, while a 
modal with a stative, progressive, or perfect predicate is preferentially 
interpreted epistemically (Katz 1995) 
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 The first two tests involve the acceptability of the progressive and the type of 
interpretations available for the simple present tense, perhaps the most well-known 
diagnostics for stativity.  In the latter tests ((6)c through g), those predicates which are 
traditionally described as being stative and which are picked out by the first two tests – 
such as predicate adjectives and verbs like know, love, exist, stink, and so on (many of 
which are individual level predicates which describe psychological conditions) – pattern 
with aspectually-marked clauses of a number of types, including progressives, perfects, 
and habituals or generics.  These latter tests should be sensitive to some property that 
statives and these other aspectually complex predicates share, and several authors have 
come to the conclusion that these tests are in fact sensitive to whether a predicates which 
can be true at a moment of time, rather than over an interval of time (see especially Katz 
1995).  Because the relationship between statives, progressives, and habituals crucially 
depends on one’s analysis of progressives and habituals, most of these tests ((6)c through 
g) will be discussed at greater length after considering just those tests which involve the 
progressive and habitual or generic interpretations themselves. 
2.1.3.1 Dowty’s (1979) analysis of present tense and the progressive 
 Dowty (1979) proposes an account of tense, the progressive, and stative 
predicates in English which is intended to explain the observations in (6)a and b.  To do 
this, he follows a number of authors (especially Bennett and Partee 1978) in evaluating 
basic propositions (i.e., the semantic content of a sentence apart from tense) as true or 
false not with respect to moments or instants of time, but with respect to intervals of time.  
This is intended to capture the intuition that if John engaged in drawing a picture from 
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2pm to 4pm, a sentence like John drew a picture should only be said to be true over the 
complete interval from 2pm to 4pm, and not strictly true at a single point of time within 
that interval, such as 3pm (although any single moment of time between 2pm and 4pm 
could certainly be described as within a larger interval of picture-drawing).24  Intervals 
may extend over long periods of time, such as two hours in this example, or may 
minimally consist of a single moment or instant of time.  (Where I do not specify that 
intervals must be non-momentary, it should be assumed that any interval that is referred 
to can consist of many moments of time or just a single moment.) 
 Dowty also assumes that for present tense sentences, the interval of time at which 
the basic proposition is evaluated is the moment of utterance.  In a framework where 
basic propositions are evaluated at an index rather than simply a time – where the index 
would include all the information relevant for making truth-conditional evaluations, such 
as the speaker, the context, or other factors relevant, for example, to possible-worlds 
semantics – a present tense sentence would be evaluated at the current world at the 
moment of utterance.25  This default assignment of the moment of utterance for the 
                                                 
24 The use of temporal intervals for the evaluation of basic propositions seems easily 
converted to a Davidsonian system in which basic propositions are predicates of 
eventualities, where the eventualities themselves occupy an interval of time. 
25 Dowty (1979) uses a theory of tense, aspect, and modality in which a predicate is 
evaluated for truth at an index which consists of an interval of time and a possible world.  
Intervals of time are defined by an initial moment and a final moment, and can minimally 
consist of a single moment if the initial and final moments are identical; the time line is 
isomorphic to the set of real numbers (i.e., time is dense and is linearly ordered, though 
Dowty only arbitrarily makes the choice of dense over discrete moments of time).  A 
possible world consists of the configurations of individuals over the set of all times such 
that they are consistent with all necessary truths, and is a theoretical mechanism that is 
frequently employed for modal semantics; the set of possible worlds includes every way 
that the world might actually be, and the determination of which of these possible worlds 
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interval of evaluation in simple present tense sentences results in an anomaly for 
sentences which cannot be assigned a truth value at a single moment.  Dowty claims that, 
of the four Vendlerian time schemata, only stative predicates can be assigned truth values 
at a moment of time; all other predicates require a minimum interval of at least two 
distinct moments (such as for instantaneous changes of state, i.e., achievements, or for 
ongoing activities), making them unable to occur in the simple present – thus explaining 
(in (6)b) why a sentence with a stative predicate is acceptable in the simple present, as in 
John knows the answer, and why sentences with other kinds of predicates are acceptable 
in the simple present only with additional aspectual or temporal modification, as in John 
runs (habitual reading only), John draws a picture (habitual reading only), and The vase 
shatters (habitual/generic reading only). 
 His explanation of the diagnostic in (6)a of course depends on his account of the 
progressive, which he assumes is an operator that combines with a basic proposition φ 
(which for Dowty is a complete but untensed sentence); his final semantic analysis of the 
progressive is shown in (7). 
(7) [PROG φ] is true at 〈I, w〉 if and only if for some interval I' such that I ⊂ I' and I is 
not a final subinterval for I', and for all w' such that w' ∈ Inr(〈I, w〉), φ is true at 
〈I', w'〉. (Dowty 1979:149) 
In words, this states that the progressive is an operator which applies to a basic 
proposition φ and which yields truth at a given index (an interval of time I in a given 
world w) just in case the proposition φ is true at another index 〈I', w'〉, which is defined as 
follows: I' is an interval of time of which I is a proper subpart and which does not end 
                                                                                                                                                 
actually corresponds to the real world is an empirical issue, not a logical one. 
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with I (i.e., the condition that I is not a final subinterval of I' means simply that I does not 
include the last moment in I'; this is required to capture the fact that the progressive of an 
accomplishment predicate – that is, a predicate which is telic – entails that the natural 
endpoint of the accomplishment has not yet occurred at I), and w' is a world which is in 
the set of “inertia worlds” of w at I.  The set of inertia worlds, picked out by the function 
Inr, is the set of worlds that are identical to a given world up through a given interval of 
time, and for which “the future course of events after this time develops in ways most 
compatible with the past course of events” (Dowty 1979:148).  All this is to say that a 
predicate may be truthfully uttered in the progressive if it appears consistent with the 
current situation that the predicate will be true of an interval of time which itself extends 
into the future, even if the predicate is not true of an interval which terminates at the 
present; thus, a progressive sentence like John is drawing a circle can be true at the 
moment of utterance even if the relevant circle does not yet exist at the moment of 
utterance, as long as the situation looks as if John actually will complete the task of 
drawing a circle – for instance, if he has drawn half of it already.26 
 A sentence with the progressive operator of (7) may then be taken as an argument 
of a higher tense operator, such as PAST φ or FUTURE φ, which will set the interval of 
evaluation I relative to the utterance time.  If neither of these tense operators is present, 
the default index at which the predicate is evaluated is the current world at the moment of 
                                                 
26 Chapter 3 of Dowty (1979) discusses several types of future sentences in English, some 
of which involve only the progressive (such as John is leaving for London tomorrow), 
which differ from each other with respect to the degree of certainty that they express. 
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utterance.27  Since the interval of evaluation of the progressive (I in (7)) is not required to 
be an interval at which the predicate itself actually holds (which is I' in (7)), no problem 
results if this interval I is now taken in the present tense to be a single moment.  This is 
why non-stative predicates may occur in the present progressive, even when they may not 
occur in the simple present. 
 The progressive therefore converts a basic proposition of any of Vendler’s four 
temporal schemata into a predicate which has the Subinterval Property.  A paraphrase of 
Dowty’s statement of the Subinterval Property is given in (8).28 
(8) A predicate α has the subinterval property if and only if the following is true: α is 
true at an interval I if and only if α is also true at any subinterval I' of I. 
Some authors, in fact (e.g., Taylor 1977, Bennett and Partee 1978, Copley 2003), equate 
stativity with this very property; if a stative predicate is true over some interval I, it is 
also true at all subintervals of I, including the smallest subintervals of all, namely every 
moment of time within I; if the basic proposition the box be green (i.e., a tenseless 
sentence) is true over an interval of one minute, it is necessarily the case that the box be 
green is also true at every point in time within that minute.29  Activities, being atelic and 
durative, have the Subinterval Property down to some minimal interval length, which 
                                                 
27 Once again, this is because Dowty assumes that the present tense does not require a 
tense operator.  The analysis would be entirely compatible with a non-null present tense 
operator, as well. 
28 Dowty (1979:166) actually presents a definition from Taylor (1977) which is slightly 
different.  Taylor, like Bennett and Partee (1978), uses statements of temporal properties 
like this to distinguish basic predicates with Vendler’s four time schemata. 
29 Not all predicates which are traditionally considered to be stative have this property 
down to moments of time, however.  Those which don’t have it are the class which 
Dowty (1979:184) refers to as “interval” statives, generally consisting of positional 
verbal predicates like sit, stand, and lie.  These will be discussed immediately below. 
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hypothetically corresponds to a “grain size” of the activity; if the basic proposition John 
run is true of an interval of one minute, it is necessarily the case that John run is true of a 
30-second subinterval of that minute, and a 15-second subinterval of that minute, and so 
on, down to whatever the minimal interval is over which John can truthfully be said to 
run.  Accomplishments and achievements, as telic predicates, might be said to have a 
kind of anti-Subinterval property, since if they are true at an interval I, they are 
necessarily not true at any interval that is smaller than I.  The effect of the progressive, 
however, is to create a new type of predicate which allows that climax to exist in the 
future for a given interval of evaluation I – namely, in the interval I', which extends some 
distance into the future in one of Dowty’s inertia worlds (though other mechanisms may 
also be used to express this modal-aspectual concept).  The progressive therefore turns a 
predicate which does not have the Subinterval Property into one which does. 
2.1.3.2 Activities as predicates which require a non-momentary interval 
 As noted above, the only basic propositions of which the Subinterval Property 
holds are those with the time schema of states, though something close to the Subinterval 
Property holds of activities, as well.  We might wonder why, apart from stipulation, 
activities but not states should only be defined for truth over a non-momentary interval of 
time; this is the only temporal property which distinguishes activities from states.  If 
activities but not states necessarily involve change (internal or external) or motion (which 
is change in position), then a restriction to some minimal interval of time is at least 
reasonable, since change is not defined without reference to multiple moments of time.30 
                                                 
30 More generally, this should be stated as “change is not (or cannot be) defined without 
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 Dowty also points out that for some activities, such as those involving repeated 
sub-events or cycles like the activities associated with verbs like waltz and semelfactives 
like knock, the minimal interval over which such a predicate may be true – the “grain 
size”, referred to above – can be no smaller than the minimal sub-event, not just the 
minimal interval required to determine that some change is going on.  Dowty discusses 
the verb waltz as an example; the activity expressed by the verb waltz, he argues, 
minimally involves at least three steps.  If a dancer moves for only one step and stops, we 
cannot say truthfully the dancer waltzed, even if that step is identical to one that would be 
involved in a complete cycle of waltzing.  This is not an epistemic question (For what 
length of time must observation go on in order for speakers of a language to determine 
that an activity of a certain type is going on?), but rather a cognitive one (For what 
length of time must an activity go on in order for speakers of a language to comfortably 
refer to that as an activity of a certain type?), and seems not to have a ready explanation 
other than that it seems to fit the intuitions that speakers (especially Dowty) have. 
 This line of reasoning seems to be fruitful also for explaining those cases of 
traditionally stative verbs which seem to require an interval for evaluation – what Dowty 
refers to as “interval statives”, consisting mostly of positional verbs.  While the sentence 
The book is on the table (i.e., a copular clause involving a locative prepositional phrase) 
can be assigned a truth value at a single moment and thus has the Subinterval Property 
                                                                                                                                                 
reference to multiple values of some parameter”, since change in its most general form 
can be with respect to time, space, or some other parameter, as well.  In the examples 
being discussed here, the parameter in question is time, though in the discussion of Pima 
resultatives in chapter four we will see examples of predicates which involve change with 
respect to a spatial parameter, thus allowing them to be temporally stative. 
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down to moments of time, the truth of The book is lying on the table (i.e., a clause 
involving a positional verb) seems to require that the book’s location not change over 
some minimal interval; thus, even though the type of relation that these verbs express 
explicitly involves no change, they seem to require a non-momentary interval at which to 
hold.31 
 Where it does not seem appealing that all activities require a non-momentary 
interval of time is with certain predicates like smile and feign death.  These verbs or verb 
phrases pattern like activities according to Dowty’s tests: they cannot occur in the simple 
present without a habitual or frequentative interpretation, and they can occur in the 
progressive.  The situations which they express, however, at least intuitively seem to 
involve no change; there does not seem to be any reason why they should require a non-
momentary interval to be evaluated as true or false: John is smiling, for example, or John 
is feigning death, would seem to equally well describe a non-momentary interval of time 
or a single instant.  In order to salvage the explanation for these tests given above, one 
might claim that the non-momentariness of the eventualities associated with such 
predicates is simply an empirical fact about the meaning of these predicates in English: to 
count as smiling, the smile has to stay on one’s face for more than a moment.  This is 
stipulative at this point, however, and would not by itself constitute an explanation.  If 
                                                 
31 Dowty also discusses the occurrence of positional verbs in the simple present as non-
transitory predicates, as in New Orleans lies at the mouth of the Mississippi River.  These, 
he claims, involve individual-level or object-level predication (in the sense of Carlson 
1977), and as such entail the meaning that would be expressed by the (stage-level) 
progressive; since the object-level sentence makes a stronger claim, Gricean reasoning 
holds that the progressive form should only be used if the speaker has reason to believe 
that the object-level sentence is not true (e.g., if the city changes location periodically). 
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agenthood or control is necessarily involved in verbs like these, perhaps the explanation 
is to be found in what it means to be an agent or to exercise control – though it should be 
clear from the discussion of these topics in section 2.1.1 that much additional work is 
needed before agency and control are well understood. 
 This discussion of why activities require a non-momentary interval does not 
address another important issue regarding the progressive, however; namely, why stative 
predicates are unacceptable with the progressive.  Although stative predicates can be true 
at a moment of time, they may certainly also be true over a non-momentary interval of 
time, as well, so there is no semantic reason why they should not occur in the progressive 
as defined in (7).  If a stative predicate is true over a non-momentary interval, however, 
by the Subinterval Property of (8) it must necessarily be true at every moment within that 
interval, and since it is possible to use the simple present with stative predicates, the use 
of the progressive would not contribute additional information useful to a listener.  By 
Gricean reasoning, therefore, the simple present should be preferred to the progressive for 
stative predicates – that is, for predicates which have the Subinterval Property down to 
moments of time. 
 This explanation, given by Dowty (1979), is a pragmatic explanation for the 
pattern in (6)a, rather than a strictly semantic or syntactic one.  Dowty does not 
specifically address the status of aspectually complex predicates which are temporally 
stative, however, so it is not clear what explanation he would give for the properties 
noted in (6)c through g – that is, why all temporally stative predicates, whether 
aspectually simple or aspectually complex, pattern the same. 
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2.1.3.3 Katz’s (1995) analysis of the progressive, present, and other tests 
 Dowty’s explanation for the distribution of the progressive and the interpretation 
of the present tense contrasts somewhat with the account of Katz (1995), who presents an 
analysis of stative and non-stative predicates within a classical Davidsonian semantic 
framework, and who proposes an explanation for all the tests in (6). 
 Katz claims that the unacceptability of statives in the progressive does not have 
the sense of violating a conversational implicature, but is instead closer to simple 
ungrammaticality.  Katz instead explains the distribution of the progressive and the 
interpretation of the simple present tense as a type clash between the semantic type of 
non-aspectually-modified eventive predicates (i.e., basic propositions) and the predicate 
type that higher tense operators (including, unlike Dowty, the present tense) may apply 
to.  In his dissertation and later papers, Katz proposes that while non-stative basic 
propositions have an event argument that ranges over events proper, stative predicates are 
strictly properties of moments of time, not mediated by an eventuality argument.  Stative 
predicates under this analysis may still be interpreted over a non-momentary interval, but 
only as a consequence of the Subinterval Property in (8): evaluating a stative predicate 
over a non-momentary interval of time is equivalent to evaluating it at each moment of 
time within that interval.  Basic predicates which have this property – those that are 
traditionally considered statives – need no further modification to combine with tense, for 
instance.  For other predicates, aspectual operators like the progressive convert a 
predicate of events into a predicate of moments of time (which by the Subinterval 
Property may also be interpreted over a non-momentary interval). 
 36
 This explains why certain aspectually-modified predicates – perfects, habituals, 
generics, and the progressive forms of eventive predicates – pattern with most traditional 
statives (i.e., adjectives and stative verbs) in the tests in (6).32  Statives may not occur 
with the progressive because it takes as its argument a predicate of events, not moments 
of time.  The restriction noted in (6)b, that only statives, progressives, and other 
aspectually-modified predicates may occur in the simple present tense, involves the same 
restriction which Dowty employed: utterances in the present tense are evaluated for truth 
at the moment of utterance, not over a non-momentary interval of time; predicates which 
cannot be given a truth value at a momentary interval are anomalous. 
 Katz’s theory then explains (6)c through g as characteristic behavior of predicates 
of moments of time, rather than predicates of events (which by hypothesis take place over 
a non-momentary interval of time).  Note that these other aspectually-modified 
predicates, like statives, cannot occur in the progressive – a result which is predicted if 
these aspects, too, create a predicate which is of the wrong semantic type to combine with 
the progressive. 
(9) Generic:  Pool sharks smoke.   ~ * Pool sharks are smoking.33  
 Perfect:  The picture has faded.  ~ * The picture is having faded. 
 Progressive: The roof is collapsing.   ~ * The roof is being collapsing. 
 Katz (1995) spends an entire chapter explaining why predicates of moments of 
time work as they do in the tests in (6)c through g, and I do not wish to reproduce the 
                                                 
32 To be fair, Dowty (1979) observes that stative predicates are the only underived 
predicates that can be true at a moment of time, though he does not use this characteristic 
in quite the same way that Katz does. 
33 Although this sentence does have an interpretation as a claim about an in-progress 
event involving an indefinite group of pool sharks, it cannot be interpreted as a generic 
statement about the kind picked out by the bare plural pool sharks. 
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details of his argumentation here; I will therefore outline his explanation for only one of 
these tests, the properties of when-clauses (6)d.34 
 The explanation for the interpretation of when-clauses rests on the interpretation 
of temporal relations in discourse (related to test (6)c), for which Katz (1995) follows the 
analysis of Dowty (1986).  Katz assumes, following Dowty, that the default assumption 
in interpreting a sequence of sentences is that the eventualities or situations that they 
express abut each other sequentially, as well – that they do not overlap.35  Thus, in a 
sequence of sentences as in (10), the default interpretation is that John’s waking up 
preceded his shower, and his shower preceded his making breakfast and eating it. 
(10) John got up at 9am.  He took a long shower.  He made himself a big breakfast and 
ate it. 
Where the eventualities or situations necessarily occupy a non-momentary interval of 
time, this assumption of non-overlapping sequence results in moving the narrative time 
forward – in (10), by the length of time it takes John to shower, or the length of time it 
takes to make breakfast. 
 Where the events expressed by the main clause and the when-clause are not in a 
logical part-of relationship, the events appear to receive a similar non-overlapping, 
sequential interpretation, as in (11). 
(11) Bill jumped back when the vase shattered. 
Katz builds this interpretation into the representation for the when relation between 
                                                 
34 This diagnostic was particularly helpful in determining stativity in Pima. 
35 Katz (1995) does, however, discuss quite interesting examples where this non-overlap 
of eventualities is violated. 
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clauses φ and ψ, paraphrased in (12).36 
(12) [ψ when φ] is true if and only if there are intervals of time r' and r'' such that φ is 
true at r', ψ is true at r'', and r' abuts r'' (where abuts means that r' and r'' do not 
overlap, that r' is linearly before r'', and where no intervals exist between r' and 
r'').                (adapted from Katz 1995:72-73) 
The representation in (12) encodes the fact that the eventuality expressed by the main 
clause immediately follows the eventuality expressed by the when-clause. 
 The temporal interpretation of a when-clause when the main clause is stative, 
however, does not appear to fit this representation, however.  In (13), the stative predicate 
in the main clause – John being asleep – is most naturally interpreted to hold at the same 
time as the eventive predicate in the when-clause, and probably somewhat before and 
possibly after it, as well. 
(13) John was asleep when the vase shattered. 
Katz proposes a pragmatic explanation for this phenomenon.  The meaning of (13) as 
predicted by (12) should be that the moment of time r'' at which John is asleep 
immediately follows the interval r' on which the vase shatters.  Even though in Katz’s 
(1995) analysis stative predicates are predicates of single moments of time, our 
knowledge about the world tells us that many predicates are seldom true at just a single 
moment but instead may be true for at least a small interval of time.  The pragmatic 
inference that John was asleep for at least some small interval before and after r'' is what 
is responsible for the sense that John’s sleeping extended both before, and possibly after, 
                                                 
36 Katz (1995) uses a Reichenbachian analysis of tense, where propositions are evaluated 
with respect to the speech time and a reference time.  To avoid the lengthy explanation 
that would be required to use this tense system here, I have rephrased Katz’s 
representation slightly. 
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the shattering of the vase. 
 Since this is a pragmatic inference, we might expect that it would be blocked by 
the right pragmatic factors in some contexts, and this is in fact the case.  Where the event 
introduced in the when-clause is the cause of the state that is expressed by the main 
clause, it would not make sense for that state to hold before the causing event is 
complete; thus, the interpretation in such contexts should be that the temporal extent of 
the stative predicate of the main clause follows the temporal extent of the eventive 
predicate in the when-clause.  This is in fact the temporal interpretation that is given to 
sentences like (14), where John’s fear may be naturally understood as resulting from the 
shattering of the vase (a non-causal interpretation, where John’s fear holds before the 
shattering event, is also possible). 
(14) John was afraid when the vase shattered. 
2.1.4 Why stativity as a temporal property isn’t enough 
 If the ability to hold at a moment of time, rather than an interval, is what is means 
for a predicate to be stative – which is the content of Katz’s analysis, where stativity is 
equivalent to having the Subinterval Property – and if it is this property which is 
associated with the patterns noted in (6), then the patterning together of all temporally 
stative predicates is explained; the ability to be true at a moment of time is a property that 
both aspectually simple predicates (i.e., traditional stative predicates) and aspectually 
derived ones (progressives, perfects, etc.) may possess. 
 For Dowty, however, treating all temporally stative predicates equally is 
inadequate.  In Dowty’s (1979) account of verb meaning, a small number of lexical 
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aspectual operators (abstract elements BECOME, CAUSE, and possibly DO) combine with a 
set of monomorphemic, basic predicates to produce all possible verb meanings.  He 
restricted this set of basic predicates to only those predicates that are stative.  An analysis 
of this type, however, requires some restriction on the type of meanings that these basic 
stative predicates can have, since if a basic predicate can have any meaning that a 
complex predicate can have (or even worse, any conceivable meaning at all), this 
decompositional system is not restrictive; it does not give any substantive restrictions on 
the set of possible verb meanings.  If temporal stativity as defined here (i.e., being true at 
a moment of time) is all that is required to be one of these basic predicates, however, then 
the meanings that are associated with generic, perfect, and progressive forms of 
predicates should have a status equivalent with traditional stative verbs and adjectives.  
Dowty’s system would then predict that monomorphemic stative predicates should be 
able to have the meanings that are associated with generic, perfect, and progressive 
predicates; these predicates should then be available as the basis for more complex verb 
meanings constructed with BECOME, CAUSE, and DO. 
 Problematically, this situation does not seem to be the case.  Dowty notes that 
meanings equivalent to having grammatical aspectual operators like the perfect and 
progressive take scope within lexical aspectual operators like BECOME and CAUSE are not 
observed for single verbs.  An example of such a hypothetically impossible verb meaning 
(but one which may be expressed periphrastically) is something like x causes y to have 
become blue; this would be represented in Dowty’s representational system by 
[[DO(x)]CAUSE[BECOME[P(y)]] (where P(y) is a temporally stative basic predicate with a 
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meaning that would normally be associated with the perfect of a change of state); this 
states informally (and without making reference to tense in the matrix “clause”) that the 
individual that is represented by the variable x causes it to become the case that P is true 
of the individual that is represented by the variable y, where P is true of y at a time t if 
and only if at some time t' before t, the individual denoted by y was blue, and at some 
time t'' before t', the individual denoted by y was not blue. 
 There needs to be some way to distinguish aspectually simple stative predicates 
like simply blue from the aspectually complex ones like have become blue by some 
property of their meaning, since it is aspectually simple statives, not aspectually complex 
ones, which form the basis for possible meanings of verbs.  Distinguishing between these 
two types of statives is necessary in order to tighten the restrictions on what type of 
meaning can correspond to a (stative) basic predicate in a system like Dowty’s.  Although 
it is not as clear in the informal paraphrase of P given in the preceding paragraph, one 
thing which distinguishes a predicate like have become blue from simply blue is that the 
former makes reference to an event – an event of change of state – while the latter refers 
simply to a state.  In a neo-Davidsonian analysis, the former meaning should only be 
representable by something which has an eventuality argument ranging over events, 
while the latter should have only an eventuality argument ranging over states.  That is, 
there should be independent restrictions (imposed, perhaps, by whatever cognitive system 
deals with eventualities) on what meanings can be associated with the cognitive objects 
known as states, such that have become blue is not a meaning which can be associated 
with a simple predicate whose eventuality argument ranges over states.  If this is what 
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distinguishes have become blue from blue such that the former is impossible as a basic 
predicate, then we may say that it is predicates of states, rather than simply any 
temporally stative predicate, which comprise the set of basic predicates. 
 Two options are in principle available to implement this in an analysis of possible 
and impossible word meanings applied to a particular language.  First, it might be 
possible to explicitly state the restrictions on what sort of meanings can correspond to 
states, and then check the meaning of each hypothesized basic predicate to determine if it 
meets those definitional criteria.  Formulating these criteria might be rather difficult 
however; an alternative would be to find an empirical or operational test which is 
sensitive to the presence of an event argument.  This test could then be performed on a 
hypothetical basic predicate, and if an event argument is detected, we can conclude that 
the hypothetical basic predicate is not basic, after all. 
2.1.4.1 Restricting the type of situations that states may denote 
 Dowty (1979) acknowledges the need for a restriction on the types of meanings 
that basic predicates may have, and also acknowledges that these restrictions are quite 
difficult to formulate.  Is being temporally stative sufficient for a predicate to have a 
single eventuality argument that ranges over states?  Obviously not, since otherwise the 
meaning of have become blue should be able to exist as the basis for more complex verb 
meanings.  Dowty sketches the outlines of this kind of definitional approach, but he 
himself describes this attempt to delimit what can and cannot be a stative predicate for 
the purposes of decomposition as merely “tentative and programmatic” (Dowty 
1979:126).  The idea behind it, however, rests on the fact that most stative predicates 
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involve physical properties of location, size, weight, texture, color, composition, and so 
on.  By adding specifications for these properties to the model-theoretic semantics, for 
example, it becomes possible to distinguish predicate types in terms of the way they 
make reference to these specifications.  He posits a multi-dimensional logical space, with 
each dimension corresponding to a property from the list above.  The model would also 
include a function that takes as arguments an individual and an index, and returns the 
location occupied by that individual at that index on each of the property dimensions.  
The set of stative basic predicates could then be defined as below: 
(15) “...for each stative [basic] predicate there is a region of logical space such that at 
each index, an individual is in the extension of that predicate at the index if and 
only if the individual is assigned to a point within that region of space.” (Dowty 
1979:127) 
Since, as formulated in (15), the definition of a stative predicate cannot vary with the 
index (and so cannot vary with time), the fact that stative predicates can hold at a single 
moment of time follows.  The meaning of heavy depends only on the position of an 
individual on the scale of weight, even if the precise region of the scale which qualifies as 
heavy also depends on a contextual variable.37  A predicate which requires making 
reference to values on these scales at multiple times, however, like have become blue, 
does not fit this definition for what can be a basic stative predicate.  Imaginary predicates 
like Goodman’s (1955) grue are also ruled out; grue is an imaginary color term to 
describe an object that is green up to a certain time, and blue after that time.  It is 
                                                 
37 The introduction of a contextual variable would require the definition of (15) to be 
reworded as “For each stative predicate P, for each value of a contextual variable C, there 
is a region of logical space…”, so that once the predicate and the context have been fixed, 
the region of space that is relevant does not vary with temporal changes in the index. 
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impossible to formulate such a meaning as a basic predicate in this kind of model. 
 This model-theoretic approach works well for certain predicates, but not for 
others.  Determining the structure of the scale for adjectives like beautiful and pleasant, 
as well as the relevant region of the scale in which an individual must lie for the predicate 
to be true, seems to be a non-trivial task.  It would also seem somewhat contrived to posit 
a scale with only two values for non-gradable adjectives like alive and free.  Moreover, 
stative verbs like love, know, resemble (and other verbs that have stative as well as non-
stative interpretations like prove, show, and see) do not seem amenable to this kind of 
treatment in terms of logical space at all.  Dowty suggests that a way to address this issue 
may have something to do with Carlson’s (1977) observation that the set of predicates for 
which physical criteria are suitable, whether stative or not, are stage-level, while the set 
of predicates for which physical criteria are inappropriate are individual level, though he 
does not present a clear solution.38 
2.1.4.2 Finding an operational distinction for basic predicates 
 Rather than seek a definitional solution to the question of what may and may not 
be a basic predicate (i.e., a predicate of states), there is at least one diagnostic which is 
sensitive to the presence of an eventive Davidsonian argument and which can therefore 
distinguish aspectually complex stative predicates (i.e., those built from predicates of 
events) from those which are not. 
                                                 
38 In fact, it is not clear that this claim which Dowty attributes to Carlson is in fact 
correct.  Adjectives like tall and blonde are easily definable in terms of measurable 
criteria, yet when referring to people they are most naturally individual level.  Other 
adjectives like available are stage level, yet not amenable to a definition in terms of 
physical criteria. 
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(16) Test which distinguishes predicates of events from other predicates: 
a. Only events (or predicates that take them) can be modified by rate adverbials 
like quickly or slowly (Kenny 1963, Katz 2003)39 
Superficially, it appears that adverbs like quickly and slowly may occur with predicates 
which are temporally stative, but not with aspectually simple statives.  Consider the 
examples below (using examples comparable to (9)). 
(17) Generic:       9 Pool sharks smoke quickly. 
 Perfect:       9 The picture has slowly faded. 
 Progressive:      9 The roof is slowly collapsing. 
 Traditional stative (verb): * The student knew the answer quickly. 
 Traditional stative (adj):  * The child was tired quickly. 
 The results of this test must be interpreted with caution, however, since adverbs 
are known to receive different interpretations based on their linear location in a sentence, 
presumably corresponding to their precise syntactic hierarchical position (see, for 
example, Cinque 1999).  The claim here is not that quickly or slowly may be predicated of 
a perfect, progressive, or generic/habitual directly, but that an eventive subcomponent of 
these predicates allows these adverbs; the rate adverbial would then be within the scope 
of the perfect, progressive, or generic/habitual.  In fact, changing the position of the 
adverbs in these sentences to a position which might bring the perfect, progressive, or 
generic/habitual into the scope of the adverbial does change their acceptability; strangely, 
doing so appears to improve the stative sentences, as well. 
                                                 
39 Kenny claims that this property holds only of activity verbs, though this appears not to 
be quite true; uses of such adverbs with achievements are possible, but the adverbs are 
typically given a different interpretation than they receive with activity or 
accomplishment predicates: John quickly discovered the problem has the meaning “It 
quickly came about that John discovered the problem”, rather than “John’s discovery of 
the problem occurred at a rapid rate”.  This may be related to the phenomenon, observed 
by Dowty (1979) in his discussion of types of future sentences, that the planning stages of 
an event sometimes appear to constitute a part of that event. 
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(18) Generic:       * Pool sharks quickly smoke. 
 Perfect:       * The picture slowly has faded. 
 Progressive:      * The roof slowly is collapsing. 
 Traditional stative (verb): 9 The student quickly knew the answer. 
 Traditional stative (adj):   9 The child quickly was tired. 
Changing the scope of the rate adverbial would seem to place the progressive, perfect, 
and generic/habitual sentences back on par with the traditional statives in (17), except 
that the acceptability of the traditional statives has also reversed.  Their acceptability in 
(18), however, appears to be associated with a non-stative interpretation.  As Vendler 
noted, quite a few predicates are consistent with multiple time schemata, and in their use 
in (18), the traditionally stative predicates have only an inchoative meaning: these two 
sentences may be paraphrased as “the student came to know the answer in a short period 
of time” and “the child became tired in a short period of time”.  Inchoatives or inceptives 
are not themselves stative, and within a Davidsonian framework, such forms are typically 
analyzed as including an eventuality argument ranging over events, thus accounting for 
the acceptability with a rate adverbial.40  The acceptability of quickly and slowly with a 
certain predicate is therefore an indication of an event argument somewhere within that 
predicate, and the scope of the rate adverbial should indicate the constituent within which 
that event argument is open for modification; the unacceptability of a rate adverbial with 
a certain scope indicates the lack of an event argument which is open for modification.  
By this diagnostic, even those traditionally stative predicates which pattern like non-
statives by some tests, such as those predicate adjectives and nouns like noisy and a hero 
                                                 
40 Or, within a neo-Davidsonian framework such as that found in Parsons (1990), which 
is more directly comparable to Dowty’s (1979) analysis, they would involve both the 
original stative predicate whose eventuality argument ranges over states, as well as a 
BECOME predicate which introduces an eventuality argument ranging over events. 
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that may occur in the progressive and in pseudoclefts with do, are seen to lack an 
eventuality argument ranging over events (excluding a non-stative inchoative or inceptive 
interpretation): *John {was quickly/quickly was} noisy, *John {was quickly/quickly was} 
a hero. 
2.1.4.3 Restricting the type of situations that states may denote: another try 
 Showing that a predicate is temporally stative, as determined by the diagnostics in 
(6), and that it does not involve an eventuality argument ranging over events, as 
determined by the rate adverbial diagnostic in (16), is not the same as showing that that 
predicate does have an eventuality argument ranging over states.  Katz in fact concludes 
that there are no predicates of states, and that all stative predicates that are not derived 
from predicates of events are merely predicates of moments of time; their ability to be 
predicated of non-momentary intervals is a result, he says, of the Subinterval Property.  
Proving that all predicates do have an eventuality argument has been the goal of works 
like Parsons (1990), Landman (2000), and Mittwoch (2003), and the case of statives that 
are not derived from predicates of events will be discussed in the following section.  
What is worth considering at this point, however, is what it is that enables predicates of 
events to nevertheless be able to take a truth value at a single moment of time; this may 
help to refine the definitional approach to delimiting the meanings of aspectually simple 
stative predicates, that is, those that are stative because they are predicates of states, and 
can therefore form the basis for building verb meanings. 
 Those temporally stative predicates which contained within them an eventuality 
argument ranging over events proper, such as perfects, generics, and progressives, also 
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required some temporal, aspectual, or modal operator involving reference to other events, 
points in time, or possible worlds, in order to make them true at moments of time, rather 
than over intervals.  Aspectually simple stative predicates, on the other hand, can be 
assigned a truth value at a single moment of time and require for their evaluation only 
information about that moment, not information about other moments or intervals.  This 
seems to fit with Dowty’s programmatic suggestion for delimiting the set of predicates 
which can form the basis for his decomposition, that they not involve reference to times 
or intervals of time, but to properties independent of time.  The following definition 
therefore seems hold of aspectually simple stative predicates, i.e., predicates of states: 
(19) A predicate of states is one that has the Subinterval Property down to moments of 
time and whose truth value can be determined without any information from any 
time besides the moment of evaluation 
Having the Subinterval Property down to moments of time ensures that predicates of 
states are temporally stative in the sense of the diagnostics in (6), and the restriction to 
the moment of evaluation excludes any predicate which involves reference to an event 
proper.  For instance, the meaning of the progressive as formulated by Dowty (given in 
(7)) would not by this definition be a possible meaning for a predicate of states since it 
requires knowledge about multiple moments of time.  The evaluation of the progressive 
at interval I, which in the present tense is the moment of utterance, requires knowledge of 
the truth of the predicate at interval I', which is necessarily a larger interval than I, and 
therefore includes moments of time apart from the moment that is included within the 
interval I. 
 Although the definition in (19) provides a basis for delimiting the kinds of 
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meanings that can serve as building blocks of more complex verb meanings, it does not 
fully answer the question brought up earlier of whether all temporally stative predicates 
that are not based on predicates of events are actually based on predicates of states.  One 
question raised by this definition is the status of individual level predicates: all individual 
level predicates, including all of the traditionally stative verbs in English, in addition to 
habituals and generics, pattern like statives with regard to the tests in (6), but since an 
individual exists over an interval of time, not a single moment (i.e., a stage of an 
individual occupies a single moment, while the individual itself exists over an interval), 
we would expect predicates of individuals to be assigned truth values over intervals of 
time.  Can an individual level predicate have an eventuality argument that ranges over 
states, given this restriction on what can be a predicate of a state?  The definition in (19) 
also excludes positional verbs like sit, stand, and lie, which have a non-active sense on 
which they do not have the Subinterval property, as indicated by their acceptability in the 
progressive (as in 9The hat rack was standing next to the door when John left).  The 
following section will therefore review a number of proposals regarding precisely which 
stative predicates have an eventuality argument, and what the nature of that argument is. 
2.2 Stative predicates and predicates of states 
 Subclasses of temporally stative predicates certainly need not behave identically 
with regard to diagnostics which are not sensitive to the Subinterval Property.  This has 
already been shown with regard to the rate adverbial diagnostic of (16), which was taken 
to indicate the presence or absence of an eventuality argument ranging over events 
proper.  Other differences in behavior of classes of stative predicates have similarly been 
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attributed to different types of eventualities that those predicates take as arguments, or 
even the absence of an eventuality argument of any kind. 
 For instance, Bach (1986) cites L. Carlson (1981) as classifying stative 
eventualities into DYNAMIC states (Bach’s examples are the positional senses of sit, stand, 
and lie) and STATIC states (his examples are be drunk, be in New York, own x, love x, and 
resemble x).  This appears to correspond to Dowty’s (1979) distinction between interval 
stative predicates (mainly positional verbs) and momentary stative predicates, which he 
notes include habituals from all other aspectual classes (similar to the position of Katz 
1995).  Dowty’s syntactic test for interval predicates is the ability to occur in the 
progressive; of those predicates that do not involve predication over events,41 only 
interval stative predicates (denoting dynamic states) may occur in the progressive, as in 
The book is sitting on the table.  No other differences are proposed by Bach or Dowty to 
correlate with this sortal difference in denotation, however.42 
                                                 
41 Dowty, of course, does not take a Davidsonian approach, and so makes no reference to 
predication over events.  His own classification of such predicates as statives is based on 
their behavior with respect to other diagnostics discussed in section 2.1, as well as 
potentially his own intuitions, though the rate adverbial diagnostic provides an even 
simpler way to classify all such verbs as stative-like in some sense. 
42 Dowty also cross-classifies these two classes of states as non-agentive or agentive (as 
he does for the other three Vendlerian classes), as evidenced by their ability to occur in 
imperatives, with adverbials like deliberately, and several other tests from (4), resulting 
in four classes of stative predicates (1979:184).  His semantic representation of these four 
classes of stative predicates does not reflect this subclassification directly, however; non-
stative predicates are distinguished from statives by including one or both of the 
operators DO or BECOME, but the subcategories within stative predicates cannot be easily 
read from the elements of the semantic representation.  Whether a predicate may hold at a 
momentary interval or not, that is, whether it denotes a static or dynamic state, is for 
Dowty an empirical semantic fact for each predicate (though, as discussed earlier, there 
are generalizations concerning which predicates require an interval), as is whether the 
subject is agentive or not. 
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 Another proposal relevant to the question of the type of eventuality argument 
taken by statives is that of Kratzer (1995), who proposes a difference of type (among 
other differences) between stage level predicates and individual level predicates: namely, 
she proposes that only stage level predicates have a Davidsonian eventuality argument, 
and that the nominal arguments of individual level predicates are their only arguments.  
While this is first of all a claim about the stage level/individual level distinction, it is 
relevant for issues of stativity since all individual level predicates pattern as statives by 
the diagnostics in (6).  In fact, all of the predicates in English that are categorically verbs 
and that Dowty classifies as momentary statives – the set which includes verbs like know, 
love, and hate, as well as own and resemble – are individual level.  To state this another 
way, the only momentary stative predicates that are stage level in English are adjectives 
and other copular constructions.43 
 Kratzer’s account appears to explain the temporal properties of individual level 
predicates, and through a syntactic reflection of this semantic property, seems to explain 
other syntactic facts observed by Diesing (1988, 1990) in German, as well.  Jäger (1999), 
however, points out in response to this that the adverbial modification facts that are a 
strong motivation for a Davidsonian analysis of stage level eventive verbs can also be 
observed with individual level predicates, both verbal and non-verbal, and concludes that 
                                                 
43 This observation is made by Dowty (1979:179), though what is meant by stage level 
here cannot simply be the same as transitoriness, since there appear to be verbs that can 
be true at a moment (as evidenced by their acceptability in the simple present) and yet 
pattern like stage level predicates in that they are acceptable with temporal modifiers: My 
leg hurts right now, but the pain will probably go away by this afternoon; The garbage 
disposal stinks right now, and it stank for hours last night before I rinsed it out, too.  In 
some but not all such cases, the progressive sounds at least marginally acceptable. 
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although they may not have the same type of eventuality argument as stage level 
eventualities, individual level predicates nevertheless have an eventuality argument of 
some kind.  An example is given below. 
(20) a. John was a Catholic with great passion in his youth. 
 b. John was a Catholic with great passion. 
 c. John was a Catholic in his youth. 
 d. John was a Catholic.           (Jäger 1999: (50)) 
This behavior displayed by the sentences in (20), referred to as a “diamond” entailment 
pattern, is one that is often taken as a strong argument for a Davidsonian analysis of 
eventive sentences.  We can note that sentence (20)a entails sentences (20)b, c, and d, 
that sentence (20)b entails (20)d, and that (20)c entails (20)d.  The conjunction of 
sentences (20)b and (20)c, however, is not equivalent to (20)a, since (barring possible 
questions of theology) John may potentially be a Catholic at separate intervals of time – 
he may be a lukewarm Catholic in his youth, fall away, and become a passionate Catholic 
at a later age.  This result is predicted if the semantic representation of the sentences in 
(20) is something like what is shown in (21) (the predicates shown are intended to be 
schematic; what is important is their relationship to each other between sentences). 
(21) a. ∃s [ be-a-Catholic'(s)(John) ∧ with-great-passion'(s) ∧ in-youth'(s)(John) ] 
 b. ∃s [ be-a-Catholic'(s)(John) ∧ with-great-passion'(s) ] 
 c. ∃s [ be-a-Catholic'(s)(John) ∧ in-youth'(s)(John) ] 
 d. ∃s [ be-a-Catholic'(s)(John) ] 
The conjunction of the representations in (21)b and (21)c would include two instances of 
existential quantification over states, each with a distinct scope; this differs from the 
representation in (21)a, where both modifiers are predicated of the same state variable 
within the same scope of quantification.  Thus, while two separate states occupying 
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distinct temporal intervals may satisfy the conjunction of (21)b and (21)c, only a single 
state occupying a single interval of time can satisfy (21)a.  Jäger notes that the eventuality 
argument for non-verbal predicates like this also cannot simply be provided by the 
copula, since the adverbial behavior characteristic of an eventuality argument can be 
observed, he argues, even in constructions that do not require a copula (as in 9A Catholic 
with great passion in his youth, John later became a Protestant.). 
 Maienborn, in a number of recent papers (2004a, 2004b, among others), also 
examines differences among statives, focusing on issues related to the copula, and 
concludes that while all verbal and copular predicates have some kind of extra argument, 
there are at least three types of such arguments, as evidenced by three patterns of 
behavior of predicates with regard to eventuality-related tests.  She draws a distinction 
between events proper, DAVIDSONIAN STATES (or D-states), and KIMIAN STATES (or K-
states), arguing that while events and D-states have all the properties traditionally 
attributed to eventualities in the Davidsonian tradition, K-states are abstract objects 
(introduced by the copula in the case of non-verbal predicates, though Jäger’s evidence 
may show differently) which are only available for cognitive processes and have only a 
temporal location. 
 Maienborn takes the consensus view concerning eventualities to be that they have 
certain ontological properties: they are concrete objects in the real world, which means 
that they are perceptible, they have a location in space and time, and they can vary in 
their realization.  Maienborn argues that predicates that are traditionally considered to be 
eventive, presumably whether or not they are aspectually modified so as to have stative 
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temporal properties (i.e., the perfects, progressives, and habituals/generics of the previous 
section), can be shown to take events proper as arguments; they are grammatical with rate 
adverbials (the diagnostic in (16)), and they may also occur as the subject of happen, as 
in the sentence below.44 
(22) a. 9 The car made loud noises.  This happened while it was accelerating. 
Dowty’s class of interval statives fail these specifically-eventive tests, however; they may 
not occur with rate adverbials, and they may not occur as the subject of happen.  Other 
statives, such as copular constructions, also fail this test. 
(22) b. * John stood at the window. This happened while... (stood = interval stative) 
 c. * The student was busy.  This happened while...  (be busy = stage-level AP) 
 In many other ways, however, interval statives behave just like predicates of 
events are expected to behave, based on the ontological properties Maienborn assumes 
for eventualities.  Predicates of events proper and interval statives may both occur as the 
non-finite complement of a perception verb, for instance, which is predicted if their 
arguments are observable, concrete objects.  Copular predicates and momentary stative 
verbs are not acceptable in this context, which Maienborn takes to indicate that their 
referent is not a concrete, observable object like other eventualities. 
(23) a. 9I saw the book spin on the table.       eventive 
 b. 9I saw the book lie on the table.       interval stative 
 c. * I saw the book be on the table.       copular (momentary) stative 
                    (cf. Maienborn 2004b: (14)) 
As another example, eventive predicates and interval statives allow an eventive reading 
                                                 
44 Examples of the second test typically involve anaphoric binding of this in a sentence 
beginning with This happened while....  For further discussion, see Maienborn (2004b:8). 
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of the modifiers ein bisschen or a little bit, while copular statives, she claims, do not.45 
(24) a. Max ran a little bit yesterday.      9event reading (also 9degree reading) 
 b. Max sat in the garden a little bit.   9event reading (also ?degree reading) 
 c. Max was in the garden a little bit.      *event reading (9degree reading only) 
Some verbs, like run in (24)a, allow a degree interpretation with an adverbial like a little 
bit, meaning that the distance that was run was not great.  All eventive verbs and interval 
statives, however, also allow an eventive reading of a little bit, on which the event (of 
running or sitting) goes on for a period that is not great.  Copular predicates and all other 
momentary statives allow only a degree reading of such modifiers (on which, for 
example, Max might be on the edge of the garden, and only a little bit of him actually 
occupies space within the garden).46  Interval statives, Maienborn says, therefore involve 
predication over an eventuality which in many ways resembles the eventuality that is 
present in eventive sentences, which she refers to as a D(avidsonian)-state.  Copular 
predicates and all other momentary stative verbs, she says, do not take the same kind of 
eventuality argument. 
 Maienborn does not conclude that momentary statives lack any kind of hidden 
argument, however.  She notes that eventive verbs, interval statives, and verbal and 
copular momentary statives all support temporal modification, as in (25). 
(25) a. The book spun on the table {yesterday/twice/for one minute}. eventive verb 
 b. The book lay on the table {yesterday/twice/for one minute}. interval stative 
 c. The book was on the table {yesterday/twice/for one minute}. copular stative 
                                                 
45 Maienborn’s arguments are based on German sentences; they have been replaced by 
English sentences for exposition here.  The judgments, however, are retained from the 
German sentences. 
46 Maienborn notes that such predicates are all acceptable with the modifier for a little bit, 
which she argues should be given a distinct analysis as merely a time-span adverbial. 
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Furthermore, the denotations of momentary statives are available for processes of 
cognition, as demonstrated by their support of a kind of anaphora with this, as in (26).47 
(26) a. Trash lay all over the room.  This lasted for days until the janitor cleaned it up. 
 b. Carol is angry, but this will soon be over. 
She therefore proposes that momentary statives take a “hidden” argument that ranges 
over entities that are similar to but ontologically distinct from eventualities (events and 
D-states), which she terms K(imian)-states.48 
 Kimian states are named for Jaegwon Kim, who in a number of papers (1969, 
1976) proposed an alternative to Davidson’s conception of events according to which 
events are merely “temporally-bound property exemplifications” (Maienborn 2004b:19).  
Maienborn synthesizes this concept with work by Asher (1993, 2000), who holds that 
abstract objects are mentally-constructed entities, to result in the concept of a Kimian 
state: K-states are “abstract objects [i.e., cognitive objects – EJ] for the exemplification of 
a property P at a holder x and a time t” (Maienborn 2004b:20).  K-states have different 
properties from D-states and events proper because they are distinct types of entities; 
because they are abstract mentally-constructed objects, they cannot be perceived and 
have no location in space, though they are accessible to cognition (recall the anaphora 
facts) and they may hold over an interval of time. 
 Most important for the purposes here, however, her conclusion that all clausal 
predicates have one of these three types of additional argument – and although 
                                                 
47 Again, Maienborn’s judgments are given only for German sentences: 9Carol ist 
wütend.  Das wird bald vorbei sein.  9Der Schlüssel war weg und das seit dem 
Wochenende. 
48 Predicates which take K-states as arguments include all copular constructions as well 
as momentary stative verbs, thus K-states coincide with Bach’s set of static states. 
 57
Maienborn herself does not extend this proposal to non-copular nouns, adjectives, and 
prepositions, if Jäger’s arguments regarding non-copular contexts are correct (see the 
discussion following (21)), this additional argument position may be a property of the 
lexical vocabulary as a whole, not just verbs and the copula.  Even without accepting all 
the details of her analysis, however, it seems safe to treat predicates in general as 
containing an eventuality (or eventuality-like) argument, and to assume that the variation 
within stative predicates is due to properties of this argument. 
2.3 Summary: the uses of the term “stative” 
 This chapter has shown that the term “stative” has been used even within modern 
linguistics in a number of ways, with a number of specific meanings.  As used by Lakoff 
(1966), STATIVE was one value of a syntactic feature which cross-classified both 
adjectives and verbs; the value of this feature for a given adjective or verb was to be 
inferred from the acceptability of the word in a number of syntactic constructions, and 
although most adjectives and verbs which were STATIVE shared the semantic property of 
inactivity (which was left undefined), this semantic property was not a sufficient 
condition for the grammatical feature value STATIVE.  In the tradition of Aristotle, Ryle, 
Kenny, Vendler, and formalized by Dowty, a stative predicate was one which employed 
the time schema of a state – that is, a predicate which was able to be true at a non-specific 
moment of time, or over an interval of such moments; this was labeled within this chapter 
as temporal stativity.  As has become clear, quite a few of the originally proposed tests 
are actually sensitive not to the ability to be true at a moment, but to properties which 
may be closely related to this, such as agency (volitionality or controllability), durativity, 
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or telicity.  Moreover, although a number of tests do distinguish predicates which can be 
true at a moment, certain such predicates – generics or habituals, progressives, and 
perfects – may still require information beyond that moment in order to determine their 
truth or falsity.  Generally, these predicates that are temporally stative yet require 
information about other moments can be distinguished from what are traditionally 
thought of as stative predicates – positional verbs, copular constructions, and individual 
level verbs – by the presence of an event argument somewhere within their meaning. 
 The last section addressed the question of whether these temporally stative 
predicates that did not include an event argument within their meaning nevertheless 
included a hidden temporal argument of some kind.  Although there is as yet no 
consensus on the precise solution, Maienborn’s arguments appear to show that at least all 
sentential predicates (verbs and copular constructions) include an argument position 
which can be used to specify temporal extent, and other authors (like Jäger) have 
concluded that this argument position is also available with the same predicates outside 
of the copular construction.  In the following chapters, I will therefore assume that all 
predicates have some kind of hidden argument, with the caveat that not all such 
arguments may be created equal. 
 A related point is that although a number of different types of predicates involve 
no change at the moment of evaluation, not all such predicates appear to be available as 
bases for building up complex word meanings; that is, temporally stative predicates come 
in two types: predicates with an eventuality argument ranging over states and predicates 
which may have an eventuality argument which ranges over events but which (due to 
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other temporal operators) may have truth assigned at a moment, rather than over an 
interval.  The set of predicates of states is taken to be the hypothetical basis, according to 
a theory like Dowty’s (1979), for building more complex word meanings.  It was 
concluded that the following definition (repeated from (19)) holds of predicates of states, 
and therefore restricts the types of situations (in terms of the real world or a cognitive 
model of it) that states could correspond to: 
(19) A predicate of states is one that has the Subinterval Property down to moments of 
time and whose truth value can be determined without any information from any 
time besides the moment of evaluation 
This definition seems to agree with intuitions regarding what makes a stative predicate 
stative, and there seem to be readily available tests for the first clause (such as occurrence 
in the simple present tense).  It is not clear, however, how an arbitrary predicate might be 
evaluated regarding the second clause without either reflecting on intuitions about the 
meaning of the predicate or examining a semantic representation for relations between 
multiple times.  Although examining the semantic representation of a complex predicate 
is easily done by the linguist when such a representation is available, nothing so far 
formally prohibits a predicate ranging over states from including reference to some other 
time (though such predicates are felt not to exist, such as the famous example of grue as 
an impossible color term meaning ‘green up to a certain time, and blue thereafter’). 
 The discussion so far has established that it is possible to derive a predicate which 
is temporally stative from one that denotes an event; perfects, progressives, and habituals 
and generics are all examples of this.  Stative predicates that are derived from events are 
expected to retain the semantic properties that are associated with those events, but as we 
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will see in the following chapters, this is not always the case. 
 For instance, we have seen that lack of agency (possibly also realized as lack of 
volition or lack of control) is a property frequently associated with temporally stative 
predicates that are also predicates of states.  This correlation is so salient that the 
Vendlerian tradition initially believed that a number of tests which are now known to be 
sensitive to lack of agency instead indicated stativity.  Currently there is no formal 
explanation for this tendency, nor for why it should be merely a tendency and not an 
absolute.  In the following chapters, however, we will see that in a number of languages, 
there are morphemes which derive stative predicates from eventive ones, and in many 
cases these stative predicates lack the agentive component of meaning that at least 
appears to be part of the meaning of their morphological base. 
 While this might seem to fit with the general co-occurrence of stativity and lack 
of agency, it appears to involve non-compositional semantic derivation, and also runs 
against the sense of a slightly different cross-linguistic generalization.  A number of 
authors (for example, Koontz-Garboden and Levin 2004, who refer back to Dixon 1982 
and other work) note that languages in general tend to lexicalize different kinds of states 
in different ways.  States that may be considered property concepts – “states related to 
speed, age, dimension, value, etc., and which presuppose no change” (Koontz-Garboden 
and Levin 2004:2) – are most often expressed in languages by morphologically simple 
expressions; those states which might be thought of as resulting from some other process 
or change are most often expressed in languages by morphologically complex 
expressions, these typically being derived from verbs denoting a change of state.  In 
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chapter four, I will describe two resultative constructions in Pima that derive temporally 
stative predicates from eventive ones – which by this generalization should presuppose a 
change of state; nevertheless, one class of such forms at the very least presuppose no 
agency, and a subclass will be seen to presuppose no change of state, as well.  The 
following chapter will therefore evaluate two different published analyses of resultatives 
and derived statives with these properties. 
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3. How to make a stative: Resultatives in Chichewa and German 
 Resultatives in the broad sense (i.e., including both resultatives proper as well as 
derived statives) appear to be relatively common cross-linguistically; that is, in many 
languages there exist verb paradigms in which a verb form expressing an event of a 
certain type contrasts with a verb or verbal derivative that expresses the condition which 
results from an event of that type, though for some verbs in some languages, the 
condition expressed by the resultative need not result from an event of that type (in this 
case, the resultative is more precisely a derived stative).  The typological survey of 
resultatives in Nedjalkov (1988) includes papers on 23 languages of Eurasia, Africa, and 
the Pacific, and though the details within each language vary, they all fit this general 
schema.49  The resultatives themselves – the verbs or deverbal expressions that express a 
condition or state – may be descriptively referred to as “stative”, and in fact a number of 
the papers in Nedjalkov (1988) refer to all such resultative forms as denoting or 
expressing a state, though as we have seen in the previous chapter, it is important to be 
clear about what “stativity” means as applied to such forms, and whether they have 
stative temporal properties or are in fact predicates of states, as this term is used here. 
 One morphological opposition of this type which has been the focus of a large 
body of work is the adjectival passive in English, from an early stage of generative 
linguistic theory through the present (Siegel 1973; Wasow 1977; Lieber 1980; Bresnan 
1982; Marantz 1984; Levin and Rappaport 1986; Dubinsky and Simango 1996; Kratzer 
                                                 
49 The under-representation of certain areas or language families from this survey may 
reflect the political and geographic limitations of the authors more than any differences in 
the occurrence of resultatives, especially since the three languages that will be examined 
in this dissertation and that have similar oppositions are all from the Americas. 
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2000; Emonds 2002; Embick 2003, 2004; among others).  While I will not attempt to 
review all of the literature which focuses on the English adjectival passive, this 
opposition will be referred to indirectly; this chapter will primarily examine the analyses 
of similar oppositions in other languages which have themselves been compared to the 
English adjectival passive: the stative suffix in Chichewa, a Bantu language, and the 
Zustandpassiv or state passive in German, which understandably bears a close historical 
relationship to the English adjectival passive.  The discussion here will focus on those 
aspects of these analyses which will be of particular interest for Pima, namely, the status 
of agentive subjects (typically external arguments, or arguments which are syntactically 
external to the verb phrase) in the resultative and base forms, the nature and direction of 
the derivational relationship between the eventive and stative forms, and the apparent 
changes in components of meaning (in particular, the requirement that the condition 
expressed by a resultative is a result of some event, a requirement which is not present 
with derived statives). 
3.1 The Chichewa stative suffix 
 Chichewa (also referred to as Chewa, Nyanja, or Chinyanja) is a Bantu language 
spoken primarily in Malawi and other areas of southern Africa.50  This language, like 
Bantu languages in general, has a passive morpheme, which reduces the number of 
syntactic arguments of a verb by eliminating the argument that was the subject of the 
verb, though the demoted subject to may be specified in a PP adjunct, as seen below. 
                                                 
50 Ethnologue and ISO/DIS 639-3 language code: nya.  The data on Chichewa which is 
referred to here comes from Mchombo (1993) and Dubinsky and Simango (1996). 
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(27) a. Naphiri  a-na-tsuka           mbale 
  Naphiri  AGR-PAST-wash   plates 
  Naphiri washed the plates. 
 b. Mbale  zi-na-tsuk-idwa            (ndi  Naphiri) 
  plates   AGR-PAST-wash-PASS     by  Naphiri 
  The plates were washed (by Naphiri).      (Dubinsky and Simango 1996: (3a)) 
 This language also has a contrasting verbal suffix which has been called the 
STATIVE.51  Like the passive, is associated with a reduction in the arity of the verb: the 
subject of the base verb is not an argument of the stative form.  Unlike the passive, 
however, the subject of the base verb may not be specified in an oblique.  Chichewa 
stative predicates in some ways resemble a derived stative, rather than a resultative: they 
have no entailments about the semantic involvement of an agent.  The event or state 
denoted by the predicate can be spontaneous or brought about by an agent, but a stative 
predicate simply makes no claim about this.  An example like (28) says that this was 
simply the way the plates were at the time. 
(28) Mbale  zi-na-tsuk-ika           (*ndi  Naphiri) 
 plates   AGR-PAST-wash-ST      by  Naphiri 
 The plates were washed (*by Naphiri).      (Dubinsky and Simango 1996: (3b)) 
Dubinsky and Simango analyze this as not just the absence of an agent within the 
meaning of a stative verb, but as the absence of an eventuality which results in that state.  
Where such a foregoing eventuality would seem to be required, as with a verb like wash, 
they suggest that it is instead only pragmatically implicated (1996: fn.19). 
 The passive and the stative suffixes are distinguished by several other properties, 
as well.  While a passivized verb is grammatical with a purpose clause (as in (29)), an 
                                                 
51 The use of this term as a traditional label for a verb form derived with a specific suffix 
should not be confused with the temporal use of this term as laid out in chapter 2.  I shall 
attempt to make clear which of these senses I intend through context. 
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agent-oriented adverb (as in (30)), or an instrument (as in (31)), a stativized verb is not. 
(29) a. Chakudya  chi-na-phik-idwa        kuti  anthu    a-sa-fe            ndi     njala 
  food           AGR-PAST-cook-PASS  that  people  AGR-NEG-die  from  hunger 
  The food was cooked so that people should not die of starvation. (ibid: (4a)) 
 b. * Chakudya  chi-na-phik-ika       kuti  anthu    a-sa-fe            ndi     njala 
     food           AGR-PAST-cook-ST  that  people  AGR-NEG-die  from  hunger 
  The food was cooked so that people should not die of starvation. (ibid: (4b)) 
(30) a. Chitseko  chi-na-tsek-edwa         mwadala. 
  door         AGR-PAST-close-PASS  deliberately 
  The door was closed deliberately.       (ibid: (5a)) 
 b. * Chitseko  chi-na-tsek-eka        mwadala. 
     door         AGR-PAST-close-ST  deliberately 
  The door was closed deliberately.       (ibid: (5a)) 
(31) a. Kalata  i-na-lemb-edwa           (ndi   pensulo). 
  letter    AGR-PAST-write-PASS   with  pencil 
  The letter was written (with a pencil).      (ibid: (7a)) 
 b. * Kalata  i-na-lemb-edwa       ndi   pensulo. 
     letter    AGR-PAST-write-ST  with  pencil 
  The letter was written with a pencil.      (ibid: (7b)) 
Dubinsky and Simango (1996) take this as evidence for the presence of an agent in the 
passive, at least covertly, but not in the stative. 
 Dubinsky and Simango also point out several other types of evidence that quite 
different things are going on with the passive and stative suffixes in Chichewa.  First, 
these two suffixes differ in their selectional restrictions regarding other affixes, and other 
affixes distinguish the passive and stative in terms of their selectional restrictions, as 
well.  While the passive may attach to stems which have been derived by the causative or 
applicative affixes, the stative may not.52  In contrast, the benefactive applicative suffix 
may not attach to passivized stems, though it may freely attach to stems with the stative 
                                                 
52 This is contrary to a claim made by Mchombo (1993) that the stative suffix may attach 
to verbs derived by the causative suffix.  Dubinsky and Simango argue that Mchombo’s 
examples contain fossilized causative affixes, rather than true, synchronic examples of 
the causative affix. 
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suffix. 
 Another difference between the stative and the passive suffixes concerns their 
phonological stability. The stative interacts phonologically with certain stems, while the 
passive, applicative, and causative affixes do not: the combination of stem plus stative 
suffix shows phonological reduction, as in gulul- ‘extract/remove’ + -ika ‘STATIVE’ → 
guluka ‘be removed’ (stative), compared to gulul-idwa → gululidwa ‘be removed’ 
(passive), gulul-itsa → gululitsa ‘make remove’ (causative), and gulul-ira → gululira 
‘remove for’ (applicative). 
 Furthermore, there appear to be differences between the passive and stative in 
terms of semantic stability.  While the semantic result of the passive suffix is always 
predictable, Dubinsky and Simango note that forms produced by the stative suffix are 
more susceptible to semantic drift: the passive of tay ‘throw away’ is the predictable tay-
idwa ‘be thrown away’, but the stative tay-ika has a meaning closer to ‘be lost’. 
 Most critically for the discussion here, Dubinsky and Simango claim that the 
stative affix displays a sensitivity to the lexical aspect of a stem that the passive does not.  
While the passive may apply to almost any transitive verb, the stative suffix is restricted 
to accomplishments whose meaning includes an event or process which results in a 
change of state for the theme (where they suggest the definition of ‘change of state’ from 
Dowty 1991: coming into existence, going out of existence, and definite and indefinite 
changes of state, where “indefinite” here refers to indefinite changes in degree or in 
position).  As examples, they point out that the change-of-state verbs phika ‘cook’, swa 
‘break’, and kumba ‘dig’ may be suffixed either by the passive or by the stative affix, 
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while the non-change-of-state verbs luma ‘bite’, omba ‘slap’, and kumbatila ‘embrace’ 
may only form passives. 
3.1.1 The mechanics of Dubinsky and Simango’s analysis 
 The analysis of the stative suffix which Dubinsky and Simango present makes use 
of this semantic fact, and attempts to also explain the different properties of the passive 
and stative as due to their status within the grammar: the stative suffix is attached within 
a lexical component, while the passive is attached within the syntax (assuming a structure 
of grammar something like the Lexical Phonology tradition as stated. for example, in 
Kiparsky 1982).  They also adopt an earlier version of the lexical semantic theory set out 
in Pustejovsky (1995), in which one component of the lexical semantic information of a 
verb is a representation of its event structure, its LEXICAL CONCEPTUAL STRUCTURE (or 
LCS).  A verb whose theme undergoes a change of state, like phika ‘to cook (transitive)’, 
would have the lexical conceptual structure shown in (32). 
(32)           T(ransition)      phika ‘to cook (transitive)’ 
     w   
  P(rocess)     S(tate) 
  !       !  
  !       [COOKED(x)] 
  !  
 [ACT(y,x) & ¬COOKED(x)]          (ibid: (46)) 
The stative suffix on their analysis may only attach to verbs whose lexical conceptual 
structure includes both a “process” portion and a “state” portion, the latter of which 
describes the resulting state of the theme argument.  The result of adding the stative 
suffix to a verb on their analysis is to derive a new verb, i.e., a new lexical entry, whose 
lexical conceptual structure lacks the process portion of the lexical conceptual structure 
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of the original verb, as seen in (33). 
(33)     T(ransition)        phikika ‘to be cooked’ 
    g  
     S(tate) 
    g  
    [COOKED(x)] 
                    (ibid: (47)) 
Since the agent is associated only with the process portion of the lexical conceptual 
structure, the new verb would be anomalous with any linguistic expression whose 
meaning references such an agent, therefore predicting the observed incompatibility of 
stativized verbs with purpose clauses, agent-oriented adverbials, and instruments seen in 
(29)b, (30)b, and (31)b. 
 Although this is the lexical conceptual structure that Dubinsky and Simango list 
as the output of this operation, a number of considerations indicate that the proper 
representation for stative-suffixed verbs may only include the state node and below.  
First, it is taken as obvious why a verb with an LCS as in (33) would be considered 
stative; presumably such a representation is equivalent in the event semantics framework 
adopted in chapter 2 to a predicate with an eventuality variable that ranges over states 
(whether D-states or K-states), and is therefore temporally stative, as well.  If only the 
process node is deleted and the transition node is left, however, the resulting verb should 
have a non-stative meaning, namely, the meaning of an inchoative or non-caused change 
of state (i.e., a transition into a state).  Even if this predicate necessarily combined with an 
aspectual morpheme such that it was temporally stative (according to the diagnostics of 
(6)), the presence of a transition node would also seem to contradict the claims regarding 
the meaning of the stative found in Dubinsky and Simango (1996) and Mchombo (1993), 
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that stative-suffixed verbs do not entail an event of the state’s coming to hold – i.e., that 
they are derived statives in the sense of Nedjalkov and Jaxontov (1988). 
3.1.2 Consequences of this analysis 
 There are three important points of discussion concerning this proposed analysis.  
First of all is the issue of compositionality.  This absence of a portion of the meaning of 
the base verb from the derived verb can be stated, as Dubinsky and Simango do, in terms 
of deletion (that the stative suffix copies the LCS of the base verb into a new lexical entry 
and subsequently deletes a portion of it) or equally well as selective copying (that when 
the stative suffix creates a new lexical entry, it copies only a portion of the meaning of 
the base), but in either case the semantic combination of the base and the stative suffix 
must involve an examination of the internal semantic structure of the base (in this case, 
the LCS); the meaning of the base verb cannot be treated as an unanalyzable unit.  This 
runs contrary to one of the central properties that are presumed to hold of the operations 
that compute the meaning of complex expressions in natural language, the Principle of 
Compositionality: the meaning of a constituent is determined solely by the meaning of its 
parts and the rule used to combine them (Portner and Partee 2002).  This is standardly 
taken to mean that semantic combination treats the elements that it combines as “black 
boxes”, without referring to their internal structure; this is an assumption, or at least an 
interpretation of this principle, that Dubinsky and Simango appear to reject. 
 The second issue deserving comment is the need for independent evidence of 
lexical conceptual structures of the type that Dubinsky and Simango propose.  If 
limitations on the occurrence of the Chichewa stative suffix are to be explained in terms 
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of the type of LCS that a verb’s lexical entry contains, then it is necessary to have 
evidence of a verb’s LCS that is independent of the properties of this stative suffix.  
Dubinsky and Simango do propose such evidence, but as we will see in section 3.3, their 
evidence may not in fact show what they intend to conclude from it. 
 The third issue deserving comment is the concept of monotonicity of semantic 
derivation – or in other words, the fact that semantic operations are not assumed to result 
in the “loss” of meaning over a derivation.  In a footnote (fn. 20, p. 772), Dubinsky and 
Simango acknowledge that it is odd for a morphologically more complex expression (the 
stative) to have a semantic representation that is less complex (i.e., which lacks a part of 
the meaning present in the morphologically simpler form).  Dubinsky and Simango 
explicitly reject a similar framework where monotonicity in event structure is taken to 
hold, namely in the event structure templates of Levin and Rappaport Hovav (1995, and 
later work by these authors), because that framework would allow only the existential 
quantification of an agent argument, rather than allowing deletion of the component of 
event structure that introduces that agent. 
 This is a more general problem, however, since the Chichewa stative is not the 
only example from natural language in which a morphologically derived form seems to 
lack portions of the meaning of the base from which it is derived.  Haspelmath (1993) 
presents data from a number of languages in which inchoative verb forms (or at least a 
subset of them) look exactly like causative verb forms with the addition of reflexive 
morphology (typically a reflexive clitic).  The meaning of these derived inchoatives does 
not simply involve existential quantification over a causer argument (which would 
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involve monotonically adding to the meaning of their morphological base), since 
inchoatives derived in this way may also be used to express internally-caused events or 
non-causative changes of state; an inchoative derived from a causative by reflexivization 
may be used in a context where the speaker wishes to make no assertions regarding any 
cause for the change of state.  Rather, the assertion of an external cause that is part of the 
meaning of the causative form appears simply to be absent.  If the apparent relative 
morphological complexity is a true indication of the direction of morphological and 
semantic derivation (i.e., if the inchoatives are derived from causatives by the addition of 
a reflexive clitic), then these cases as well involve derived forms whose meaning fails to 
include part of the meaning of the base. 
 Pesetsky (1995) discusses cases like this, as well, however, and concludes that the 
causative cases are only “apparently” simpler morphologically.  In his analysis, the 
causative forms include a phonologically null causative morpheme which is not present 
on the inchoative forms, and which obviates the need for a reflexive clitic (which is 
required for other reasons); thus, the causatives are in fact derived from the inchoatives, 
which are only apparently more complex morphologically.  The notion of “morphological 
complexity” may therefore need to take into account the possibility of phonologically 
null morphemes, which would make the determination of the direction of derivation more 
difficult.  To the extent that null morphemes are detectable primarily by their semantic 
contribution (Pesetsky discusses other ways, though meaning relations are a primary 
one), there does not seem to be a guaranteed way of determining morphological 
complexity and the direction of derivation independent of semantic complexity. 
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 To summarize the proposal of Dubinsky and Simango, the stative suffix derives a 
stative verb from an eventive verb by filtering out (through deletion or selective copying) 
that portion of the meaning of the base verb that makes it eventive (i.e., a predicate of 
events), leaving a component which is stative in the narrow sense (i.e., a predicate of 
states) and thus also temporally stative; the stative component does not make reference to 
certain components of meaning of the base verb (an agent and an event which results in 
the state), and so these are not part of the meaning of the stative-suffixed verb.  This 
formulation of the stative suffix is defined to operate only on verbs whose lexical 
conceptual structure fits a certain pattern – those that have both a process component and 
a resulting state component – and requires the ability to selectively manipulate 
subcomponents of the meaning of the base verb. 
 An alternative account which would produce very similar results in terms of the 
distribution and meaning of stative forms, but which would also allow compositionality 
and monotonicity to be maintained, can be formulated based on the type of analysis 
proposed by Pesetsky.  If the process portion and the resulting state portion of the 
meaning of a transitive change-of-state verb are contributed by syntactically distinct 
elements, then the stative-suffixed form may involve the attachment of the stative suffix 
only to the element which contributes the state meaning, while the passive may involve 
the attachment of the passive suffix to a complex expression consisting of the process 
expression and the resulting state expression.  This would explain the stativity of the 
stative-suffixed form, the absence of the eventive verb’s external argument as an 
argument of the stative verb forms, and the lack of an entailment in the stative-suffixed 
 73
form that the state be the result of some process or action, though it would require the 
process expression to be expressed by a zero morpheme.  Like Dubinsky and Simango’s 
analysis, it would also require evidence for separating the meaning of what appears to be 
a single lexical item into subcomponents of meaning.  This type of proposal will be 
elaborated on in the following chapter. 
 A somewhat different proposal for deriving a stative predicate from an eventive 
one has been made for the German state passive by Kratzer (2000), one which also 
involves the possibility of syntactic elements that are not expressed by phonological 
features, and which appeals to a decomposition of the meaning of verbs.  This will be 
presented in the following section. 
3.2 The German state passive 
 Although state or adjectival passives in English and German have been an active 
research topic for many years, recent work by Angelika Kratzer (2000) on the German 
state passive appears to be the first to make a distinction between two different 
interpretations that state passives can receive, based on a distinction made by Parsons 
between POST-STATES (or RESULTANT STATES, in his terminology) and TARGET STATES. 
 Parsons (1990), writing in the neo-Davidsonian tradition,53 proposes that there is a 
state which holds forever after any given event culminates, or reaches its natural 
completion.  Parsons labels this the RESULTANT STATE of the event.  This state cannot 
                                                 
53 The term “neo-Davidsonian” refers to a set of theoretical claims that extend the 
original proposal of Davidson (1967): predicates of all types (nouns and adjectives, as 
well as verbs) include an eventuality argument, and all of a verb’s nominal arguments are 
introduced by predicates of this eventuality.  A neo-Davidsonian representation of John 
swept the floor would be something like ∃e [ sweeping'(e) ∧ agent'(e)=John ∧ 
theme'(e)=the-floor ]. 
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cease to hold at some later time since it holds at a moment of time only by virtue of its 
associated event having reached its completion at a previous time; the resultant state of an 
event understandably figures into Parsons’ analysis of the perfect.  His use of this term, 
however, is not to be confused with the use of the term resultant state to refer to the state 
that the theme changes into in the previous discussion of Chichewa.  Other authors use 
terms like after state or post-state to refer to a resultant state in Parsons’ sense, and to 
avoid ambiguity I will use the term POST-STATE in subsequent discussion. 
 The state which an argument of a verb comes to be in at the conclusion or 
culmination of the event, referred to as a resulting state in the discussion of Chichewa, is 
what Parsons refers to as a TARGET STATE.  Some, but not all, events have an associated 
target state.  Unlike a post-state, it is a matter of contingent fact whether a target state 
holds or not at any given moment of time; that is, it is possible for a target state, unlike a 
post-state, to cease to hold at a later time.  His examples of target states include the 
locative state of the ball in the sentence I threw a ball on the roof and the condition of the 
vase in the sentence The fall cracked the vase, prior to a possible change of state – for 
example, if the ball is retrieved or the vase is repaired.  The verb push, on the other hand, 
does not entail that its object undergo a change of state, whether in its location or its 
condition, or that any particular state be true of its object, and so does not involve a target 
state.54  Thus, a sentence where the plausible result of pushing (i.e., a change in location) 
is denied, as in I pushed the box, but the box didn’t move, is perfectly acceptable. 
 German, like English, has both a verbal (or eventive) passive and an adjectival (or 
                                                 
54 Such a target state may be specified by other elements of the sentence, however, such 
as a directional prepositional phrase like onto the truck. 
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state) passive.  German provides a better context for studying the state passive than 
English, however, since the two types of passive in German are clearly distinguished by 
the choice of auxiliary: verbal passives in German occur with the auxiliary verb werden 
‘to become’, while state passives occur with the auxiliary sein ‘to be’.  Kratzer’s novel 
observation regarding the state passive is that state passive participles in German can 
have one or both of the interpretations expressed by Parsons’ two state concepts just 
discussed.  It appears that every state passive participle can receive a post-state reading, 
and a subset of participles can also receive a target state reading (which, when it is 
available, is typically the most salient interpretation). 
 One diagnostic which she uses to distinguish these two readings involves the 
adverbial immer noch ‘still’: since post-states are true at all times after their associated 
event, it is infelicitous to assert with immer noch that a post-state ‘still’ holds. 
(34) a. Target state reading: 
  Die            Geisslein    sind     (immer.noch)  versteckt. 
  DET:NM:p  little.goats  be:3p    still                 hidden:PPRT 
  The little goats are (still) hidden.       (Kratzer 2000: (1a)) 
 b. Post-state reading only: 
  Die           Gäste   sind    (*immer.noch)  begrüsst. 
  DET:NM:p  guests  be:3p     still                greeted:PPRT 
  The guests are (*still) greeted.        (ibid: (2d)) 
In interpreting these results, it is important to understand what unacceptability with 
immer noch really indicates.  This is not a test for stativity, since tests like those in (6) 
can be used to show that all state passives are temporally stative; in English, still is 
acceptable with a wide variety of predicates, including habituals, progressives, negated 
sentences, and sentences based on predicates of states, and is acceptable with a possibly 
different meaning on generics and perfects, as well.  What still in English seems to 
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contribute to meaning is that the truth value of the sentence it occurs in remains 
unchanged as some parameter is shifted (typically time, though other contextual factors 
are possible as parameters); it is therefore odd to use still to modify a sentence whose 
truth value could not possibly change in the first place, such as a sentence expressing a 
post-state.  Acceptability with still (and presumably also with immer noch) indicates that 
a predicate is reversible. 
 Since this test is sensitive to reversibility, target states that happen to be 
irreversible based on real-world knowledge pattern just like post-states, so Kratzer 
advises caution in interpreting the results of this test.  Examples of participles which fail 
this test, and which Kratzer proposes to analyze as irreversible target states, are the 
English participles dead and cooked.  Although a sentence like #The food is still cooked 
is odd, she argues that it can be made to sound better in a context in which cooked food 
eventually returns to a raw state.  That this type of context is not sufficient to save a 
sentence like *The program is still completed she takes to indicate that completed has 
only a post-state interpretation. 
 The other diagnostic for distinguishing participles with a target state reading from 
those with solely a post-state reading is by the occurrence of the base verb with durative 
temporal prepositional phrases introduced by für ‘for’: verbs whose passive participles 
have a target state reading are just those that allow modification by such adverbial PPs. 
(35) a. Target state reading: 
  Die          Mutter hat         die             Geisslein     für ein paar Stunden versteckt. 
  DET:NM:f mother have:3s DET:ACC:p  little.goats  for one pair hours      hidden 
  The mother hid the little goats for a few hours.   (ibid: (10a)) 
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 b. Post-state reading only: 
  * Du       kann-st       die             Gäste   für  eine  Stunde  begrüssen. 
  2s:INF  can-2s:INF  DET:ACC:p  guests  for  one  hour      greet 
  You can greet the guests for an hour.      (ibid: (11a)) 
In the two German examples above, the temporal adverbial can only be interpreted as the 
length of time the target state held; in (35)a, a few hours is the length of time that the 
little goats were in a state of being hidden.55  If für is limited to predication over state 
arguments, and if the verb in (35)b lacks a target state, then the occurrence of the für-PP 
is correctly predicted to be ungrammatical.  This indicates that the target state which is 
asserted by the passive participle versteckt ‘hidden’ in (34)a is also present in the 
meaning of the eventive source verb in (35)a and is syntactically accessible, at least to the 
extent that the temporal adverbial may be predicated of it. 
3.2.1 The mechanics of Kratzer’s analysis 
 Kratzer’s analysis of state passive participles must explain why they are stative, 
why there are distinct interpretations available to some but not all participles, and why 
they appear to be passive: the subject of the base verb (as in (35)) is not an argument of 
the state passive participle (as in (34)) – a property which was true of the Chichewa 
stative, as well. 
 Kratzer follows her earlier work (Kratzer 1996) in proposing that agentive 
subjects (i.e., external arguments) are introduced not by the verb root itself but by a 
syntactically higher functional morpheme that combines with the verb root (she calls this 
                                                 
55 This is in contrast to the English glosses, in which the temporal adverbial can be 
predicated of the length of time of the state or of the event.  German uses the postposition 
lang to indicate duration of events, as in the acceptable form Du kannst die Gäste eine 
Stunde lang begrüssen ‘You can greet the guests for an hour’. 
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morpheme Voice); this morpheme is frequently not associated with any phonological 
features.  The lack of the agent as an argument of the state passive participles is explained 
as a structural fact: it follows from her analysis, to be presented below, that the 
morpheme which introduces the agent is syntactically prohibited from combining with 
the morphemes that together constitute the state passive participle. 
 The temporal modification facts observed with regard to für-PPs appear to 
indicate that verbs that can form target state passive participles are composed of 
components that can be separately modified.  Kratzer explicitly rejects the claim, 
however, found in Generative Semantics and several more recent proposals, that verbs 
may consist of stative and eventive components that are syntactically distinct.  She 
instead proposes that participles which allow target state interpretations are formed from 
abstract roots that have two eventuality arguments: an argument for an event (as is 
typically proposed for predicates in the Davidsonian tradition),56 as well as an argument 
for the target state.  From this one root, both verbal (eventive) predicates and participial 
(stative) predicates are derived.  Her example of the representation of the root aufpump- 
‘pump up’, which combines by function application with its direct object (in (36)b), is 
shown below. 
(36) a. [[ aufpump- ]]         = λx λs λe [event(e) ∧ pump(e) ∧ cause(s)(e) ∧ inflated(x)(s)] 
 b. [[das Boot aufpump-]] = λs λe [event(e) ∧ pump(e) ∧ cause(s)(e) ∧ inflated(b)(s)] 
                    (ibid: (12),(13)) 
                                                 
56 According to Kratzer’s analysis, this argument is typically restricted to events proper 
(by the event(e) predicate in (36)a and b), though she argues later that this restriction does 
not hold for all verbs, since the corresponding argument of at least some verbs may be 
filled either by an event or a state.  Such cases appear to always involve individual-level 
interpretations of the verbs. 
 79
The root in (36)a thus takes an individual, a state, and an eventuality as arguments, and 
asserts that the eventuality is an event proper which is an event of pumping and which 
causes a state, which is a state of being inflated and is true of some individual.  Kratzer 
proposes that predicates based on abstract roots of this type, like the one in (36)b, must 
combine with a morpheme that both assign a syntactic category (since such roots, she 
proposes, are ambiguous between a verb and an adjective) and will leave only one 
eventuality argument open.57  Examples of such morphemes are given in (37): an 
eventizer, which would existentially close the state argument to produce an eventive 
predicate, or a target stativizer, which would existentially close the event argument to 
produce a stative predicate (more specifically, a predicate of states).  Predicates which 
have a single open eventuality argument (i.e., those which lexically have only an event 
argument, or roots like aufpump- once they have had all their other argument positions 
filled) may also combine with a post-stativizer morpheme.58 
                                                 
57 Kratzer cites Lieber (1980) in treating state passives categorically as adjectives.  A 
distinct proposal which shares this property can be found in Levin and Rappaport (1986), 
though Laczkó (2001) proposes that some “adjectival” (that is, state) passives be 
considered categorically verbs. 
58 Alternatively, if a rule of Function Composition is available for combination of zero-
level heads, then the post-stativizer could attach to heads which have both an open event 
and an open state argument, as does aufpump- in (36).  This would leave the state 
argument open, however, without any higher head to close it.  Kratzer therefore proposes 
that the syntactic category label ‘V’, whose meaning may be that of the eventizer in (37), 
must occur below aspectual operators like the post-stativizer.  She does not, however, 
explain why the target state and post-state participles both display the same participial 
morphology.  She proposes that the participial morphology is required to justify the 
absence of richer verbal inflection, but she does not say why other non-finite verbal 
morphology, for example, could not also serve this purpose. 
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(37)  Eventizer:    λR λe ∃s R(s)(e)59 
  Target stativizer:  λR λs ∃e R(s)(e) 
  Post-stativizer:  λP λt ∃e [P(e) ∧ τ(e) < t]   (ibid: (14), (24)) 
The eventizer combines with a relation between states and eventualities and an 
eventuality, with a meaning that some state exists such that the relation is true of that 
state and that eventuality.  The target stativizer, on the other hand, combines with a 
relation between states and eventualities, with a meaning that some eventuality exists 
such that the relation is true of that state and that eventuality.  The post stativizer, unlike 
either of the other two, combines with a property of eventualities and a time, with a 
meaning that some eventuality exists such that the property is true of that eventuality and 
the running time of that eventuality (given by τ(e)) is before the given time.  On this 
analysis, although both the target stativizer and the post-stativizer produce predicates 
which are temporally stative, only the target stativizer truly involves predication over 
states.  The post-stativizer may more properly be characterized as aspectual, relating 
properties of events and times: the predicate τ(e) yields the running time of the event e, 
and so the post-stativizer simply asserts that an event of P happened before t. 
3.2.2 The distribution of target state interpretations 
 This largely accounts for the passive and stative properties of the state passive 
participles; however, the distribution of target state interpretations must still be explained, 
or within her analysis, which verbs are composed of an abstract root which has a second 
eventuality argument specifying the target state.  Recall that for the similar Chichewa 
stative, Dubinsky and Simango claimed that the stative suffix – which in the current 
                                                 
59 The semantic form of this eventizer is not given in Kratzer (2000); its form is inferred 
based on the desired semantic output.  A similar extension of this idea is Stechow (2003). 
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terminology had a target state reading – could attach only to verbs whose lexical 
conceptual structure included both an eventive component and a state; they took this to be 
the set of accomplishment verbs, as indicated by the lexical aspectual diagnostics of 
Dowty (1979) and the Vendlerian tradition, whose theme arguments undergo a change of 
state.  A similar hypothesis for German might also be that all verbs which lexicalize a 
change of state of one of their arguments should have this second eventuality argument.  
A generalization like this, however, would both underapply and overapply.  Kratzer notes 
that only a subset of accomplishment verbs allow target state passive formation, and that 
moreover, certain adverbials appear to allow verbs which do not lexicalize a change of 
state of one of their arguments to receive a target state interpretation.  These two 
observations appear to receive at least partially satisfying answers within her analysis, but 
neither is without problems. 
 Regarding the latter observation, that certain verb phrases can receive a target 
state interpretation while the verb in isolation cannot, certain manner adverbials appear to 
introduce a state argument, thus creating a predicate with the proper form for the target 
stativizer to apply to.  Kratzer’s example is shown below. 
(38)  Die            Haare  waren          immer.noch  schlampig  gekämmt. 
  DET:NM:p  hairs    be:3p:PAST  still               sloppily      comb:PPRT 
  The hair was still combed sloppily.      (Kratzer 2000: (16)a) 
Kratzer concludes from this that target state participles must be derivable from larger 
phrasal constituents (i.e., the phrase die Haare schlampig gekämmt ‘combed the hair 
sloppily’), since the verb and object by itself (die Haare gekämmt ‘combed the hair’, 
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parallel with (36)b) should not be able to form a target state participle.60  Although 
Kratzer does not give a semantic representation of the sentence in (38), it is possible to 
infer its intended semantic form from a similar example (see Kratzer 2000:(22)). 
(39) a. [[ die Haare gekämmt ]]  = λe [comb(the hair)(e)] 
 b. [[ schlampig ]]     = λe λs [action(e) ∧ cause(s)(e) ∧ indicate(sloppy(e))(s)] 
  (combining by Event Identification) 
 c. [[ die Haare schlampig gekämmt ]]  =  
    λe λs [action(e) ∧ cause(s)(e) ∧ indicate(sloppy(e))(s) ∧ comb(the hair)(e)] 
The “manner” adverbial schlampig ‘sloppily’, therefore, is a function which takes both an 
eventuality and a state as arguments and whose meaning is that the eventuality is an 
action which caused the state, and that the state indicates that the event was performed in 
a sloppy way.61  This analysis therefore requires that an event cannot truthfully be called 
schlampig if it does not result in some current state which indicates the manner of the 
event that brought about that state (see Kratzer 2000:11 for discussion).  After the 
adverbial combines with the verb + object constituent, the semantic form of (39)c is a 
relation between an event and a state, which is the proper type for the target stativizer of 
(37) to combine with – and importantly, this state has been introduced by the manner 
adverbial, rather than residing in the verb + object constituent seen in (39)a. 
 This leaves a number of open questions, however, about the proper analysis of the 
eventive equivalent of (38) with manner adverbials, as in Jens hat die Haare schlampig 
gekämmt ‘Jens combed his hair sloppily’.  Problematically, there is no way to derive a 
                                                 
60 This indicates that the derivation of at least some target state participial forms must 
occur in the syntax, even if Event Identification (as noted in fn. 58) is available to 
combine verb roots and the target stativizer in the lexicon, since the constituent that the 
target stativizer combines with in this case is itself built in the syntax. 
61 Kratzer does not indicate the significance of the predicate action(e) in this paper. 
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strictly eventive predicate from the form in (39)c apart from having it combine with the 
eventizer in (37) because of the open state argument.  Kratzer argued that the eventizer 
was the semantic contribution of a verbal category head, so either the entire phrase in 
(39)c must combine with a verbal head (problematic in that this constituent should 
already contain a verbal head and that the entire syntactic constituent in (39)c with the 
manner adverbial can be categorically marked as a complex verb), an unknown higher 
head must existentially bind the state, or the state variable must simply remain open. 
 Even this latter option, however, is not satisfying.  If the state argument was 
allowed to remain open, this would remove the need for the verbal head to perform this 
quantification for any predicate, and therefore Kratzer’s claim that a verbal category head 
is responsible for this quantification with verb roots like aufpump- is unnecessary.  In 
addition, Kratzer elsewhere presents data which does support analyzing a light verbal 
head as closing off this state variable to further operations.  This complicates the analysis 
of manner adverbials, however, if some but not all manner adverbials require a higher 
verbal head to close off a state introduced by that adverbial.  In the hierarchy of clausal 
functional heads presented by Cinque (1999), for instance, manner adverbials are merged 
in the specifier of a Voice head, which, although low in Cinque’s system, is still higher 
than the lowest verbal head.  This would pose yet another problem for state passives, 
however: Kratzer’s explanation for the lack of an external argument in state passives is 
that the state passive is derived from a constituent which is not large enough to include an 
external argument.  For her, external arguments are introduced by the Voice head.  
Granting that Cinque’s Voice head and Kratzer’s Voice head may not be identical, this at 
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least requires Kratzer to claim that manner modifiers of an event (of the type seen in 
(39)b) are merged below the agent of that event.  
 The discussion in this section has so far only addressed the under-occurrence 
problem – that target state passive interpretations are available for verbs that are not just 
accomplishments in the Vendlerian sense whose theme argument changes state.  There 
are also accomplishment verbs that seem to lexicalize a change of state of one of their 
arguments but do not allow modification by für-PPs and do not allow their state passive 
participle to receive a target state interpretation.  These include verbs derived from 
adjectives, like leeren ‘to empty’ and trocknen ‘to dry’, resultative verbs like leertrinken 
‘to drink empty’, as well as some verbs like zumachen ‘to make shut’ which are not 
derived from adjectives but where lexicalization of a target state seems plausible. 
 The pair of sentences in (40) indicate the general direction that Kratzer takes. 
(40) a. * Jens  hat         die              Tür   für  zehn  Minuten  zugemacht. 
              have:3s  DET:ACC:f  door  for  ten     minutes  make.shut:PPRT 
    ‘Jens made the door closed for ten minutes.’ 
 b.    Jens  hat          die              Tür   für  zehn  Minuten  geschlossen. 
              have:3s:  DET:ACC:f  door  for  ten    minutes  close:PPRT 
    ‘Jens closed the door for ten minutes.’ 
While both schliessen ‘to close’ and zumachen ‘to make shut’ are quite similar in 
meaning, they differ in the presence of an overt light verb (machen ‘to make or do’); 
recall also that Kratzer associated the eventizer morpheme in (37) with a light verbal 
head.  Although she does not claim that the semantic content of machen is identical to the 
eventizer as given here, she does claim that any light verbal head, including the light verb 
machen in (40)a, will existentially bind any open state argument within its complement.  
The verb zumachen, as long as it contains a light verb, would therefore never have an 
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open or accessible state argument for the formation of a target state passive, even if a 
subcomponent like zu- were to have one.62  The verb schliessen ‘to close’, on the other 
hand, would require a null light verb to perform this quantification in the eventive case, 
which is consistent with there being an abstract root schliess- with both an event and a 
state argument, and this root could be the base for derivation of the target state passive. 
 Consider also de-adjectival verbs like leeren ‘to empty’ and trocknen ‘to dry’, 
which lack target state passive forms (evidenced by the ungrammatical *immer noch 
geleert ‘still emptied’ and *immer noch getrocknet ‘still dried’) and are transparently 
related to (presumably state-denoting) adjectives; as verbs, do they somehow lack target 
state arguments, or are such arguments merely inaccessible to temporal modifiers for 
some other reason?  To claim that the adjectives themselves have an eventuality 
argument that ranges over states, but that the verbs lack this argument position altogether, 
would violate the monotonicity or compositionality property of semantic derivation that 
was discussed earlier.  It therefore seems more consistent to assume that the internal 
structure of deadjectival causatives includes a position for a state argument, but that this 
position is for some reason not accessible for modification in the same way that the state 
argument for roots like aufpump- is. 
 The behavior observed for such forms is actually predicted under Kratzer’s 
analysis, however, if the null causative verbal head which attaches to these roots again 
involves existential closure of any open state variable, as with other light verbs like 
                                                 
62 It’s not clear that this explanation would predict the absence of temporal modification 
by für-PPs, which could conceivably merge below the light verb, without specifying that 
the target stativizer of (37) could not attach to prepositions – presumably what zu is. 
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machen and the eventizer of (37).  Recall that participles with target state interpretations 
are formed when the target stativizer in (37) combines with an expression which has both 
an open event and an open state argument – a characteristic which Kratzer takes to 
indicate that the root is neutral with respect to category.  In the case of a de-adjectival 
verb like leeren ‘to empty’, at no stage in its derivation will there be a constituent which 
has both an open event and an open state argument.  The adjective itself may have an 
argument for a state but not for an event, and any verb which is derived from the 
adjective can only have an open event argument, since the verbal head itself must 
existentially close any open state arguments within its complement. 
 It is likewise puzzling at first that verbs with secondary predication of a resulting 
state like leertrinken ‘to drink empty’, which one might think would introduce a state 
argument similar to the manner-adverbial-modified verb schlampig gekämmt ‘sloppily 
combed’ in (38), cannot receive a target state interpretation. 
(41)  Die           Teekanne  ist       leer-getrunken. 
  DET:NM:f  teakettle    be:3s  empty-drunk:PPRT 
  The teapot is drunk empty. (post-state reading only) Kratzer 2000: (8)b 
The same explanation regarding the properties of verbal heads that predicted the behavior 
of causativized adjectives also predicts that target state interpretations should be 
unavailable for verbs with secondary predicates specifying resulting states; the difference 
between resultative secondary predicates and manner adverbial modification rests in the 
syntactic location of the state-denoting predicate in each case.  Recall that the 
characteristic which allowed verbs with manner modification to form target state passives 
was that they contained both an open state and an open event argument at some level 
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within a verb phrase (i.e., the manner adverbial attaches above the level of the verb 
itself).  In contrast, if the resultative secondary predicate attaches at or below the level of 
the verb, then such verbs are straightforwardly predicted not to allow target state 
interpretations, since there will be no constituent of the proper semantic type for the 
target stativizer to attach to.  In the most straightforward application of this, the 
resultative secondary predicate would attach directly to a verbal head. 
 This is in fact the structure that has been proposed in a number of analyses of 
resultative secondary predication, which treat the verb and secondary predicate (of some 
phrasal category like AP) as a kind of complex predicate.  Embick (2004, citing Marantz 
1989 and Larson 1988) proposes that resultative phrases are licensed as complements of a 
complex verb composed of a lexical root that has merged with a light verb BECOME.  
Embick’s structure for resultatives (here for the phrase the teakettle drunk empty, which 
would combine with tense to form a complete sentence) is shown in (42).63 
(42)     ASPP 
    ei  
  ASP      vP 
        qp 
      DP        v' 
   6    ei   
   the teakettle      v        aP 
         3   5   
       √DRINK  BECOME   empty    (after Embick 2004: (36)) 
Embick does not include event arguments in his semantic forms, so his analysis cannot be 
compared directly to Kratzer’s.  Nevertheless, the fact that the constituent which 
                                                 
63 This representation differs from Embick’s for ease of presentation.  He distinguishes 
the resultative aspectual head ASP here from other ASP heads, and he gives the label 
FIENT to his verbal head to distinguish it from formulations of a BECOME operator that are 
based on telicity (which he avoids; see Embick 2004:366 for further discussion). 
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introduces the state argument (the aP) is the complement of a light verbal head predicts, 
within Kratzer’s system, that the smallest constituent which includes both the predicate of 
events and the predicate of states – namely the v' – will not be of the proper semantic type 
to combine with the target stativizer; it will have an open event argument, but not an open 
state argument.  Kratzer’s analysis therefore correctly predicts that verbs with overt 
verbal morphology, verbs with null verbal morphology, and those with resultative 
secondary predicates should lack target state interpretations. 
 Although Kratzer’s analysis does appear to make correct predictions concerning 
the under-occurrence of target state interpretations to state passive participles (and 
possibly the cases of over-occurrence, as well), there is at least one point where her 
analysis appears to miss a generalization: the distribution of derived stative (i.e., non-
result resultative) interpretations. 
3.2.3 Resultatives and derived statives in Kratzer’s analysis 
 In Kratzer’s analysis, state passive participles with post state interpretations are all 
predicted to be resultatives in the strict sense – as part of the meaning of the post-
stativizer, they require some event to have completed before some reference time.  State 
passive participles with target state interpretations are similarly predicted to be 
resultatives proper.  All participles with target state interpretations are derived by the 
target stativizer in (37) (repeated as (43)a), which existentially quantifies over an event.  
Given the typical form of roots which combine with this target stativizer to produce 
semantic forms like that in (43)b (an extension of (36)b), this existentially quantified 
event is lexically specified to cause the relevant resulting state.  Every state passive with 
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a target state interpretation should therefore entail that there was an event which caused 
this state to come into being; all target state passives are therefore resultatives in the strict 
sense, not derived statives. 
(43) a. Target stativizer:  λR λs ∃e R(s)(e)      (Kratzer 2000: (14)) 
 b. [[ das Boot aufgepumpt ]] = λs ∃e [event(e)∧pump(e)∧cause(s)(e)∧inflated(b)(s)] 
                    (ibid: (14)) 
The existential quantifier contributed by the target stativizer in the case of (43)b requires 
there to be some event of pumping which led to the boat's being in an inflated state, even 
though it is the state which is the focus (in a non-technical sense) of this form and which 
is responsible for the temporal stativity of the participle. 
 This is the opposite generalization than was claimed for Chichewa by Dubinsky 
and Simango, where all stative-suffixed verbs are predicted to be derived statives: the 
process portion of the lexical conceptual structure of a verb (corresponding to the causing 
event) is deleted in the formation of a stative-suffixed verb.  Neither the prediction of 
Dubinsky and Simango’s analysis nor the prediction of Kratzer’s analysis is true for 
resultatives in Pima, however.  Many Pima resultatives are resultatives proper, but there 
are at least some resultatives in the broad sense in Pima which lack an entailment of a 
past change of state, though the lack of such entailments appears to be sensitive to 
morphological environment in a way reminiscent of Kratzer’s account of the under-
occurrence of target state interpretations. 
 The prediction that all state passives in German are resultatives proper is actually 
not correct, either; Kratzer acknowledges that not all state passives with target state 
interpretations are results; some of them are derived statives.  She proposes two ways to 
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explain the absence of event entailments with these participles, though her explanation 
fails to capture a generalization about such verbs, and may also fail to account for similar 
resultatives in Pima.  Kratzer suggests that there is one category of “‘deverbal’ adjectives 
that are not derived in a completely compositional way” (2000:8), that is, whose meaning 
must simply be listed rather than computed (i.e., they are idioms).  State passive 
participles which fall into this category should show additional evidence for non-
compositionality, such as a tendency for semantic drift from their eventive meaning.  
(Recall that this was a property that was observed by Dubinsky and Simango for verbs 
with the Chichewa stative suffix, as well.)  The other category of derived statives may be 
derived compositionally, but must have another property which allows the absence of an 
event entailment even under a compositional derivation. 
 This property that all of the compositional derived statives share is that they have 
stative interpretations even when they occur as “eventive” verbs – that is, when they 
occur without state passive morphology.64  Kratzer interprets this fact to mean that the 
primary eventuality argument of these verbs, that is, what would be the “normal” 
Davidsonian argument, may range over both events and states.  The example she 
discusses in shown in (44). 
(44) a. The blood vessel was still obstructed. 
 b. Because of a congenital malformation, tissue obstructs the blood vessel. 
               (Kratzer 2000: (17), (18), slightly modified) 
 c. As the incision healed, scar tissue slowly obstructed the blood vessel. 
Kratzer does not give a semantic representation for the verb root for obstruct, though one 
                                                 
64 The temporal stativity that they exhibit is of the type shared by interval statives like sit, 
stand, and lie. 
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can be inferred from her discussion.  The relevant observation about obstruct is that the 
non-state-passive use in (44)b (as indicated by its transitivity, since both forms are 
marked with -ed) may still be stative, as the context for (44)b is intended to indicate.  
This is to be contrasted with the explicitly eventive reading of (44)c which is forced by 
the presence of a rate adverbial.  A semantic representation of the root √OBSTRUCT which 
is in the spirit of Kratzer’s proposal is shown in (45). 
(45) a. [[ √OBSTRUCT ]]                          =  λx λs λe [cause'(s)(e) ∧ obstructed'(x)(s)]65  
 b. [[ [VP the blood vessel obstructed] ]]  =  λs ∃e [cause'(s)(e) ∧ obstructed'(v)(s)] 
This representation differs in two important ways from Kratzer’s representation for 
aufpump- in (36)a: there is no predicate event'(e) which restricts the eventuality 
argument e to events proper, and there is no predicate analogous to pump'(e) which 
specifies the type of event which causes the obstructed state.  Kratzer focuses on the 
former fact, though we will return to the significance of the latter fact below.  If the 
eventuality which is chosen to fill the variable e is actually a state,66 then this expression 
is still well-formed and should yield a meaning in which one state (uncharacterized by 
this representation) causes another state, namely the blockage of the blood vessel.67 
 While the idea of a causative which is stative may sound odd at first, this idea was 
                                                 
65 I will hereafter diverge from the notation which Kratzer uses, in order to follow what I 
take to be a more standard style.  I am using the root notation of Pesetsky (1995) (the √ 
symbol and block caps), and I distinguish semantic predicates from the linguistic objects 
of the same name by boldface and prime notation, such as cause'(s)(e). 
66 This assumes that there is no ontological difference between the eventualities that may 
occupy this position; this would be a problem if certain states (such as Maienborn’s K-
states from section 2.2) were not eventualities in the same sense that events are. 
67 It is for this reason that the semantics of causation for Kratzer should not involve an 
operator with a meaning like the BECOME operator of Dowty (1979), since the presence of 
such an operator would not result in stative causation in the present cases. 
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proposed by Pylkkänen (2000) on the basis of a subset of morphological causatives in 
Finnish.  Taking Kratzer’s and Pylkkänen’s claims together, a sentence like the one in 
(44)b means informally that a state of the existence of tissue in a location causes a state 
of obstruction in the blood vessel.  Finnish stative causatives are argued by Pylkkänen to 
be individual level predicates, though this example of stative causation in (44)b seems to 
indicate that this need not be a property that all stative causatives possess.  Verbs like 
obstruct largely pattern like stage level predicates: they are acceptable with explicit 
temporal modification (46)a and in episodic contexts (46)b, properties characteristic of 
transitory or stage level predicates.  In contrast, they do pattern like non-transitory or 
individual level predicates by apparently triggering a generic interpretation for a bare 
plural subject (46)c.  This shows an interesting interaction with tense and modification, 
however; note that an existential interpretation, characteristic of stage level predicates, is 
favored when a locative modifier occurs (46)d or when the verb is in the past tense (46)e. 
(46) a. Tissue obstructed the baby’s blood vessel for several hours after birth before it 
could be surgically removed. 
 b. Just as he was nearing his destination, John noticed a truck slowly turning 
around in the road in front of him.  It completely obstructed the flow of traffic 
for several minutes while the driver inched backwards into a nearby driveway. 
 c. Stoplights obstruct the free flow of traffic. 
 d. Stoplights obstruct the free flow of traffic in Westwood. 
 e. Stoplights obstructed the free flow of traffic. 
It is not clear if this unusual behavior is due to multiple senses that this verb may occur 
with, or if some other factor is responsible here.  It appears to be the case, however, that 
causative predicates do not need to be non-transitory in order to be stative, and an 
analysis of such forms as involving stative causation may be appropriate. 
 While Kratzer’s generalization appears to be correct that many compositional 
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derived statives are associated with verbs that have a stative causative sense, this may in 
fact be a distraction from the real issue.  There appears to be evidence that the state 
passives produced from verbs with stative causative senses have more in common with 
eventive passives (apart from their stative temporal property) than do other state passives. 
 If passive participles like obstructed are truly state passives, they are unlike the 
state passives of other eventive verbs in that the argument which is realized as the subject 
of the base verb is licensed with the passive form in a by-phrase even when the verb 
receives a stative interpretation, as in (47)a.  This contrasts with other state passives 
which do not allow the demoted subject (as in (47)b), and is also not characteristic of 
underived adjectives, which do not allow an agent or actor potentially responsible for the 
state (as in (47)c), or even an inanimate state causer (as in (47)d), in a by-phrase. 
(47) a. The blood vessel seemed congenitally obstructed (9 by tissue).68 
 b. The window seemed broken (# by the kids).69 
 c. The door seemed open (# by the butler). 
 d. The door seemed open (# by the doorstop). 
The primary difference between passives of stative causatives and passives of eventive 
verbs in general is that the passives of stative causatives are temporally stative, but this is 
expected if their primary eventuality (i.e., the eventuality that tense and aspect 
morphemes modify) can range over states, as the non-passive cases demonstrate.  In 
order to derive a stative form for such verbs, the “normal” passive morpheme may 
                                                 
68 The verb seem takes a complement that is adjectival, not verbal; seem therefore forces 
an adjectival passive interpretation of its complement, rather than an eventive passive 
interpretation.  This diagnostic is mentioned in other works on adjectival passives, such 
as Levin and Rappaport (1986). 
69 The last three sentences all allow a locational reading of the by phrase; this reading is 
irrelevant to the present analysis. 
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suffice; we do not need to use Kratzer’s target stativizer to form stative passives from 
stative causatives.70 
 If this is the case, we are left with only a single category of “true” state passives 
(i.e., state passives formed with either the target stativizer or the resultant stativizer) 
which are derived statives rather than resultatives proper – that is, resultatives that lack 
the entailment of a causing event, an entailment which is predicted by Kratzer’s analysis.  
Examples of such participles in English are closed, broken (in the sense of being non-
functional), and scattered for some speakers.  Kratzer only explanation is that all such 
cases merely involve idioms. 
 There appears to be an argument, however, that the best analysis for exceptional 
cases like these at least in English and Pima does not involve listed, unpredictable 
meaning for all such forms.  What is troubling about listing the meaning of all such forms 
is the high degree of regularity which the meanings of the stative forms and eventive 
forms have: the eventive forms appear to mean just that some state came about (or was 
caused), while the stative forms merely denote that very state.  Words whose meanings 
are listed could in principle vary more in meaning than this, even though they would not 
be required to.  Moreover, there appears to be a way to predict, based on the meaning of 
the base verb, whether its target state passive will have a derived stative meaning.  These 
systematic relationships seem like they should be captured by the grammar. 
 One way to modify Kratzer’s analysis to capture this generalization will be 
                                                 
70 One fact that would be unexplained for passives of stative causatives, however, is why 
they pattern like other expressions that are categorically adjectives, rather than verbs – 
see footnote 68.  Perhaps this diagnostic is not sensitive to syntactic category after all, 
and some “adjectival” passives are categorically verbs, as Laczkó (2001) suggests. 
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discussed in detail in the following chapter.  Before moving on to the details of Pima 
resultatives, however, it is worth examining an assumption that was crucial to both 
Dubinsky and Simango’s analysis and Kratzer’s, namely that the meaning of certain 
verbs can be decomposed in some way (like Dubinsky and Simango’s lexical conceptual 
structures or Kratzer’s second eventuality argument) into an eventive component and a 
target state component. 
3.3 Evidence for decomposition of target states 
 Within the Davidsonian tradition, there are differing views on how to treat stative 
eventualities.  Among those who acknowledge an ontological category of states as well as 
events, there is disagreement about the nature of the state argument in a number of types 
of stative predicates: individual level or non-transitory predicates have been argued by 
some not to involve predication over states at all, while others distinguish adjectival 
states from verbal states (and those predicates that involve a copula), or the states taken 
by interval statives (like sit, stand, and lie) from those taken by other stative predicates; 
such distinctions were discussed in section 2.2. Those who propose these distinctions 
among states do so on the basis of differences in the behavior of subsets of stative 
predicates, or differences in the behavior of stative predicates in different syntactic 
contexts.  Tests that might be used to argue for the presence or absence of a state in the 
decomposition of a predicate should therefore take such facts into account, or run the risk 
of finding only states of a certain type (or rather, risk using a test which is sensitive only 
to certain types or instances of states). 
 For example, Kratzer’s durative adverbial diagnostic involves specifying the 
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temporal duration of a state: für zehn Minuten ‘for ten minutes (applied to a state)’ versus 
zehn Minuten lang ‘for ten minutes (applied to an event)’.  This diagnostic is therefore 
primarily sensitive to target states which saliently have a limited duration – transitory or 
stage level states.  Even if individual level states exist as a type of individual distinct 
from stage level states, this test would not be sensitive to their presence.  To illustrate, an 
individual level predicate like be American is predicted to sound anomalous with a 
durative temporal adverbial whether or not it involves predication over a state, because 
the type of state that is hypothetically present is not one that would felicitously occur 
with any specified duration; the awkwardness of ?Fred was American for five minutes 
should not be taken as evidence that be American lacks an eventuality argument at all, but 
that it lacks an eventuality argument with certain temporal properties. 
 Moreover, in languages like English where the same adverbial may be used to 
specify the duration of an event or a state, an ambiguity between an event-duration and a 
state-duration reading of the temporal adverbial will only be detectable if the event and 
target state lexicalized by the verb are located at distinct intervals of time.  To illustrate, 
the stative causatives just discussed involve the causation of one state by another, but this 
causative relationship holds at each moment of time.  The causing state and the caused 
target state therefore have identical temporal extents; a sentence like Tissue obstructed 
the blood vessel for ten minutes is therefore predicted not to display the high/low 
ambiguity in temporal modification that is elsewhere evidence of a decomposed target 
state.  This test will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
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3.3.1 What is not evidence: Vendlerian lexical aspect 
 Dowty (1979) attempts to provide an aspect calculus which equates Vendler’s 
four lexical aspectual classes – states, activities, accomplishments, and achievements – 
with decompositional syntactic and semantic structures; in this analysis, accomplishment 
and achievement verbs are the categories which lexicalize changes of state and are 
associated with decomposed state predicates in their semantic structure.  This is by now a 
popular belief, and is expressed even in works as recent as Dubinsky and Simango 
(1996), yet the tests that Vendler and Dowty propose to characterize accomplishment and 
achievement predicates are sensitive not to the presence of a target state, but merely to 
the durativity and telicity of a predicate.  The work of Beth Levin and her co-authors 
(Rappaport Hovav and Levin 1998, Hay, Kennedy, and Levin 1999, among others) has 
demonstrated that although telicity and change of state may frequently be associated, 
verbs need not entail a change of state or include a decomposed target state in order to be 
telic, and verbs that do entail a change of state need not be telic.  Determining the lexical 
aspect of a predicate is therefore not sufficient to determine whether it should be 
decomposed into an eventive (inchoative or causative) component and a target or 
resulting state component. 
 For example, the degree achievements discussed by Hay, Kennedy, and Levin 
(1999) pattern like activity predicates (i.e., are durative and atelic, as shown by the 
acceptability of the temporal adverbial for twenty minutes) when they involve a change of 
state of an indefinite degree, as in (48)a.  These predicates pattern like accomplishments 
(i.e., are durative and telic, as shown by the acceptability of the telic temporal adverbial 
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in twenty minutes) when the change of state is understood to reach a contextually-defined 
point on the scale (i.e., whatever temperature is considered warm in the context), as in 
(48)b, or when the change involves a specific interval along the scale, as in (48)c. 
(48) a. The chemist slowly warmed the solution for twenty minutes.71 
 b. The chemist warmed the solution in twenty minutes. 
 c. The chemist warmed the solution five degrees in twenty minutes. 
Telicity is not an inherent and unchangeable property of causative change of state verbs 
like warm, even though it would plausibly be decomposed into an eventive (causative) 
component and a target state component; atelicity is therefore not a reliable indication of 
the absence of a decomposed state. 
 Likewise, telicity is not a reliable indication of the presence of a decomposed 
state.  Certain verbs like scrub and wash may have primarily an activity (i.e., durative and 
atelic) sense, as in (49)a, as indicated again by the durative, atelic temporal adverbial.  
They may also have an accomplishment sense (i.e., durative and telic, as indicated by the 
adverbial), as in (49)b, if the direct object is taken to be an incremental theme (Krifka 
1987, Dowty 1991): an argument of the verb for which a homomorphism exists between 
the progress of the event denoted by the verb and the extent to which some property holds 
of that argument.  On this reading, the scrubbing event culminates when the scrubbing 
action has been completed over the entire surface of the tub; the physical extent of the 
tub’s surface that has been scrubbed can be homomorphically mapped to the progress of 
the scrubbing event.  Note that whether the direct object is the stain or the tub, it is 
merely an implicature and not an entailment that the stain itself or the surface of the tub 
                                                 
71 The rate adverbial slowly has been added to this sentence to eliminate a reading in 
which the temporal adverbial indicates the length of time the solution remained warm. 
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change in any way. 
(49) a. Marge scrubbed the stain for twenty minutes. 
 b. Marge scrubbed the tub in twenty minutes. 
 c. Marge scrubbed the tub clean in twenty minutes. 
On an account of resultative secondary predication like that of Rappaport Hovav and 
Levin (1998), resultative secondary predicates can be added only to verbs which do not 
already lexicalize a change of state; the acceptability of the resultative secondary 
predicate clean in (49)c would therefore provide additional evidence that scrub by itself 
does not lexicalize a change of state, whether the direct object is the stain or the tub.  If 
the lexicalization of a change of state is required in order for a target state to be 
decomposed for a given verb, scrub should not be decomposed in this way, despite the 
fact that it has a telic use in (49)b.  Lexical aspect, as understood in the sense of Vendler 
and Dowty, is therefore not sufficient to determine whether a verb lexicalizes a change of 
state, and does not determine whether it should be decomposed into an eventive portion 
and a target state portion. 
3.3.2 What is evidence: Ambiguity of temporal modification 
 Dowty (1979) devotes an entire chapter to evaluating the different types of 
evidence that have been used to argue for the decomposition of a target state component 
within eventive verbs.  While he finds most of the types of data not to require a 
decompositional analysis, there are several types which he does feel are best explained by 
appealing to decomposition, and which may therefore provide the strongest diagnostics 
for the presence of a grammatically-accessible lexicalized target state for a given verb.  
This evidence in general involves scope ambiguities in which modifiers (both 
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morphological and syntactic) of certain predicates appear to have two different readings 
based on whether they modify the entire event denoted by the predicate or merely a target 
state which is the actual or intended result of this event. 
 The first class of examples involves durative temporal modification.  The 
argument may be illustrated most clearly with a clause which uncontroversially contains 
two eventuality arguments, such as the periphrastic causative in (50).  The temporal point 
or duration that is specified by an adverbial on the right edge of a periphrastic causative 
sentence may be interpreted as holding either of the eventuality denoted by the 
complement of the causative (a so-called “low” reading) or the eventuality denoted by the 
causative itself (a “high” reading). 
(50) a. The wicked witch made the princess sleep when the clock struck midnight. 
 b. The wicked witch made the princess sleep for a hundred years. 
In the first sentence, the modifier when the clock struck midnight can be understood as 
giving either the time that some activity on the part of the wicked witch went on (the 
eventuality which resulted in the princess sleeping, denoted by the causative) or the time 
of the princess’s sleeping (the eventuality denoted by the complement of the causative).  
Similarly, the modifier for a hundred years can be understood as giving the length of 
time of the wicked witch’s action, or the length of time that the princess slept.72 
 The use of the terms “high” and “low” to describe these readings reflects a 
                                                 
72 Since English does not mark repetitiveness on verbs, there are actually two high 
readings for this sentence, which easier to see in a non-causative example like The wicked 
witch chanted the spell for a hundred years.  There is a repetitive reading on which for 
one hundred years the wicked witch repeatedly performs the action of chanting, and 
another on which the wicked witch’s single action of chanting lasts for one hundred 
years.  The telic nature of the event in the single-event reading of made the princess sleep 
makes that reading somewhat degraded with the atelic temporal adverbial, however. 
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structural explanation of this ambiguity, where the structure of a periphrastic causative 
like the ones in (50) is assumed to be something like [ make [ the princess [ sleep ] ] ]; the 
high reading corresponds to the syntactic attachment of the modifier at the level of the 
verb make, while the low reading corresponds to the syntactic attachment of the modifier 
at the level of the verb sleep.  If this ambiguity is to be given a structural explanation, 
then other structural properties of such sentences, such as pronominal binding 
possibilities (on an account of binding in terms of c-command), would be expected to 
correlate with the reading of the adverbial.  Since making this argument most strongly 
would require first providing evidence for the syntactic analysis of the sentences in (50), I 
will not pursue it here, especially since the judgments of the binding possibilities for the 
two interpretations may be quite subtle, and because a syntactic explanation for the 
ambiguity is not required.73  The minimum that these examples are intended to show is 
that there are two eventualities which the temporal modifiers may modify, corresponding 
to the single eventuality arguments that make and sleep have in other contexts. 
 This ambiguity is not limited to periphrastic causatives where positing two 
eventuality arguments is straightforward.  A similar type of ambiguity can be observed 
with morphological causatives as in (51), though their properties are not exactly the same 
                                                 
73 The argument would require judgments concerning a sentence like the one in (i). 
(i) The wicked witch made everyi princess sleep when heri clock struck midnight. 
On a low reading of the adverbial, the pronoun her in the when-clause should be able to 
be bound by the quantifier every princess. (In this syntactic configuration, it may also be 
bound by the wicked witch.) What is predicted to be impossible on a syntactic 
explanation of this ambiguity is a high reading of the when-clause while the quantifier 
binds the pronoun – that is, in a context in which the action of the wicked witch takes 
place toward a given princess when that princess’s clock strikes midnight.  I am not even 
confident of my own judgments in this context. 
 102
as periphrastic causatives. 
(51) a. The presenter darkened the room when John came in. 
 b. The presenter darkened the room for three hours. 
In (51)a, unlike for the periphrastic causative, the time provided by the adverbial may 
only be understood as the time that the presenter performed some action, and not the time 
that the room was in a certain state (as it would be in The room was dark when John 
came in).  In (51)b, however, the duration of time given by the adverbial may be 
understood either as the length of time that the presenter was doing something (flipping 
switches, closing drapes, or sealing up light leaks) or the length of time that the room was 
in a certain state (as a result of what the presenter did). 
 This is exactly the same type of ambiguity that was seen with the periphrastic 
causatives, and so it is reasonable to ascribe a similar explanation to it in terms of the 
structural (i.e., syntactic) placement of the modifier relative to the expressions that are 
associated with two eventuality arguments.  With the causativized adjective darken, as 
with the periphrastic causative make sleep, the presence of two eventuality arguments is 
reasonable – one provided by the adjective which corresponds to the target state of the 
room, and one provided by the causative morpheme which corresponds to the causing 
event.  Recall that the interpretation of temporal modifiers like this is one of the facts 
which prompted Kratzer (2000) to argue for two eventuality arguments in such forms. 
 Interestingly, the same behavior seen for morphological causatives can be seen 
with verbs which overtly bear no relation to an (underived) adjective. 
(52) a. Mary hid the present when John came in. 
 b. Mary hid the present for a few minutes. 
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In (52)a, the time provided by the adverbial can only be understood as the time that Mary 
performed the action.  By contrast, in (52)b the adverbial may be understood as providing 
either the length of time that Mary’s action went on or the length of time that the present 
remained in a certain condition.74 
 Advocating a structural explanation of the ambiguity in sentences like those in 
(52) is controversial.  A structural explanation for the ambiguity in (50) is not 
controversial, since the syntactic structure to accommodate a structural ambiguity is 
clearly present.  Likewise, structurally accounting for cases like (51) is minimally more 
complicated, and requires interleaving morphological and syntactic structure to provide a 
structural account; certain theories of morphology, such as Distributed Morphology 
(Halle and Marantz 1993, 1994; Harley and Noyer 1999), make such a claim for 
independent reasons.  There is no evidence for morphosyntactic structure within an 
apparently monomorphemic verb like hide apart from this ambiguity.  The similarities 
between these and the previous cases make a uniform analysis attractive, but at the cost 
of proposing internal morphosyntactic structure where none is directly observed.  
Moreover, English appears not to contain a separate morphologically underived lexical 
item which expresses the decomposed target state of being hidden from which the verb 
                                                 
74 The higher, event reading in this example may be slightly infelicitous for several 
reasons.  This adverbial may involve a longer than normal time for such events, and as an 
atelic temporal adverbial may also conflict with the necessarily telic nature of a single 
event of hiding, unlike the degree achievement darken.  When the hiding event is atelic, 
or rather, when an atelic sequence of multiple hiding events is involved, an event reading 
is more natural: Mary hid the presents for a few minutes.  Alternatively, with a telic 
temporal adverbial and a slightly richer context (provided by only), the sentence is also 
better with an event reading, though the telic adverbial does not allow a low, state-
duration reading: May hid the present in only a few minutes. 
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hide would be derived, comparable to the adjective dark from which the verb darken is 
derived.  Nevertheless, Dowty and other linguists find this trade-off worthwhile.75 
 While not ambiguous like the sentences in (52), the similar examples in (53) show 
that there are other verbs which appear to involve at least two separate targets (in a non-
technical sense) for temporal modification, even where no morphosyntactic structure is 
observed (this example slightly modified from Dowty 1979:252). 
(53) a.  John loaned his bicycle to Bill until tomorrow. 
 b. * John read a book until tomorrow. 
The past tense marked on the verb in (53)a hints that the future adverbial must be 
modifying something else; the unacceptability of (53)b indicates that this is not a general 
property of verbs, but is unique to certain verbs.  If temporal modification is always 
carried out semantically by means of eventuality variables, then positing multiple 
eventuality variables, whatever their source, receives additional support. 
3.3.3 What is evidence: ambiguity with again and re- 
 Scope ambiguities similar to those in (50) through (52) can also be observed with 
other types of modifiers, the most well-known of which are again and the semantically 
similar prefix re-.  Examples of these ambiguities with periphrastic causatives, 
morphological causatives, and apparently monomorphemic verbs are shown below. 
                                                 
75 It is worth asking whether an adjective like dark is really as underived as it looks.  
Within Distributed Morphology, adjectives like this are assumed to be composed of a 
lexical root that has combined with a category-assigning head, and some authors (e.g. 
Embick 2003, 2004) propose that adjectives combine with aspectual morphemes, as well.  
On such an analysis, the state passive hidden is not significantly different from the 
adjective dark, and in fact hidden appears to be a state passive with a derived stative 
meaning – it does not require the state it denotes to result from an event, which is a 
meaning very similar to that of dark. 
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(54) a. The wicked witch made the princess sleep again. 
(55) a. The presenter darkened the room again. 
 b. The presenter re-darkened the room. 
(56) a. Mary hid the present again. 
 b. Mary re-hid the present. 
Sentences with again generally have both a “high” and “low” reading, similar to the 
temporal adverbials seen previously.  If again is taken to modify the higher verb in (54)a, 
the wicked witch must have performed this action before, while if again modifies the 
lower verb, Aurora must have been asleep before, even if this is the first time that the 
witch has cast any spell on her.  Similarly for the high readings of (55)a and (56)a, the 
presenter and Mary must have performed this action before, while on the low readings, 
all that is required is that the room have been dark or the present have been hidden 
before. 
 The ambiguity with re- (which is not acceptable on the causative make) is very 
similar.  On the high readings of (55)b and (56)b, the presenter and Mary are claimed to 
perform an action that has been performed before (by them or potentially by someone 
else), and on the low readings, the room and the present are claimed to return to a 
condition that they were in before.  These sentences, involving nearly identical 
morphological and syntactic ambiguities to those seen with atelic temporal adverbials 
like for a few minutes, also strongly motivate an account that interleaves morphological 
and syntactic structure, as in Distributed Morphology, and which posits morphosyntactic 
structure even for apparently monomorphemic verbs like hide.76 
                                                 
76 Evidence discussed by Dowty but which is not repeated here includes scope ambiguity 
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3.3.4 Other attempts to explain this evidence are unsatisfactory 
 Ambiguities in the interpretation of modifiers like the ones just discussed appear 
to provide the strongest argument for decomposing a target state in verbs like hide.  
Instead of a structural account of these ambiguities, however, it might be proposed that 
these facts can be explained semantically using meaning postulates or calculated 
entailments.  For instance, it might be claimed that the lexical entry for hide specifies 
only the kind of event that takes place – in a Davidsonian framework, hide might have 
only a single eventuality argument that ranges over events proper – and that speakers 
know based on their knowledge about the world that an event of hiding something entails 
that the object be out of sight or difficult to find for some length of time.  Temporal 
modifiers like for a few minutes and again might be predicated of this condition as a 
result of this calculated entailment. 
 While real-world knowledge probably does allow speakers to draw a number of 
conclusions from the occurrence of a verb, not all of these conclusions have this 
characteristic of being grammatically-accessible for modification in the way that the 
modifiable target states must be.  An explanation for the modifier ambiguity facts that 
relies on calculated entailments therefore incorrectly predicts that all entailments should 
be temporally modifiable to the same extent.  Dowty (1979:267) notes, for instance, that 
the verb hospitalize, at least in a modern Western context, entails among other things that 
the patient (in both senses of the term) come to be inside a building.  This entailment does 
not, however, license a low reading of an adverbial like again in the sentence in (57) with 
                                                                                                                                                 
with reversative un- and the referential opacity of the direct object of verbs like want, 
need, and seek, a property which is typically associated with embedded clauses. 
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this particular interpretation, where the state which holds for a second time is the state of 
Mary residing in a building.  If a low reading is present for (57), it must be that Mary is 
again in a hospital and not just any particular building. 
(57)  Dr. Windsor hospitalized Mary again. 
 To refine this proposal, it might be proposed that certain entailments (such as 
those for the target state of verbs like hide) may be made in the grammar, while other 
entailments (such as the entailment of hospitalize that the referent of the direct object 
come to be in a building) may be made based on encyclopedic knowledge – for instance, 
that all hospitals are buildings.  This becomes almost indistinguishable, however, from an 
account which decomposes a verb into an eventive and a stative component within the 
grammar, and if a Davidsonian analysis of adverbial modification is motivated for the 
primary eventuality (i.e., the eventuality that tense operates on), then the simplest overall 
account would treat adverbial modification of the secondary (target state) eventuality in 
the same way.77 
 Yet another counterproposal is that the adverbs in question are simply vague 
about what they may modify, and that speakers choose an appropriate object for 
modification from the context.  Similar reasoning to that used above shows that this is 
equally unworkable.  As with the calculated entailment proposal, there must be some 
special listing of which objects are appropriate and which are not in any given context, 
since contexts which would otherwise appear to provide a suitable object (the hospitalize 
                                                 
77 Stechow (2001) discusses further counterarguments to a recent paper arguing against 
decomposition of target states in the meaning of verbs, in the context of the German 
adverb wieder ‘again’. 
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example in (57)) do not allow multiple readings.  Such a listing would be nearly 
equivalent to positing multiple eventuality arguments in just those cases, but not others. 
3.3.5 How flexible is this decompositional structure? 
 While these adverbial scope ambiguities appear to provide support for a 
decompositional analysis of certain verbs and not others (and therefore may serve as 
diagnostics for the presence of at least those target states which are temporally limited 
and distinct in their temporal extent from the higher eventuality in the sentence), whether 
a verb is understood to include a lexically-specified target state may potentially change 
under certain conditions.  When presented with an utterance which can be interpreted 
only by assuming a decomposed target state, listeners are sometimes willing to assume 
such a representation for verbs which would not normally be associated with a lexicalized 
target state.  If this coercibility varies in different syntactic contexts, then this can skew a 
survey of the lexicon in favor of decomposed target states (if the diagnostics used to 
detect decomposed states themselves provide such coercion), or can lead to acceptance of 
forms in a context which depends on the presence of a decomposed state (such as target 
state passives, if that context provides coercion), even when other diagnostics show no 
evidence of a decomposed state.  Thus, the generalization that the existence of a state 
passive with a target state interpretation correlates with the possibility of a low reading 
for temporal modifiers may appear to be inaccurate. 
 To illustrate, it was argued above that the verb scrub did not lexicalize a change 
of state and therefore should not be decomposed into components for an event and a 
target state, since a change of state of its direct object is an implicature but not an 
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entailment, and since a resultative secondary predicate like clean may be added to the 
verb.  We can now add to this evidence the fact that scrub does not result in ambiguities 
with adverbials like again and for ten minutes, as in (58). 
(58) a. Marge scrubbed the tub again.        (high reading only) 
 b. Marge scrubbed the tub for ten minutes.     (high reading only) 
We may note, however, that a resulting condition like that denoted by clean is often the 
intended result of a scrubbing action, and interestingly, this verb appears to marginally 
allow a target state reading of the adjectival passive (as determined by Kratzer’s still-test) 
when the object is the tub – something which may naturally be described as clean.  
Interestingly, the acceptability of a target state reading is reduced when the object is the 
stain – something which may not naturally be described as clean.78 
(59) a. ? When I came back the next day, the tub was still scrubbed. 
  b. * When I came back the next day, the stain was still scrubbed. 
 To the extent that (59)a is acceptable, the condition which is taken to be holding 
upon the speaker’s return is that the tub is clean as the result of a scrubbing process – that 
it is at least as clean as when the scrubbing event concluded.  The marginality of this 
form, taken with the earlier evidence that this verb does not require a change of state, 
may indicate that the morphosyntactic context of a target state passive in (59) forces the 
listener to reanalyze the verb scrub as if it did lexicalize a target state that results from the 
scrubbing event.  That is, if it is correct that state passives with a target state 
interpretation are derived from roots that include a lexicalized state (as proposed in 
different ways by both Kratzer and Dubinsky and Simango), then in order for still in 
                                                 
78 The sentence The tub is clean is much more natural than The stain is clean, 
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(59)a to be acceptable, the verb scrub as used here must lexicalize a target state.  The 
typically intended target state which is associated with a scrubbing event – namely that 
the object is clean – must be reinterpreted as a lexicalized change of state for the sentence 
in (59)a to be acceptable.  In fact, the sentence in (59)a appears to have exactly the same 
meaning as the sentence in (59)c below, whose complex predicate explicitly lexicalizes 
this very target state. 
(59) c. When I came back the next day, the tub was still scrubbed clean. 
 We can therefore conclude that, although a verb may lack a lexicalized target 
state, as indicated by the grammatical contexts which are intended to detect such states, 
the syntactic context of a target state passive may motivate a reinterpretation of the verb 
as if it did lexicalize a target state.  We might therefore expect target state passives to 
occur (albeit marginally) with more verbs than the evidence for decomposition indicates.  
Since this is a matter of reinterpretation, this may be expected to vary with pragmatic 
factors in a given context, and possibly to vary on a language-specific, verb-specific, or 
speaker-specific basis.  If this direction of coercion is common for similar alternations in 
other languages (i.e., that resultatives with target state interpretations can coerce 
interpretations that temporal modifiers cannot), then we can at least conclude that, other 
things being equal, all verbs which have low readings of temporal modifiers should allow 
a resultative with a target state interpretation. 
3.4 Summary 
 The analyses of resultatives presented in this chapter appealed to the idea that 
some verbs which express an event are somehow related to a state or property which 
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results from that event in such a way that that state is grammatically active or accessible 
to operations of the grammar.  It is this target state which then forms the basis for at least 
a subset of resultative forms derived from these verbs.  The issue of independently 
determining exactly which verbs lexicalize these target states was touched on in both of 
these analyses, and expanded upon here.  Dubinsky and Simango described the set of 
verbs which occur with the Chichewa stative as accomplishment verbs whose themes 
undergo a change of state, but this use of Vendlerian lexical aspect was seen to be not 
viable.  Kratzer’s appeal to the availability of a low, state-modifying reading of temporal 
adverbials was seen to be one of two similar diagnostics which together provide the 
strongest evidence for decomposing target states in apparently underived lexical items. 
 Clearly, the proper analysis of resultatives and similar phenomena depends 
closely on the proper analysis of events and resulting or target states.  As Kratzer showed 
for German, however, there are also resultative forms which are stative, but which 
nevertheless do not derive from predicates of states.  In her analysis, it is apparently an 
accident that two morphemes as semantically different as the target stativizer and post 
stativizer of (37) have identical morphological expressions.  While historical accident 
may be the explanation for certain properties of language, other explanations also need to 
be considered, at the risk of overlooking an opportunity to learn something about 
language.  This is particularly true since resultatives with the same phonological 
expression in Pima will be seen in the following chapter to display the same two 
interpretations as the German state passives. 
 The following chapter will therefore examine in detail two kinds of resultatives in 
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Pima.  Of particular interest will be the set of verbs which allow resultatives and the 
distribution of target state interpretations of those resultatives, including their 
grammatical category and their interaction with other derivational morphology.  Other 
properties of the derived forms will also turn out to be relevant for their analysis, such as 
the apparent semantic inaccessibility of causers and agentive arguments and the status as 
a derived stative or as a resultative proper. 
 113
4. Pima resultatives and derived statives 
 It has already been noted that resultatives are not uncommon in natural language – 
that is, it is not uncommon that there exists a morphological relationship between an 
eventive predicate and a stative predicate which denotes, for example, a target state in the 
sense of Parsons (1990) rather than simply an aspectual form that is temporally stative.79  
The English adjectival passive and the German state passive are of this type, though 
because English and German are quite closely related, it may not be surprising that they 
share this type of alternation.  Chichewa, however, which was the other focus of the 
previous chapter, is a Bantu language quite unrelated to English and German; the 
similarity in meaning of the Chichewa stative to the English and German state passive is 
therefore surprising if such alternations are at all rare.  Other languages which appear to 
show similar morphological alternations include such typologically varied languages as 
Korean, Mandarin Chinese, Archi, Chukchee, Aleut, Uzbek, Ewe, Homeric Greek, 
Tongan, Indonesian, Arabic, Russian, Lithuanian, and Finnish (Geuder and Kim 2001 
and Lee 2003 for Korean, all others from Nedjalkov 1988).  This chapter will focus on a 
further example of such an alternation from Pima (or Akimel O’odham), a Southern Uto-
Aztecan language of North America. 
 Pima is a language of the Tepiman branch of Southern Uto-Aztecan, spoken in 
several communities to the east and south of Phoenix, Arizona.  Speakers of the language 
refer to themselves as Akimel O'odham (‘river people’), and the Pima language and the 
                                                 
79 Here I use the term “relationship”, rather than “derivation”, since the exact nature of 
this relationship is not agreed upon – Dubinsky and Simango (1996) derive the stative 
form from the eventive form, while Kratzer (2000) derives both the stative and eventive 
forms from a common abstract form. 
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language of the Papago or Tohono O'odham (‘desert people’) are frequently considered 
to be dialects of a single O'odham language.  Although the two dialects have 
grammatically significant (though sometimes subtle) differences, they each have two 
verb suffixes – which are pronounced –s and –kc (or just –c in certain contexts) – which 
appear to pattern the same and which derive resultatives; these two suffixes produce 
verbs which display different argument relations relative to their base verbs.  Technical 
linguistic works written on the O'odham languages, however, say very little about them, 
and what little has been said focuses on Tohono O'odham. 
 Saxton (1982), writing about Tohono O'odham, describes these two suffixes as 
resultatives which form a passive-active pair, but gives little additional detail beyond a 
number of example sentences.  One of these suffixes (the –s) patterns very much like the 
Chichewa stative and the English and German state passive: the suffixed verb takes a 
single argument which corresponds to the object of the unsuffixed verb.  This suffix will 
be referred to here as the PASSIVE RESULTATIVE.  The other suffix displays a different 
kind of behavior: the suffixed verb takes the same number of arguments as the unsuffixed 
verb, though with a stative meaning which typically involves control or possession on the 
part of the subject.  Following the terminology of Nedjalkov and Jaxontov (1988), this 
will be referred to as the POSSESSIVE RESULTATIVE.80  The properties of each of these 
suffixes will be discussed individually, and then several possible analyses will be 
considered.  I will show in the subsequent sections that the type of analysis which best 
                                                 
80 This differs from the terminology of Saxton (1982), who refers to these as ACTIVE 
RESULTATIVES.  While possession is not universally required for possessive resultatives, I 
have chosen to use the term POSSESSIVE rather than ACTIVE to avoid the confusion that 
might be possible with the latter term, since the suffixed verbs are temporally stative. 
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accounts for the range of interpretations associated with these suffixes is one which 
derives the meaning of a class of resultatives, as well as the eventive verbal forms, from a 
common morphosyntactic root whose meaning consists only of the target state of the 
eventive verb. 
4.1 Passive resultative: The Pima –s suffix 
 The passive resultative suffix in Pima has the phonological shape [s].  The 
O'odham dictionary of Saxton, Saxton, and Enos (1983) gives an entry for this –s suffix 
as below. 
(60) “…[a] suffix added to active verbs and gerunds to form stative verbs [which 
mean] ‘be in a (specified) state as a result of action’.” (51) 
The syntactic and semantic properties of this suffix will be discussed below. 
4.1.1 Syntactic properties of the –s suffix 
 For a large number of eventive transitive verbs in Pima, this definition is perfectly 
adequate, as exemplified in (61) by the verb matog ‘to disassemble, take apart’. 
(61) a. Jason  'a-t            mato81                 heg  maagina.82 
              AUX-PFV  disassemble:PFV  DET  engine 
  Jason disassembled the engine. 
 b. 'Iida  maagina  'o                matog-s. 
  this   engine     3:SUB:IMP  disassemble-PASR 
  This engine is disassembled. 
 c. * Jason  'o  matogs  heg  maagina. 
  This engine is disassembled by Jason. 
This data shows the basis on which Saxton (1982) referred to the –s as a “passive” 
                                                 
81 Perfective aspect of the sentence is indicated by the –t morpheme in the second-
position auxiliary, but many verbs are also marked as occurring in the perfective by 
truncation of the final consonant, here g. 
82 Data is written in the orthography used by the UCLA Pima group, which is similar to 
the official orthography for Tohono O'odham except that 〈d:〉 represents a voiced alveolar 
plosive and 〈sh〉 represents a voiceless alveopalatal sibilant. 
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resultative suffix: the subject of the unsuffixed form (Jason in (61)a) is not an argument 
of the suffixed form (as shown by (61)c), while the direct object of the unsuffixed form 
(heg maagina ‘the engine’ in (61)a) is the subject of the suffixed form (as in (61)b).  
Based on data like this, the –s appears to involve very much the same kind of meaning as 
the target state interpretation of the German and English state passive and the Chichewa 
stative. 
 Like the German state passive, however, the Pima –s suffix can sometimes 
receive what appears to be a different interpretation.  The definition in (60), which like 
any dictionary entry must necessarily be brief, does not convey the variety of 
interpretations that this suffix appears to receive, as well as the variety of bases that it 
attaches to in Pima. 
 For instance, it can attach to many intransitive verbs, where it does not always 
seem to receive the same kind of resultative target state interpretation as on transitive 
verbs like matog.  Intransitive verbs that typically involve motion along a path appear to 
receive what Goldberg and Jackendoff (2004) refer to as an EXTENSION INTERPRETATION: 
the denotation of the theme argument, idealized as an extended line, occupies the entire 
path denoted by the verb.  This also shifts the predicate from denoting a transitory event 
to being non-transitory and possibly individual level, a property which appears to be 
common to all occurrences of the –s suffix.83  Although syntactic tests for an 
unaccusative/unergative distinction in Pima have not yet been well studied, the verbs in 
                                                 
83 Equating non-transitory with individual level is not always warranted, however, as 
noted by Jäger (1999).  It is not clear that individual level is the most appropriate label to 
apply to forms with the –s suffix; this point will be taken up at length below. 
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(62) are candidates for an unergative and an unaccusative, respectively, based on the 
semantic property of controlled vs. uncontrolled action (Levin and Rappaport Hovav 
1995).  Note that unlike the eventive transitive verb in (61), these verbs take the same 
number of arguments both with and without the –s suffix. 
(62) a. Muula  'a-t           'uug  voog  gahi      hii. 
  mule     AUX-PFV  high  road   across  go:PFV 
  The mule walked across the bridge. 
 b. Hodai  voog  'o              'am   gahi      him-s      'uug  voog  veco. 
  rock     road  3:SUB:IMP  DXF  across  go-PASR   high  road  under 
  The paved road goes under the bridge. 
 c. Juupin  'o                heg  kanaho. 
  sink       3:SUB:IMP  DET  boat 
  The boat is sinking. 
 d. Jeved:  'o-m                   ge     juupin-s. 
  earth     3:SUB:IMP-DXF  FOC  sink-PASR 
  The ground sinks (i.e., the ground level drops into a depression). 
Both the verbs in (62) may more properly be analyzed as unaccusative, however, since 
there exist other verbs which are also candidates for the class of unergative verbs, but for 
reasons of possible incorporation; the verb vattot ‘to build a ramada or brush arbor’ in 
(63) is derived from the noun vatto ‘ramada, brush arbor’. 
(63) a. Hemajkam  'o               vatto-t. 
  people         3:SUB:IMP  ramada-MAKE 
  The people are making a ramada. 
 b. Kii     veegaj    'o               ge    vatto-t-s. 
  house  behind  3:SUB:IMP  FOC  ramada-MAKE-PASR 
  Behind the house there is built a ramada. 
Verbs such as vattot, in contrast to verbs like him ‘to walk, to go’ and juupin ‘to sink’, do 
appear to take one fewer arguments when suffixed with the –s than without, as in (63)b; it 
is not clear what may be triggering subject agreement in such sentences. 
 A spatial, non-transitory interpretation with the –s suffix is not limited to 
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intransitive verbs involving motion along a path.  Positional verbs like daha ‘to sit (in a 
location)’ and vo'o ‘to lie flat (in a location)’, as well as other verbs like taatam ‘to touch’ 
that metaphorically indicate a position, may also host the –s prefix with the same kind of 
permanent spatial meaning that is typically used for geographic relationships, as in (64). 
(64) a. Los  Angeles  'o               'an    daha-s      kaacki  basho. 
                         3:SUB:IMP  DXS  sit-PASR    sea       in.front.of 
  Los Angeles sits on the coast. 
 b. S-cuk       Kaacki  'o               taatam-s       heg  hetasp  jejved:. 
  S-black84  sea        3:SUB:IMP  touch-PASR  DET  five     PL:land 
  The Black Sea touches five countries. 
Verbs with this interpretation are not restricted only to geographic uses, but may also 
refer to the canonical place of any particular object, such as a lamp whose canonical 
position is to sit on a table.  In the absence of a rich context, however, the spatial 
relationships that are most easily understood as permanent in this sense are geographic, 
such as Los Angeles being located on the coast.  Although this interpretation also appears 
to be available to motion verbs and positional verbs without the –s, the presence of a rate 
adverbial forces an activity interpretation of the motion verb, resulting in incompatibility 
with the geographic interpretation that is required by the –s suffix (as in (65)). 
                                                 
84 Here and in a number of examples below, there is a prefix with the shape s– which 
occurs on certain adjectives and verbs.  This prefix has the same phonological shape as 
the passive resultative suffix –s, and it is present on a number of the verbs that are 
derived by the –s.  It is important to clarify, however, that these two affixes are distinct, 
and although the s– may interact with stativity (more accurately, the acceptability of the 
s– may relate to the presence of an eventuality argument ranging over states), these two 
affixes are otherwise quite different.  Saxton, Saxton, and Enos (1983) analyze the s– 
prefix as a verb class marker which is present in non-negated contexts, and Zepeda 
(1984) uses the presence of the s– on a word as one determinant of grammatical class.  
For a detailed discussion of the properties of the s– and restrictions on its analysis, see 
Jackson (2002). 
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(65) a. S-vegi  'Akimel  'o                s-hottam   med:  kaacki  wui. 
  S-red     river       3:SUB:IMP  S-quickly  run     sea       to 
  The Colorado River is running quickly to the sea. 
 b.* Svegi  'Akimel  'o  s-hottam   mels  kaacki  wui. 
 An example with the –s suffix on an intransitive path verb illustrates another 
possibility for the interpretation of a verb with this –s suffix, namely as a noun. 
(66)  Kiihim  'o               juupin-s      c'ed:. 
  village  3:SUB:IMP  sink-PASR   in 
  The village is in a basin (i.e., a sunken area of the ground). 
A number of properties are indicative of nouns in Pima, including the ability to occur as 
the object of a postposition (as in (66)), occurrence with a determiner (frequently the 
default determiner heg, which is mandatory in certain syntactic contexts), and occurrence 
with a copula that is specific to predicate nouns (see (69)b).  What is responsible for the 
nominal properties seen here may be an instance of a more general alternation involving 
property concepts and the objects picked out by those properties, similar to alternations in 
English described by Gorbet (2003).  For reasons of space, I will continue to note where 
nominal interpretations are available, but will assume that the nominal cases follow 
naturally from whatever analysis is proposed to account for the verbal uses, as well; I will 
leave the precise nature of this phenomenon in Pima for future research.85 
 With intransitive verbs that do not lexicalize a path of motion or a spatial position, 
suffixation with the –s results in a verb which denotes an object that is characterized by 
                                                 
85 An alternation between property concepts and the objects that have those properties 
can be seen in English: “Give me your tired, your poor...”, meaning ‘people who are 
tired’ and ‘people who are poor’.  One difference between English and Pima is that while 
this alternation in English appears to be restricted either to humans or to abstract nouns, 
there appears to be no restriction at all in Pima.  Another difference is that in Pima, 
expressions which denote properties of objects but which are not derived by the –s 
apparently cannot be used in this way as nominal expressions to refer to those objects. 
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the action of the verb, typically involuntarily, again resulting in a non-transitory 
predicate.  As with its occurrence on other intransitive verbs, there is no change in the 
number of arguments that the verb takes with and without the –s. 
(67) a. Haahag  'o               'iig. 
  leaf        3:SUB:IMP  fall 
  The leaves are falling (and scattering). 
 b. Haahag  'o                veesko         'iig-s. 
  leaf        3:SUB:IMP  everywhere  fall-PASR 
  The leaves are fallen (and scattered) everywhere. 
 c. John  'o                gikujk. 
            3:SUB:IMP  whistle 
  John is whistling. 
 d. M-a-n-t                        o     veem  ñeo         heg  Gikujk-s 
  CPM-AUX-1s:SUB-PFV  IRR  with   talk:PFV  DET  whistle-PASR 
  I will talk with Whistler. 
This suffix is therefore not restricted to verbs that lexicalize a target state, though it is 
sometimes possible for the condition at the end of an event to be construed as a target 
state, as in (67)b.  Where no target state is available, such derived forms are frequently 
used as nicknames, as in (67)d, where whistling-events characterize a particular person 
(the event here is necessarily involuntary, therefore the whistling must be an involuntary 
characteristic, like a speech impediment, and not merely a habit of the person). 
 As with the intransitive verbs seen earlier, the suffixed form is judged by speakers 
of Pima to involve a sense of permanence, thus appearing to be non-transitory or 
individual level.  Verbs like those in (67)b as well as positional and path verbs with the –
s, however, may be modified by a durative temporal adverbial, which is typically 
unacceptable with individual level predicates.  The status of verbs suffixed with the –s as 
individual level predicates is therefore unclear. 
 Perhaps counter-intuitively, this suffix also appears on adjectives, though the 
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meaning contributed by the –s in such cases is not easy to discern.  An adjective with the 
–s suffix is sometimes interpreted as asserting that its argument does not prototypically 
instantiate the property contributed by the adjective (like English adjectives with –ish), 
though this does not appear to be consistent across all forms.  What appears to be more 
consistent is that adjectives suffixed with the –s give a sense of permanence (something 
like what is involved in individual level predication, as discussed above), even if the 
adjective was otherwise transitory.  Moreover, adjectives with the –s pattern syntactically 
as verbs: as verbs, they may require an adjectivizing suffix to occur as a prenominal 
modifier of a noun, and they may also occur as the main predicate in a clause without a 
verbalizing suffix, even when the adjective would normally require such a suffix. 
(68) a. Cu'i   vaaga  'o                s-moik. 
  flour  dough  3:SUB:IMP  S-soft 
  The dough is soft. 
 b. Cu'i   vaaga  'o                moik-s. 
  flour  dough  3:SUB:IMP  soft-PASR 
  The dough is soft (i.e., is the soft kind). 
Apart from the apparent change from transitory to non-transitory, however, the argument 
structure of the adjective does not appear altered; a single argument is taken either way. 
 This suffix also occurs on ditransitive verbs, where the argument structure is 
altered to include just two arguments, rather than three.  Such forms appear to 
preferentially receive a nominal interpretation (as indicated by the choice of copula in 
(69)b), though a verbal interpretation is also available (as in (69)c). 
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(69) a. Lulsi   'a-p-t                   'am    heñ-'aa'ad. 
  candy  AUX-2s:SUB-PFV  DXF  1s:OBJ-promise 
  You promised me candy. 
 b. Lulsi   maakig      'od:   heñ-'aa'ad-s. 
  candy  give-NOM  COP  1s:OBJ-promise-PASR 
  A gift of candy is my promise (i.e., the promise that is made to me). 
 c. Lulsi  'o                 ki'ap  heñ-'aa'ad-s. 
  candy  3:SUB:IMP  still    1s:OBJ-promise-PASR 
  Candy is still promised to me. 
When interpreted as verbs, forms with the –s suffix that are derived from ditransitive 
verbs take two nominal arguments which correspond to the direct and indirect objects of 
the base – a goal and a theme in (69).  The presence of both arguments can be shown by 
the properties of subject and object agreement in Pima; verbs are marked for agreement 
with at most one object by a prefix or clitic on the verb itself, and when both a direct and 
an indirect object are present, the verb agrees with the indirect object, as in (69)a.86  This 
pattern of agreement does not change when the –s suffix is attached, as can be seen in 
(69)b and c.  When interpreted as a verb, the other argument (the direct object of the 
unsuffixed, ditransitive verb) surfaces as a subject, triggering third person subject 
agreement on the second position auxiliary. 
 When this suffix attaches to transitive psychological predicates, however, which 
are all individual level and therefore non-eventive, the argument structure appears to 
remain the same, as it did with adjectives and at least some intransitives. 
                                                 
86 This is true as long as the indirect object is not introduced by an adpositional phrase; if 
so, the adposition agrees with the indirect object and the verb with the direct object. 
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(70) a. S-heñ-kee'id87   'o                heg  'Uupio. 
  S-1s:OBJ-hate     3:SUB:IMP  DET  Skunk 
  Skunk hates me. 
 b. S-heñ-kee'id-s         'o                heg  'Uupio. 
  S-1s:OBJ-hate-PASR  3:SUB:IMP  DET  Skunk 
  Skunk hates me. 
Although it is not completely clear what difference in meaning there is between these two 
forms, speakers feel that such verbs with the –s suffix are compatible with situations in 
which the emotion is somewhat inconsistent across time, while such verbs without the –s 
give the impression that the emotion is more consistent. 
 Non-eventive verbs which are not psychological, such as maas ‘look like’, do not 
allow the –s suffix, which may indicate that some difference in semantics or argument 
structure between psychological predicates and other non-eventive predicates may 
interact with the morphosyntax or semantics of the –s.  The presence of any stative verbs 
which allow the –s, however, whether psychological or not, is difficult to account for in a 
way parallel to Kratzer’s analysis of the German state passive, since stative verbs on her 
analysis systematically lack a Davidsonian eventuality argument of any kind.  No stative 
verbs, by Kratzer’s claim, are able to form state passives in German (2000:12). 
 We can conclude, then, based at least on the eventive transitive and ditransitive 
verbs, as well as potentially unergative verbs like vatto ‘to make a ramada’, that the 
argument which is uniformly absent when the –s is present is the (typically) agentive 
external argument.  If all of the other cases of attachment of the –s to intransitive verbs 
involve attachment to unaccusative roots, and if the difference between unergative and 
                                                 
87 The s- prefix, seen in these and a number of foregoing examples, may have a less direct 
association with stativity.  See Jackson (2002) for a discussion of this prefix. 
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unaccusative verbs rests in the semantic type of the subject (a difference which would be 
expressed syntactically in some theories of argument structure, such as that assumed by 
Kratzer 2000), then this generalization may be maintained. 
4.1.2 Semantic properties of the –s suffix 
 The examples of the –s suffix seen so far show it attaching to several types of 
verbs, associated with several types of derived meanings.  An important question at this 
point is whether all these instances of suffixes with the shape –s constitute a single suffix, 
or whether there are distinct –s suffixes that attach to potentially disjoint sets of words.   
 Although the apparent meanings that the –s suffix is associated with are on the 
face of it quite different, the difference in meaning when the –s combines with eventive 
transitive verbs, unaccusative and unergative verbs, ditransitive verbs, stative verbs, and 
adjectives, may be reducible to properties of the expressions that the –s attaches to.  
There are, however, a number of grammatical and interpretive properties that are shared 
by each of the occurrences of the –s. 
 Recall that the definition given for this suffix by Saxton, Saxton and Enos (1983) 
(quoted in (60)) claimed that the forms derived by this suffix were stative.  It is possible 
to show by a number of the tests in (6) from chapter 2 that verbs with the –s suffix are 
temporally stative, and that in addition many are stative in the narrow sense: for example, 
they may hold at a single moment of time or over an interval, they are atelic, and they are 
unacceptable with rate adverbials like s-hottam ‘quickly’.88  Additionally, for Saxton, 
                                                 
88 Certain stative verbs in Pima do appear to be grammatical with s-hottam ‘quickly’, but 
in such a context they always receive an inchoative or inceptive interpretation in which 
what happens quickly is a change of state; moreover, other indicators for temporal 
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Saxton, and Enos, the assertion that such derived forms are stative includes a more 
specific claim about grammatical properties, since they explicitly categorize verbs in the 
O'odham languages based on their available aspectual forms: stative verbs are claimed to 
occur only in the imperfective aspect, not in the perfective.89  This property holds of all 
expressions derived by the –s that are interpreted as verbs (that is, all the occurrences for 
which grammatical aspect can be determined).  The sentences in (71) illustrate this 
property using a transitive eventive verbal base, but this behavior is typical of all forms 
suffixed with the –s. 
(71) a. Kuup-s       'o                heg  kuupad:ag. 
  close-PASR  3:SUB:IMP  DET  door 
  The door is closed. 
 b.* Kuup-s       'a-t           heg  kuupad:ag. 
    close-PASR  AUX-PFV  DET  door 
  (ungrammatical with any meaning) 
 Another property shared by all verbs derived by the –s suffix, as mentioned 
earlier, is that they give at least the impression of permanence, resembling what has been 
claimed for non-transitory or individual level predicates.  This is the case also for 
sentence (71)a, which in the absence of any other context gives the impression that the 
door is permanently closed.  As was also observed earlier, however, this sentence is 
compatible with an adverbial of temporal duration like hetasp kuinta 'ab ‘for five 
                                                                                                                                                 
stativity also show these verbs to be not stative when given this interpretation. 
89 Compatibility or incompatibility with grammatical aspect has been used by some 
authors (e.g., Smith 1991, Durst-Andersen 1993) to argue for particular values of lexical 
aspect; Dowty’s use of the progressive as a diagnostic for stativity is an example of this, 
as well.  A proper presentation of the issues involved in taking the imperfective as a 
diagnostic for stativity is beyond the scope of this dissertation, so I will merely accept the 
categorization of Saxton, Saxton, and Enos (1983). 
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minutes’, however, which makes a permanent interpretation impossible.90 
 If expressions with the –s suffix were in fact interpreted as post-state passives, the 
permanence of the property that they express would be expected.  Durative temporal 
modification should not be acceptable with expressions which denote a post-state, 
however, and it can be shown in other ways, as well, that most expressions with the –s 
suffix are interpreted as expressing target states rather than post states.  Although 
sentence (71)a gives the impression that the condition of the door will hold indefinitely, it 
does not simply mean that a closing event has occurred in the past.  This can be shown 
straightforwardly by the completely natural occurrence of the adverbial ki'ap ‘still’ with 
forms suffixed with the –s (note also ki'ap in (69)c, involving the verb 'aa'ads ‘to be 
promised’); thus, the verb kuups, at least, patterns like Kratzer’s target state passives. 
(72)  Ki'ap  'o                kuups. 
  still     3:SUB:IMP  close-PASR 
  It is still closed. 
 In addition to the acceptability of durative temporal modification and the ‘still’ 
diagnostic, the interaction of the –s with another verbal affix indicates that the –s derives 
something with a target state interpretation, rather than a post-state interpretation or a 
perfect.  There is a Pima verbal suffix –kahim whose meaning is that the property or 
activity denoted by the verb that it attaches to went on or was true in the past, but not at 
                                                 
90 The acceptability of temporal and spatial modification are two diagnostics for stage-
level predicates, though many stereotypically individual level predicates may sometimes 
occur with temporal or spatial modification: John liked peanut butter sandwiches for 
many years, but then he just got sick of peanuts.  What this may indicate is that individual 
level predicates may sometimes be rather easily coerced into stage-level-hood. 
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the present, rather like English used to.91  If such a suffix were to attach to a perfect (that 
is, a form like a post-state passive that claimed merely that some event concluded before 
the reference time – typically the moment of utterance), it would result in conflicting 
truth conditions; the post-state predicate should have been true in the past, but false at the 
present, a temporal pattern which post-states cannot display.  To give an English parallel, 
this is rather like saying *John used to have read ‘The Hobbit’; if it is true at a time t that 
John has read The Hobbit, then it must also be true at all times after t, which is 
inconsistent with the meaning of used to.  Speakers of Pima, however, use the –kahim 
suffix quite naturally on many verbs already derived by the –s suffix, and do not find 
anything strange about their truth conditions.92 
(73)  Maagina  'o                matog-s-kahim. 
  engine      3:SUB:IMP  take.apart-PASR-PDUR 
  The engine was (i.e., used to be) disassembled. 
We may conclude from this that although the –s appears to derive non-transitory verbs, 
the verbs that it derives are still target state forms, and not post-state (or perfect) forms. 
 It is important to note, however, that certain occurrences of the –s suffix have a 
derived stative meaning; for example, although the eventive verb kuup ‘to close 
(transitive)’ denotes an event, the stative form kuups ‘be closed’ derived from it does not 
entail that an event of closing ever happened.  It is entirely natural to describe something 
                                                 
91 Strictly speaking, it appears to assert that the property or activity held in the past, and is 
associated with an implicature that this property or activity does not hold at the present.  
Even if such implicatures may be cancelled, doing so should produce a notably different 
sense for speakers even if such forms are not contradictory; no such sense is observed by 
speakers of Pima. 
92 Interestingly, however, there are certain Pima resultatives with the –s that do not allow 
the –kahim suffix. 
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as kuups which has never been open.  This is also the case for the verb in (74)a, 'eestos 
‘to be hidden’.  This sentence can be uttered if this particular gold never underwent a 
process of being hidden; for example, mineralogical processes could be responsible for 
the occurrence of the gold in locations that make it not easy to find, even though this 
process could never be described as ‘hiding the gold’. 
(74) a. 'Oola  'o               'am   do'ag        c'ed:  'eesto-s. 
   gold   3:SUB:IMP  DXF  mountain  in      hide:PFV-PASR 
  The gold is hidden in the mountains. 
 b. 'Ali   'o                'atosha-d:ad-s. 
  child  3:SUB:IMP  diaper-put.on-PASR 
  The baby is diapered. 
This property does not hold for the verb in (74)b, 'atoshad:ads ‘to be diapered’, however; 
this sentence can only be uttered truthfully if the baby has undergone a process of 
diapering, in addition to the real-world knowledge that a speaker may have that might say 
that having a diaper on always comes about from a specific change of state. 
 A structural correlate of the difference in interpretation between 'eestos and 
'atoshad:ads appears to be the presence of overt verbalizing morphology.  Where a 
verbalizing suffix occurs as part of the base that the –s suffix attaches to, a past event of 
the state coming to hold is always required; this is true whether the verbalizing suffix is a 
purely causativizing suffix like –cud or –id, or a suffix with a more complex meaning like 
–d:ad ‘put on’ in (74)b.  This is interestingly reminiscent of Kratzer’s observations 
concerning the German state passive, where a target state reading of a state passive 
participle was unavailable if a verbal head was involved.  Here in Pima, however, both 
forms may have a target state reading (that is, a reading on which it is asserted that some 
condition or property holds), but only the form that lacks an overt verbalizing suffix may 
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receive a derived stative meaning, without entailing a past event of the initiation or 
inception of that property or state.  This implication goes in only one direction, however: 
it is not the case that every verbal base that lacks an overt verbalizing suffix is a derived 
stative, but only verbal bases that lack overt verbal morphology may also lack event 
entailments. 
4.2 Possessive resultative: The Pima –(k)c suffix 
 As mentioned earlier, the –s suffix in Pima and Papago appears to be the passive 
member of a pair of resultative suffixes (Saxton 1982).  The non-passive member of that 
pair, pronounced [kt ͡ʃ] (written –kc) after vowels and [t ͡ʃ] (written –c) after consonants, is 
defined by Saxton, Saxton, and Enos (1983) as follows: 
(75) “...[a] suffix added to non-stative verbs to form stative verbs with the same 
transitivity [which mean] ‘have or ([when marked] reflexive) be (in a specified 
state or condition)’.” (31) 
As with the –s suffix, while this definition encapsulates the meaning and use of this suffix 
for many transitive eventive verbs, the details of its behavior are much more varied. 
4.2.1 Syntactic properties of the –(k)c suffix 
 This suffix attaches to transitive (76)a,b and ditransitive verbs (76)c,d, where the 
suffixed form appears to have the same argument structure as the unsuffixed form. 
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(76) a. 'Amai   'a-n-t                    hiash        heg   heñ-'oola-ga. 
  there     AUX-1s:SUB-PFV  bury:PFV  DET  1s:POS-gold-ALN 
  I buried my gold there. 
 b. 'Amai  'a-ñ               hiash-c              heg   heñ-'oola-ga. 
  there    AUX-1s:SUB  bury:PFV-POSR  DET  1s:POS-gold-ALN 
  I keep my gold buried there. 
 c. Marcus  'a-t           maa         heg  Pam  heg   'e-lial-ga. 
                AUX-PFV  give:PFV  DET           DET  ¬1:POS-money-ALN 
  Marcus gave his money to Pam. 
 d. Marcus  'o               maak-c       heg  Pam  heg  'e-lial-ga. 
                3:SUB:IMP  give-POSR  DET           DET  ¬1:POS-money-ALN 
  Marcus has his money given (e.g., bequeathed) to Pam. 
Verbs with this suffix are translated alternately with English have and keep, both of 
which involve some degree of control on the part of the subject – loosely possession, or 
in clearer cases, the maintenance of a state or condition.  In the case of English have, the 
degree of control can extend even to volitional, eventive causation (Belvin 1996), as in an 
example like John had the choir sing a song, though this is not the case with the –(k)c 
suffix in Pima; the –(k)c suffix cannot receive an eventive causative reading.  For this 
reason, keep is sometimes used in the glosses to avoid the eventive causative senses that 
English have has.  Control and maintenance of a state or condition appears to be central 
to the meaning of this suffix, however, and determining the semantic source of the 
relevant state or condition will prove to be important. 
 This suffix generally does not attach to intransitive verbs or adjectives, but it does 
attach to a few; below are examples of this suffix on an intransitive verb (77)b and an 
adjective (77)d.  Where the –(k)c suffix does attach, the suffixed forms are transitive and 
receive an interpretation involving stative causation or control, frequently involuntary.93 
                                                 
93 An empirical hazard of finding forms with the –(k)c suffix in Pima is that the form of 
this suffix following a consonant is identical to the truncated form of the causative suffix 
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(77) a. Juupin  'o                heg  kanaho. 
  sink       3:SUB:IMP  DET  boat 
  The boat is sinking. (repeated from (62)c) 
 b. Kii      damhod:ag  'o                juupin-c      heg  Marcus. 
  house  ceiling         3:SUB:IMP  sink-POSR    DET   
  The ceiling has Marcus hunched over. 
 c. Jujul       kui   'a-n-t                    ñei. 
  crooked  tree  AUX-1s:SUB-PFV  see:PFV 
  I saw a crooked tree. 
 d. Jujul-c              'a-ñ               heg  'u'us. 
  Crooked-POSR  AUX-1s:SUB  DET  stick 
  I’m keeping the stick crooked. 
Note that in (77)b, an inherent property of the ceiling (such as its low height) is 
responsible for Marcus’s condition of being “sunk”, or hunched over. 
4.2.2 Semantic properties of the –(k)c suffix 
 This suffix has a number of properties in common with the –s suffix, which may 
have been what led Saxton (1982) to propose that they formed an active/passive pair.  For 
instance, the –(k)c suffix derives verbs that cannot occur with a perfective auxiliary.  
Compare the sentence below in the perfective aspect to (76)a and b. 
(78)  * 'Amai  'a-n-t                    hiash-c              heg  heñ-'oola-ga. 
   there   AUX-1s:SUB-PFV  bury:PFV-POSR  DET  1s:POS-gold-ALN 
  I kept my gold buried there.94 
                                                                                                                                                 
–cud, and phonetically quite similar to the truncated form of another causative suffix –jid.  
The proper morphological analysis of a final suffix which sounds like -c, however, can be 
determined by examining the aspect of the sentence: truncation occurs only in the 
perfective aspect, and the –(k)c never occurs in the perfective.  Therefore, a –c suffix in 
the imperfective should always be the –(k)c suffix, and a –c suffix in the perfective 
should always be either –cud or –jid.  It is not known, however, if the similarity of 
meaning (i.e., generally control) and form has led any speakers to reanalyze them as a 
single, more general causative suffix.  For a detailed discussion of causation in Pima, see 
Smith (2005). 
94 This sentence is nearly identical to a sentence with a truncated causative suffix on the 
verb, hiashpc ‘to bury for (PERFECTIVE)’, and some speakers may allow the sentence in 
(78) with this interpretation. 
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As mentioned in the discussion of the passive resultative suffix –s, this property is taken 
by Saxton, Saxton, and Enos (1983) to be characteristic of stative verbs.  Other tests can 
be used to show that such forms have other properties expected of temporally stative 
predicates: they may hold at a single moment of time or over an interval, they are atelic, 
and they are ungrammatical with rate adverbials like s-hottam ‘quickly’. 
 Also like verbs with the –s suffix, verbs with the –(k)c suffix give the impression 
of permanence and might potentially be analyzed as individual level predicates, but as 
with the –s, they are also compatible with durative temporal modification, something that 
Individual level predicates typically do not allow. 
(79) 'Amai  'a-ñ               hiash-c-kahim           heg   heñ-'oola-ga     hetasp  'ahidag  'ab. 
 there   AUX-1s:SUB  bury:PFV-POSR-PDUR  DET  1s:POS-gold-ALN  five   year      for 
 I kept my gold buried there for five years. 
In sentence (79), the durative time adverbial is most saliently understood as the length of 
time that the gold remained buried, though it may more properly correspond to the 
duration of the control exerted by the subject.95  This sentence also shows that the –(k)c, 
like the –s, is compatible with the past suffix –kahim, indicating that the state (or states?) 
denoted by the predicate is a target state, not a post-state.  This is likewise shown by the 
acceptability of the suffixed forms with ki'ap ‘still’. 
(80)  'Amai  'a-ñ               ki'ap  hiash-c             heg   heñ-'oola-ga. 
   there   AUX-1s:SUB  still   bury:PFV-POSR  DET  1s:POS-gold-ALN 
  I still keep my gold buried there. 
 Despite these similarities, there are significant differences between the –(k)c and 
-s suffixes which may make a parallel analysis difficult.  If these suffixes differed in 
                                                 
95 These intervals may be distinguished if, for example, control of the gold changes while 
the gold remains buried – such as if the owner dies and the gold is inherited by another. 
 133
meaning only in whether they deleted or absorbed an argument, then they would be 
expected to attach to the same verbs.  This is not the case. 
(81) a. 'Iida  tapial  'o               cikpan-s. 
   this  paper  3:SUB:IMP  work.on-PASR 
  This paper is worked-on. 
 b.* Marcus  'o               cikpan-c           heg  tapial. 
                   3:SUB:IMP  work.on-POSR  DET  paper 
  (bad with any meaning) 
 c.* Marcus  novi   'o               mavgid-s. 
                  hand  3:SUB:IMP  wave-PASR 
  (bad with any meaning) 
 d. Marcus  'o               mavgid-c      heg  'e-novi. 
                3:SUB:IMP  wave-POSR   DET  ¬1:POS-hand 
  Marcus keeps his hand waved (or waving). 
The verb in (81)a and b, cikpan ‘to work; to work on’, is a transitive eventive verb that 
allows the –s suffix but disallows the –(k)c suffix.  The verb in (81)c and d, mavgid ‘to 
wave (tr.)’, is a transitive eventive verb that disallows the –s suffix but allows the –(k)c 
suffix.  Neither verb shows a low reading of a durative temporal adverbial, which is 
characteristic of a lexicalized state.  Although both the –s and –(k)c suffixes may require 
similar lexical properties of the verbs they attach to, it appears that they cannot easily be 
considered merely an active/passive pair without allowing them to idiomatically specify 
certain verbs that they may or may not attach to.  Some more significant differences must 
separate these two affixes. 
 An observation that may be relevant for the analysis of the –(k)c suffix is that it 
shows a tendency to attach to verbs that lexicalize a target state, such as 'eestod: ‘to hide 
(transitive)’, though this is not an inviolable requirement, as shown by the other sentences 
below with cindat ‘to kiss’ and melcud ‘to make run’. 
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(82) a. Heriberto  'o              'eesto-kc      heg   'e-gat. 
                   3:SUB:IMP  hide-POSR   DET  ¬1:POS-gun 
  Heriberto has his gun hidden. 
 b. Jason  'o               cindat-c      heg  Suzanne. 
             3:SUB:IMP  kiss-POSR   DET 
  Jason keeps Suzanne kissed. 
 c. Marcus  'o               mel-cud-c          heg   kalit. 
                3:SUB:IMP  run-CAUS-POSR  DET  car 
  Marcus keeps the car running. 
In its eventive use, the verb 'eestod: ‘to hide’ may be understood as lexicalizing a state; 
when a durative temporal adverbial is present, the duration of time may refer to how long 
the object remained unseen, rather than how long the subject’s act of placing the object 
took, indicating that this target state is accessible for temporal modification.  The verb 
cindat ‘to kiss’, on the other hand, is harder to think of in terms of a target state, and 
indeed a durative temporal adverbial occurring with this verb may only be understood as 
referring to the length of time that the kissing event went on.  The third sentence, 
involving the causative verb melcud ‘to make run’, illustrates that even if the semantic 
accessibility of some sort of target state is what is relevant for the –(k)c suffix, then the 
nature of that state is not necessarily as a property concept (that is, it need not be the kind 
of state that is relevant for building verb meanings; recall the discussion in chapter 2 of 
Dowty’s attempt to limit the type of meaning that a predicate of states may have).  Here, 
the condition that Marcus maintains can either be a transitory condition of the car’s 
engine turning over (relevant, for example, if Marcus is the driver of a get-away car) or a 
non-transitory condition of the car being in working order (relevant, for example, if 
Marcus is a mechanic).  The former “state” seems to correspond to an English 
progressive, which, while evaluable for truth at a moment, is semantically derived from a 
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predicate of events; the latter “state” seems to correspond to an individual level property, 
which may both be evaluated for truth at a moment of time and is at least intuitively 
construable as a property concept.  Whatever is going on in the causative verb melcud ‘to 
make run’ such that the –(k)c may occur there, the intransitive verb med: ‘to run’ from 
which melcud is built does not license the –(k)c suffix. 
 Another prediction that would be made by saying that the –(k)c and –s suffixes 
were an active-passive pair is that presumably the –(k)c suffix would not alter the 
argument structure of the verb it attaches to, but would merely alter the temporal 
properties of the verb to make it stative.  This has already been shown to be incorrect for 
those intransitive verbs and adjectives which license the –(k)c, like those in (77), where 
the derived verb is transitive and takes an agent or causer which is not an argument of the 
base.  Although more difficult to see in the case of transitive and ditransitive verbs, the 
argument structure of the suffixed form also appears to be different from the argument 
structure of the base form, not in terms of the number of arguments present, but in terms 
of entailments concerning the subject or external argument of the suffixed verb. 
 For instance, the subject of an eventive verb like 'eestod: ‘to hide (tr)’ is directly 
in control of the change of state that the object undergoes; the subject of (83)a must be 
the individual who picked up the shovel and moved the dirt to hide the gold (using a very 
concrete example of a possible context for this utterance).  In contrast, what the subject of 
the suffixed, stative form 'eestokc ‘to have hidden (tr)’ is in control of in (83)b is not the 
change of state of the object, but the maintenance of that state.  While the entity 
responsible for a change of state is frequently also responsible for maintaining that state, 
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this is not a necessary truth; this is illustrated by the pair of sentences below, which are 
quite natural in one and the same context. 
(83) a. Heñ-baabkeli           'a-t          'am   'eesto       heg   'e-'oola-ga. 
  1s:POS-grandfather  AUX-PFV  DXF  hide:PFV  DET  ¬1:POS-gold-ALN 
  My grandfather hid his gold. 
 b. Ku-ñ            vaikko.vestmaam  'ahidag  'ab  'am  'eesto-kc. 
  CPK-1s:SUB  thirty                      year      for  DXF  hide:PFV-POSR 
  I have kept it hidden for thirty years. 
The second sentence in (83) therefore cannot require that the subject be the one to have 
hidden the gold, since the first sentence in (83) states that another individual was the one 
who did this; the subject in (83)b is merely responsible for maintaining the hiddenness of 
the gold, the state that the gold was in when this control was passed on from the 
grandfather to the speaker. 
 We would therefore expect that a verb with the –(k)c suffix could be compatible 
with a situation in which there was never a change of state on the part of the object – i.e., 
that verbs with the –(k)c suffix may pattern like derived statives, rather than resultatives – 
and this is in fact the case.  The second sentence above is equally natural in a slightly 
different context, as in (84), where no change of state of the gold is required at any time. 
(84) a. Heñ-baabkeli           'a-t          'am   cee                  heg  'oola 
  1s:POS-grandfather  AUX-PFV  DXF  discover:PFV  DET  gold 
   m-o                   'eesto-s              do'ag         c'ed:. 
   CPM-3:SUB:IMP  hide:PFV-PASR  mountain  in 
  My grandfather discovered gold that was hidden in the mountains. 
 b. Ku-ñ            vaikko.vestmaam  'ahidag  'ab  'am  'eesto-kc. 
  CPK-1s:SUB  thirty                      year      for  DXF  hide:PFV-POSR 
  I have kept it hidden for thirty years. 
In the first sentence in this pair, the gold is described as being in a certain condition, in 
this case, using the passive resultative –s suffix.  There need not have been a change of 
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state that brought the gold into this condition; the gold may have been mineralogically 
deposited in the mountains in such a way that it was difficult to find, though this process 
cannot be thought of as “hiding” the gold.  The second sentence, which is identical to 
(83)b, is just as natural in this context as in the previous one.  All that is entailed 
concerning the subject is that the subject be responsible for maintaining the condition that 
the object is in, regardless of how it came to be in that condition. 
 As with the –s suffix, however, a derived stative interpretation is not available for 
every verb that the –(k)c suffix attaches to.  Those verbs that do not involve a verbalizing 
morpheme (such as a causative suffix, like –id in (85)) may receive a derived stative 
interpretation, but verbs which include a verbalizing morpheme appear to require the 
target state to be a result.  The paradigm below illustrates this. 
(85) a. Marcus  kamish  'o                s-vijin. 
                shirt       3:SUB:IMP  S-wrinkly 
  Marcus’s shirt is wrinkly. 
 b. Pam  miitol-ga  'o               vijiñ-id            heg  Marcus  kamish. 
           cat-ALN    3:SUB:IMP  wrinkly-CAUS  DET               shirt 
  Pam’s cat is wrinkling Marcus’s shirt. 
 c. Pam  miitol-ga  'o               vijiñ-id-c               heg  Marcus  kamish. 
           cat-ALN    3:SUB:IMP  wrinkly-CAUS-ST  DET                shirt 
  Pam’s cat is keeping Marcus’s shirt wrinkled. 
The sentence in (85)c, where the –(k)c suffix attaches to the causativized adjective vijiñid 
‘to make wrinkly’, can only mean that Pam’s cat is maintaining Marcus’s shirt in a 
wrinkled state, and that his shirt is not naturally in that state.  The wrinkled state must 
have come about through some event. 
 If the possessive resultative –(k)c is to be analyzed as introducing some notion of 
control, this may represent another instance of stative causation, of the type proposed by 
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Pylkkänen (2000), discussed in section 3.2.3 in the context of Kratzer’s (2000) analysis 
of the German state passive, where certain resultatives received derived stative 
interpretations; her characterization appears to apply to the Pima -(k)c suffix, as well.  
Moreover, it will be seen in the discussion to follow that there is evidence that the 
possessive resultative –(k)c always occurs outside a causative morpheme, whether lexical 
or morphological, and that the apparent derived stative interpretations in fact correspond 
to stative causation interpretations. 
4.3 Categories of analysis 
 The data presented in the previous sections of this chapter display several 
properties that need to be addressed by any overall analysis of resultatives and their 
associated eventive predicates.  Ideally, the analysis of these forms would allow in some 
way a prediction of whether a given verb in the language would license one or both of 
these resultative affixes (assuming that this property is predictable, rather than listed, and 
again remaining neutral on the specific direction of this derivation).  The analysis should 
also explain why the passive resultative forms lack an argument that is observed in the 
eventive form – though only when this argument is an agentive subject, or external 
argument.  To answer these questions requires understanding the type of stativity that the 
derived predicates show: whether they are stative because they are predicates of states, 
which I associate with a target state interpretation, or whether they are merely temporally 
stative, which is true of post-state interpretations that need not involve eventuality 
arguments ranging over states in order to be stative. 
 Along with these questions, a satisfying analysis of these resultatives should give 
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some explanation for the distribution of derived stative interpretations – interpretations 
where the target state expressed by the resultative need not have come about through a 
change of state.  There appear to be three logically possible categories into which an 
analysis of the missing change of state entailments can be placed, based on the answers to 
the following two questions. 
 The first question to be answered is whether the derived statives like 'eestos ‘be 
hidden’ and 'eestokc ‘keep hidden (transitive)’ are related synchronically to the eventive 
forms like 'eestod: ‘to hide (transitive)’ that do entail a change of state.96  If the answer to 
this question is no, that the derived statives are not derivationally related to their eventive 
bases, then the potential analysis is simple, if not very satisfying: the meaning of the 
resultatives that have derived stative interpretations can simply be listed.  If there is no 
synchronic derivational relationship between the two forms, then there is no problem that 
their meanings differ in idiomatic ways; this would unfortunately not explain why the 
difference in meaning between these two forms is generally so systematic.97 
 If there is evidence that the eventive and derived stative forms in question are 
taken to have a synchronic derivational relationship, then independently listing their 
meanings would not be the best solution.  The question to ask then is what the nature of 
that derivational relationship is.  The overt morphological relationship between the 
                                                 
96 Presumably, resultatives proper, like vijiñidc ‘keep wrinkled’, are easier to derive from 
their eventive base, since both the resultative vijiñidc and the eventive causative vijiñid 
share the entailment that an event of wrinkling went on. 
97 I am specifying here that the relationship must be both derivational and synchronic 
since it is possible to have a derivational relationship historically, but no derivational 
relationship synchronically.  A historical derivational relationship is irrelevant to 
synchronic derivation. 
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eventive and resultative expressions imposes constraints on the possible direction of 
derivation, as does the semantic relationship.  For example, is the stative form that does 
not entail a change of state derived from the eventive form that does entail a change, as 
the morphological marking appears to indicate, is the eventive form with the entailment 
derived from the stative form without it, or are both derived from a common source?  
Deriving the stative from the eventive would be a non-monotonic operation – it would 
involve deletion or loss from the derived stative form of a portion of the meaning of the 
eventive base form, which would also require the grammar to operate on part, but not all, 
of the meaning of a verb.  Deriving the eventive from the stative would not require 
deletion as an operation of the grammar nor would it require decomposition of the 
meaning of words, though it would involve semantic derivation in the opposite direction 
from the apparent morphological derivation.  Deriving both the eventive and the stative 
forms from a common source would not require deletion, but would require additional 
explanation of why the eventive forms appear to be underived. 
 The following sections will consider each of these three categories of analysis, 
and will show that the best account of the resultatives with derived stative interpretations 
does not involve listed meaning or deletion of components of meaning, but instead 
involves an extension of the proposals of Kratzer (1996, 2000), in which the external 
argument is not an argument of the “verb” at all, and even apparently monomorphemic 
verbs may be decomposed into multiple components within the morphosyntactic 
component of grammar. 
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4.3.1 Listing derived stative meanings 
 The resultatives whose derivation is the most problematic are those that receive a 
derived stative interpretation, where the stative predicate lacks an element of meaning 
that is present in the eventive predicate.  Not all of the resultatives in Pima, however, 
have a derived stative interpretation.  Verbs in which a verbalizing suffix (such as a 
causative suffix) intervenes between the passive resultative suffix and the verbal root 
never receive a derived stative interpretation.  There are even resultatives without an 
overt verbalizing suffix in this position which cannot receive a derived stative 
interpretation; only a subset of resultatives without such verbalizing suffixes have a 
derived stative interpretation. 
 If the set of resultatives with derived stative interpretations is unpredictable, this 
would support an account in which the presence of a derived stative interpretation is 
idiomatically specified for each resultative.  If this is the case, then the eventive 
predicates and the derived statives are not related derivationally, and there is no problem 
posed by any differences in meaning that they may have, since an expression with a listed 
meaning may in principle have any possible meaning. 
 Evidence in favor of listing the meanings of derived statives may also come from 
the absence of semantic transparency.  A listed-meaning analysis is required, for instance, 
for those derived statives which exhibit semantic drift from their expected meaning, like 
the Chichewa stative tay-ika, which means something like ‘be lost’, but is derived from 
the verb tay ‘to throw away’.  If one assumes that the meaning of an expression which is 
already listed is more susceptible to semantic drift than the meaning of an expression 
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which is computed by the grammar, the relatively high frequency of idiomatic meanings 
among Chichewa statives – which are claimed by Dubinsky and Simango (1996) to all 
have a derived stative interpretation – is explained if all such meanings are listed.98  It is 
not clear, however, if this is assumption concerning semantic drift is correct. 
4.3.1.1 An example of this type: Kratzer (2000) 
 The analysis proposed by Kratzer (2000) is actually left with a listed-meaning 
analysis for state passives like closed, broken, and scattered, which have derived stative 
interpretations and which cannot be cases of stative causation, since her analysis predicts 
that all state passives which do not involve stative causation, whether with a post-state 
interpretation or a target state interpretation, should entail a past change of state.  As 
discussed in section 3.2.3, the fact about derived statives in at least English and Pima that 
would be troubling on this account is the high degree of regularity which the meanings of 
the eventive forms and the derived statives have: the eventive forms appear to mean just 
that some state came about (or was caused), while the stative forms merely denote that 
very state.  This systematic relationship seems like it should be captured by the grammar. 
 One way to explain this systematic relationship between eventive forms and 
derived statives, even though the meaning of the derived statives might be listed 
synchronically, is by a diachronic, rather than a synchronic, analysis.  For instance, the 
derived statives in question might correspond historically to something more like a 
                                                 
98 Dubinsky and Simango assume a grammar with a computational lexicon, so their claim 
is not that the meanings of all statives cannot be predicted.  Instead, the meaning of a 
Chichewa stative in the default case is predictably derived and subsequently listed within 
the lexicon, and it is this lexically-listed status that makes them more susceptible to 
semantic drift. 
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perfect, whose meaning was just that some event had completed.  At some point in the 
history of these forms, the meaning may have shifted from asserting that the event is 
complete, to asserting merely that the target state – which held at the completion of the 
event – holds.  As noted in the previous sections, the Pima resultatives cannot be 
analyzed as perfect or post-state forms synchronically for a number of reasons.  Although 
this might plausibly explain the current distribution, however, and might also explain the 
semantic drift facts observed for Chichewa, a diachronic explanation would require 
diachronic evidence in order to be supported, which is not available for Pima. 
4.3.1.2 Problems with this type of analysis 
 While a listed-meaning analysis for derived statives is conceivable, there is reason 
in Pima, at least, to doubt its validity.  On any account which says that the current 
meaning of Pima derived statives must be listed, it is troubling that the resultatives with 
derived stative interpretations appear to meet other well-defined criteria.  Rather than 
being completely unpredictable, the availability of a derived stative interpretation is 
determinable based on details of the meaning of the eventive verb that appears to be the 
morphological base.  Where the actual “name” of the verb specifies an event-type or an 
instrument which is involved in bringing the resulting target state to hold, a derived 
stative interpretation is unavailable.  Derived stative interpretations are available (modulo 
the presence of a causative or other verbalizing morpheme) only where the “name” of the 
eventive verb specifies the type of target state that holds. 
 This can be illustrated with an example seen earlier.  Kratzer’s semantic 
representation for the root aufpump-, repeated below from (36)a, includes a predicate 
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event(e), which restricts the primary eventuality argument to events proper, and a 
predicate pump(e), which requires that the event filling the primary eventuality argument 
be of a certain type, namely, that it be a pumping event.99 
(36) a. [[ aufpump- ]]  = λx λs λe [event(e) ∧ pump(e) ∧ cause(s)(e) ∧ inflated(x)(s)] 
                    (Kratzer 2000: (12)) 
Because of this, Kratzer’s account predicts that both eventive verbs and target state 
passives derived from this root should (if compositional) entail an event of pumping that 
brought about the target state of being inflated. 
 The important point here, however, is that the root aufpump- specifies the type of 
event which brings the target state about – an event of pumping – in addition to the target 
state itself, and that this specification of event-type can easily be associated with part of 
the phonological label for this meaning: the pump- portion.  Kratzer rejects a syntactic 
decomposition of verbs like aufpumpen into an eventive component and a target state 
component, however, in this case primarily because the target state component of the 
meaning, consisting of the predicate inflated(x)(s), cannot always be associated one-to-
one with the separable prefix auf-.  If the prefix auf- can be underspecified, however, 
such that it could express a number of distinct target states in the context of different 
types of event components, as it could within Distributed Morphology, verbs like 
aufpumpen could easily be analyzed morphosyntactically, as well as semantically, into an 
eventive and a stative component.  The presence of this eventive component – a 
component which specifies the type of event, or an instrument that is involved in such an 
                                                 
99 The inclusion of the predicate event(e) is actually redundant here; it would be sufficient 
for this purpose merely for the predicate pump(e) to be present, since any eventuality that 
is a pumping event will necessarily be an event proper. 
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event, as with the English state passive hammered – would necessarily make a derived 
stative interpretation unavailable. 
 Although Kratzer does not give semantic representations for the roots that are the 
source of state passives like closed, broken, and scattered, note that all of these 
resultatives which can receive derived stative interpretations do not require a certain type 
of event to bring about the target state, but merely specify the type of target state that is 
brought about.  This characteristic is also true of, for example, deadjectival causative 
verbs like empty, clean, and dry, whose resultatives emptied, cleaned, and dried do not 
have derived stative interpretations; these deadjectival resultatives, however, were seen to 
have only post-state passives, which necessarily require the target state to result from an 
event.  In the case of closed, broken, and hidden, there is no morphologically simple 
adjective (like empty, clean, and dry) that denotes just the target state of closedness, 
brokenness, or hiddenness, and so there is no way apart from these derived statives to 
express the property concepts with a non-result interpretation. 
 The availability of a derived stative interpretation therefore appears to depend on 
precise properties of the meaning of a verb – or rather, the meaning of a verb may prevent 
a resultative which corresponds to that verb from having a derived stative interpretation.  
How can we be certain, however, apart from native-speaker intuition, whether a verb has 
a meaning of the relevant sort?  Ideally, some syntactic diagnostic could be found to 
distinguish verbs with these components of meaning, in the same way that durative 
temporal modification was used to indicate the presence of a decomposed target state. 
 While I cannot point to a specific diagnostic which will serve this purpose, the 
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relevance of semantic properties for syntactic behavior in English is the focus of Levin 
(1993), and the framework developed there is refined in subsequent work (Levin and 
Rappaport Hovav 1995, Rappaport Hovav and Levin 1998, among others).  Levin (1993) 
represents a catalog of syntactic properties and verb argument or diathesis alternations in 
English, and concludes that for a sample of about 3,000 verbs, the grammatical classes of 
verbs that pattern in identical ways syntactically are also distinguished by common 
“structural” aspects of meaning – such as the specification of a target state or of an event 
type or instrument.  While Levin (1993) does not provide a structural representation for 
each class of verbs (what are referred to as EVENT STRUCTURE TEMPLATES in Levin and 
Rappaport Hovav 1995 and subsequent work), or list the semantic or structural properties 
(in the sense of properties of event structure templates) that are relevant for the 
alternations she discusses, it should be possible in principle to find a syntactic diagnostic 
which will indicate the presence of a specified event type or instrument. 
 This does not by itself constitute a complete explanation for the absence of event 
entailments in cases like broken, hidden, and closed.  This generalization that the only 
resultatives that receive derived stative interpretations are those whose corresponding 
verbs do not specify an instrument or event type is a strong indication, however, that an 
analysis which claims that all derived statives are idioms is not desirable.  The following 
sections will consider ways to derive the derived stative interpretations. 
4.3.2 Decomposition with deletion 
 If the meaning of resultatives with a derived stative interpretation is to be 
computed rather than listed, the next question is to determine what it is to be computed 
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from, and whether this source for derivation includes as part of its meaning that some 
event occurs to bring about the state (as does the apparent morphological base) or not.  
Whether this derivational source includes an entailment of a past event or not is 
independent from whether the source is the surface eventive verb itself or an abstract root 
from which the eventive verb is also derived – since even the root in Kratzer’s analysis 
entailed an event which resulted in the target state.  If the semantic derivation follows the 
apparent morphological derivation – that is, if the meaning of the base for derivation does 
include this past event – then some mechanism is required to remove this meaning from 
the meaning of the derived form, either deletion of this eventive meaning, or a selective 
copying operation that can exclude the eventive meaning. 
4.3.2.1 An example of this type: Dubinsky and Simango (1996) 
 The analysis given by Dubinsky and Simango (1996) for the Chichewa stative 
morpheme falls into this “remove the event” category.  Recall from section 3.1 that 
according to the Generative Lexicon theory of Pustejovsky (1995), information 
concerning causation, inchoation, or a target state is encoded in the lexical entry for each 
verb by means of a Lexical Conceptual Structure (LCS).  The Chichewa stative suffix is 
claimed to attach only to verbs whose LCS includes a target state, and its effect is to 
create a new verb (i.e., a new lexical entry) whose LCS includes only the state portion of 
the base verb’s LCS.  This both derives a temporally stative predicate – since the new 
lexical entry involves predication over states, rather than events – and ensures that the 
external argument, which occurs in the LCS under the process node, is not an argument 
of the derived verb and is not semantically accessible in the same way that it is for a 
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passivized verb. 
 The details of Dubinsky and Simango’s analysis depend on a number of 
properties of the architecture of the grammar that they use.  The foremost of these is that 
the grammar includes a computational component both within the lexicon and within the 
syntax.  Dubinsky and Simango find the divergent properties of the passive and the 
stative to be an argument in favor of placing them in distinct components, and thus an 
argument in favor of a grammar with this architecture.  Their analysis also depends on the 
representation of event structure according to Pustejovsky (1995), in which the entire 
LCS of a verbal lexical entry can be manipulated by derivations that occur within the 
lexicon.  Unlike the event structure templates of Levin and Rappaport Hovav, the LCS of 
a derived verb may differ from that of its base not just by augmentation but by reduction 
as well, whether the precise mechanism involves selective copying of the structure of the 
base or complete copying followed by partial deletion; thus, operations on LCSs do not 
need to be monotonic or meaning-preserving.  If this type of representation or this type of 
operation on it were unavailable, Dubinsky and Simango’s analysis would not be 
possible. 
4.3.2.2 Problems with this type of analysis 
 An attempt to apply Dubinsky and Simango’s theory to resultatives in Pima runs 
into a number of problems, some of which are not limited to Dubinsky and Simango’s 
particular analysis, but which would be shared by any deletion-type analysis.  First, if a 
derived stative interpretation (i.e., one where the LCS of a verb is altered) is associated 
with morphological operations within the lexicon, and an interpretation as a resultative 
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proper (i.e., one where the LCS of a verb is not altered) is associated with morphological 
operations within the syntax, then the Pima resultatives must occur in both the lexical and 
syntactic components, since they show both interpretations in different contexts.  A single 
affix should occur in only one or the other component.  This problem cannot be solved by 
claiming that interpretation as a resultative proper is triggered when the resultative 
suffixes attach outside other verbalizing suffixes (that is, that all resultatives that are 
outside other verbalizing affixes are necessarily in the syntax, rather than the lexical 
component), since interpretation as a resultative proper is not limited to such cases.  
There are verbs which retain an entailment of a past event but which do not involve a 
verbalizing affix – verbs like aufpumpen and hammer which lexicalize an event type or 
instrument. 
 This brings up another problem regarding target state passives: Dubinsky and 
Simango’s analysis is formulated to produce only target state passives with derived 
stative interpretations, and not target state passives whose target states are properly 
results.  That these must be formed in the syntax is shown by Kratzer’s observation that 
the target state can be provided by a phrasal constituent, as in her schlampig gekämmt 
example in (38), repeated here. 
(38)  Die            Haare  waren          immer.noch  schlampig  gekämmt. 
  DET:NM:p  hairs    be:3p:PAST  still               sloppily      comb:PPRT 
  The hair was still combed sloppily.      (Kratzer 2000: (16)a) 
Presumably a treatment of post-state passives as aspectual morphemes in the syntax 
would fit easily with Dubinsky and Simango’s analysis of derived statives.  Their 
analysis would need to be extended, however, to explain how target state passives which 
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are interpreted as results, as in (38), can be derived in the syntax, as well, and why verbs 
with verbalizing suffixes and deadjectival verbs, like zugemacht ‘closed’ and geleert 
‘emptied’, would not have target state interpretations. 
 These criticisms are associated with generating derived stative interpretations and 
interpretations as results in separate computational components; the possessive 
resultatives, however, pose problems independent of the computational components that 
are involved.  Recall that for verbs suffixed with the Pima possessive resultative –(k)c, an 
“external” argument is present, but it does not receive the same entailments that are true 
of the external argument of the eventive form (which is the base for derivation, in this 
type of analysis).  To accomplish this exchange of entailments in a system like Dubinsky 
and Simango’s would require replacing the Process and Transition nodes by another 
component to introduce the new external argument, following the steps in (86). 
(86) a. Base verb: 
            Transition         'eestod: ‘to hide (s.t.)’ 
     w   
  Process       State 
  !       !  
  !       [HIDDEN(x)] 
  !  
 [ACT(y,x) ∧ ¬HIDDEN(x)] 
 b. Process (and Transition) subcomponent deleted: 
           State      'eesto-s ‘to be hidden’ 
           g  
         [HIDDEN(x)] 
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 c. New subcomponent added:100 
         Control       'eestokc ‘to have (s.t.) hidden’ 
    qp  
  Control/Maintenance  State 
     !         !  
     !        [HIDDEN(x)] 
     !  
 [CONTROL(y,x)] 
Here, the control that the external argument exerts is over the maintenance of the state, 
and an LCS like that in (86)c is consistent with a derived stative interpretation, where all 
reference to a past change of state has been removed.  What operation should be 
involved, however, for those possessive resultatives that have target state interpretations 
but require the target state to result from a past event?  If such an operation does not 
modify the LCS, how is the resulting predicate temporally stative? 
 One last objection to a deletion account is that it does not straightforwardly 
account for the extent interpretation of the Pima passive resultative –s (such as with path 
verbs and positional verbs) and the individual level interpretation that the –s appears to 
force on adjectives: what would be getting deleted, if the argument structure appears 
unchanged?  There may be no way around positing at least a few distinct interpretations 
for the passive resultative, but reducing the number of interpretations that is required 
would be desirable, if possible. 
 To avoid these difficult questions raised by a deletion analysis of Pima 
                                                 
100 Since this last step requires an extension of Pustejovsky’s (1995) structure of LCSs 
and involves meanings that are not attested in Dubinsky and Simango’s analysis of 
Chichewa, it is not clear what sort of new nodes would be appropriate (the 
control/maintenance and control nodes), or what sort of predicate should introduce the 
argument y.  Plausibly, the control that y exerts should be over the state, rather than the 
object x that is in that state. 
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resultatives, it would be equally possible to represent the content of Pustejovsky’s lexical 
conceptual structures or Levin and Rappaport Hovav’s event structure templates not as a 
component of a lexical entry, but as a structure that is built in the syntax, as recent 
theories of syntax and morphology (such as Hale and Keyser 1998) have proposed for 
other reasons.  The following section will discuss how to coordinate a semantically 
monotonic, purely structure-building account with the apparent morphological derivation. 
4.3.3 The structure-building approach 
4.3.3.1 Derived statives 
 If the eventive verbs and the resultatives with a derived stative interpretation are 
derivationally related semantically as well as morphologically, and if this semantic 
derivation is monotonic – that is, if operations like deletion are not to be used in the 
derivation of the derived stative forms – then the meaning that is shared by the derived 
statives and the eventive forms is all that can be contributed by a hypothetical common 
derivational source.  The meaning of this base for derivation should not include an 
entailment of an event of the state coming to hold, since the derived statives lack this 
entailment.  This first of all requires that the eventive forms, in spite of their overt 
appearance, are actually morphologically complex, since some other element must 
introduce the eventive components of meaning that are not supplied by this hypothetical 
base, such as this entailment of the an event of change of state.  Moreover, if the meaning 
of the passive resultatives which receive a derived stative interpretation is merely that the 
target state of the verb holds of their single argument, then the meaning of these derived 
statives is entirely a part of the hypothetical base: the event that the eventive verb denotes 
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culminates in the coming to hold of this state.  There is therefore a contrast between the 
eventive verbs, which are derived from this hypothetical source by a morpheme that adds 
meaning but not phonological features, and the derived statives, which are derived from 
this hypothetical source by a morpheme that adds phonological features but no meaning.  
This is at a minimum unexpected, and potentially undesirable. 
 Rather than adding no meaning at all, it is possible that the passive resultative 
morpheme on a structure-building account like this would introduce a slight change in 
meaning, such as a presupposition that the eventuality involved in this predication is a 
state.  Moreover, some morpheme very much like Kratzer’s target stativizer of (37) 
would be needed for the derivation of resultatives proper with a target state interpretation 
– resultatives that express a target state that is required to be a result.  Resultatives with a 
post state interpretation would also require a morpheme like Kratzer’s post stativizer.  A 
structure-building account may therefore be viewed as merely an extension of Kratzer’s 
(2000) proposal; one additional morpheme is needed for the derived statives, and the 
abstract roots which she proposes merely turn out not to correspond to syntactic atoms. 
 In the presentation here of a structure-building account, I will make a number of 
assumptions about general syntactic relations of arguments which are common to 
syntactic theories that would encode this kind of event structure information 
syntactically.  Since the external argument is not something which is shared by the 
eventive and (passive-like) stative forms, it clearly cannot be present in their common 
derivational source.  Following Kratzer (1996) and others, I will assume that the external 
argument is not an argument of the verb root, but is introduced by a dedicated voice head; 
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in English, this voice head need not have any phonological realization.  A verbal 
extended projection which lacks this active voice head will also lack an external 
argument, just like an eventive passive.  I will also assume (following Hale and Keyser 
1998, for instance) that adjectives cannot syntactically combine with an argument 
directly, but require the mediation of some other element, such as a light verb or some 
element that occurs in nominal structure; the precise treatment of causativized adjectives 
will be discussed further after the basic analysis of lexical causative verbs has been 
sketched. 
 The principle behind an account of this type can be illustrated with a transitive 
change-of-state verb, which lexicalizes a target state but not an event type that brings 
about that state, like Pima 'eestod: ‘to hide’.  Eventive occurrences of this verb, as in the 
sentence ‘My grandfather hid his gold’ in (83)a, would be built from a structure 
something like (87); the root for this verb, indicated as √'EESTOD:, has been given just the 
meaning that is shared by the eventive verb and the resultatives.  The precise structure 
seen here, though commonly used (for example, Kratzer 1996), will be seen to require 
modification to account for other properties of the resultatives. 
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(87) a.     vP 
      ru  
    DP      v' 
   4  ru  
   (A)     v   ROOTP  
       [AGENT] ru  
        √'EESTOD:    DP 
             4  
             (O) 
  b. Constant expressions: 
   [[ √'EESTOD: ]]  = λx [ λs [ hidden'(x,s) ] ] 
   [[ v[AGENT] ]]   = λP [ λy [ λe [ ∃e' [ P(e') ∧ cause'(e,e') ∧ agent'(e,y) ] ] ] ] 
                     (to be revised) 
  c. Calculations: 
   [[ ROOTP ]]   = λs [ hidden'(O,s) ] 
   [[ vP ]]    = λe [ ∃e' [ hidden'(O,e') ∧ cause'(e,e') ∧ agent'(e,A) ] ] ] 
Here, O and A are constants that are used in place of the individuals denoted by the two 
DPs (assuming that they are denoting expressions).  The variables s, e, and e' range over 
eventualities of any type, though their range may be restricted by the predicate they occur 
with (as mnemonically indicated by the choice of s or e for ‘state’ or ‘event’).  All 
semantic combination is by Function Application; the meaning of the non-terminal 
constituents, given the meaning of the constants in (87)b, is shown in (87)c. 
 This semantic model is technically incomplete without a specification of the truth 
conditions for the predicates it employs, namely hidden', cause', and agent'.  Because 
the purpose of this discussion is merely to schematize one type of analysis and examine 
its algebraic form, and because the truth conditions for predicates of natural language like 
cause' and agent' are still a matter of debate among linguists, I will not discuss them is 
detail here.  This analysis does assume, however, that such predicates can be defined, and 
 156
in fact depends crucially on it.101 
 It will be sufficient for discussion at this point to note that because the meaning of 
the root is identical (or nearly identical) to the desired meaning of the passive resultative, 
the proper meaning for this verb with the –s suffix can be produced merely by 
substituting a semantically vacuous head for the light verb in (87). 
                                                 
101 Dowty (1979), for instance, spends an entire section discussing the appropriate truth 
conditions for cause'.  Although he does not resolve all the questions concerning 
causation in natural language, he concludes with the following truth conditions for 
causation (which he treats as a relation between two sentences represented by φ and ψ): 
(i) [φ CAUSE ψ] is true if and only if (i) φ is a causal factor for ψ, and (ii) for all 
other φ' such that φ' is also a causal factor for ψ, some ¬φ-world is as similar or 
more similar to the actual world than any ¬φ'-world is. (Dowty 1979:109) 
(ii) φ is a causal factor for ψ if and only if there is a series of sentences φ, φ1,…, φn, ψ 
(for n ≥ 0) such that each member of the series depends causally on the previous 
member. (Dowty 1979:108) 
(iii) ψ depends causally on φ if and only if φ, ψ, and ¬φ → ¬ψ. 
(In (iii), the implication → is the natural language implication, for which Dowty cites 
Stalnaker (1968).)  To be a complete analysis, therefore, similar truth conditions would 
need to be stated for all the other predicates used, like agent' and the more lexical 
predicates like hidden' – a task which is nontrivial. 
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(88) a.     vP 
     ru  
     v   ROOTP 
  [STATE] ru  
      √'EESTOD:    DP   
           4  
           (O) 
  b. Constant expressions: 
   [[ √'EESTOD: ]]  = λx [ λs [ hidden'(x,s) ] ] 
   [[ v[STATE] ]]   = λP [ λe [ P(e) ] ]102 
  c. Calculations: 
   [[ ROOTP ]]   = λs [ hidden'(O,s) ] 
   [[ vP ]]    = λe [ hidden'(O,e) ] 
The structure in (88)a forms the basis for a sentence with 'eestos ‘be hidden’, like 
(74)a.103  The semantic form given here for v[STATE], which would be expressed by the –s 
suffix in Pima, should be taken only as an initial proposal; what is relevant is that this 
voice head adds no other participants in the eventuality, that the meaning of its 
complement is passed on with little or no change, and that its presence removes any 
necessity for the attachment of the agentive light verb v[AGENT], seen in (87).  The –(k)c 
suffix would work in a similarly simple way, as illustrated in (89). 
                                                 
102 As mentioned above, this morpheme may not be completely devoid of meaning; it 
may introduce a restriction, perhaps via a presupposition, that the eventuality argument in 
question ranges over states: [[ v[STATE] ]] = λP [ λe [ P(e) ] ]; ∀e [ P(e) → state'(e) ], where 
the presupposition follows the semicolon.  This might result in incorrect predictions, 
however, where the –s attaches outside of a verbalizing morpheme like the causative. 
103 This also requires morphological merger of the root to left-adjoin to the light verb, in 
order for the –s which expresses the light verb v[STATE] to occur as a suffix on 'eesto. 
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(89) a.     vP 
     ru  
    DP      v' 
   4  ru  
   (C)     v   ROOTP  
       [MAINT] ru  
        √'EESTOD:    DP   
             4  
             (O) 
  b. Constant expressions: 
   [[ √'EESTOD: ]]  = λx [ λs [ hidden'(x,s) ] ] 
  [[ v[MAINT] ]]   = λP [ λy [ λe [ P(e) ∧ maintain'(e,y) ] ] ]104 (to be revised) 
  c. Calculations: 
   [[ ROOTP ]]   = λs [ hidden'(O,s) ] 
   [[ vP ]]    = λe [ hidden'(O,e) ∧ maintain'(e,C) ] 
This structure would form the basis for a sentence with 'eestokc ‘keep hidden’, like (83)b.  
The v[MAINT] head, which would be expressed by the –(k)c suffix in Pima, removes any 
need for the presence of the light verb v[AGENT] that introduces an agentive external 
argument, just like the v[STATE] does.  In place of v[AGENT], v[MAINT] would introduce an 
external argument of a different kind (as expressed by the predicate maintain'(e,y)). 
 It should be clear from these examples that the meaning of a suffixed form is 
strongly dependent on the meaning of the root itself.  The variation in interpretation that 
has been observed for verbs and adjectives with the –s suffix in Pima can therefore be 
explained as variation in the types of meanings of the roots that this suffix attaches to.  A 
number of quite distinct theories of lexical semantics accept that roots may differ 
significantly in their semantics, perhaps including such ontologically diverse items as 
                                                 
104 Here, the truth conditions for maintain' are intended to capture whatever is asserted 
about the subject of verbs with the –(k)c suffix – this individual is somehow responsible 
for maintaining the state that is predicated of the direct object. 
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properties (of individuals or events), relations, degrees, paths, and so on; Levin (2004) 
points out, however, that while many theories of lexical semantics put a large proportion 
of the burden of meaning on roots, there has not been much progress on what the 
meanings of the entire set of roots of a language actually are.  The suggestions in (87) 
through (89), which involve properties of events and relations between eventualities and 
individuals, are merely suggestive, and it should not be inferred that all roots should have 
a similar form (like, for example, the roots involved in relational verbs like cost and 
weigh, those involved in unergative verbs like sing or whistle, or those involved in path 
verbs like sink and zigzag).  Because the semantics of roots is not a well-developed field, 
I may not be able to base many firm conclusions on it for the purpose of investigating 
Pima resultatives.  Nevertheless, several plausible proposals for the semantics of the –s 
and the semantics of certain classes of roots may be made. 
4.3.3.2 Path verbs and adjectives 
 One favorable prediction which this analysis makes concerns the individual level 
interpretation that is associated with adjectives and path verbs with the –s suffix, in 
conjunction with a syntactic account of the individual level/stage level distinction along 
the lines of that proposed by Diesing (1990).  She proposes, based on extraction 
properties in German, that the subject of a stage level predicate is merged into syntactic 
structure quite low in a clause (i.e., governed within the verb phrase), while the subject of 
an individual level predicate is merged quite high (i.e., ungoverned in the specifier of IP).  
For the sake of comparison with the present analysis, we might suppose that stage level 
subjects are introduced by a voice head like that of (87), while individual level subjects 
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are introduced by some element higher in the structure, possibly as high as a Tense 
projection, but the precise structural position may remain unspecified – as long as this 
position is available in structure that dominates the v[STATE] light verb of (88). 
 If we adopt Diesing’s proposal, there are then three positions where arguments 
may be introduced in a clause: as an internal argument (i.e., an argument of the root), as 
an argument of a light verb like v[AGENT] or  v[MAINT], or in the high position in which 
subjects of individual level predicates are merged.  If the presence of this v[STATE] light 
verb corresponds to the absence of other light verbs like v[AGENT], then the only arguments 
that we expect to see on a verb with the –s suffix are internal arguments or arguments 
associated with this individual level interpretation.  Verbs and adjectives with the –s 
suffix should not occur with stage level external arguments. 
 This provides a simple explanation for the individual level interpretation that 
adjectives with the –s in Pima receive.  I will assume that the merge position of subjects 
of adjectives depends on the stage level or individual level status of the adjective, in just 
the same way as for verbs.  If what distinguishes adjectives from verbs is that adjectives 
require some other element in order to be predicated of their argument (as proposed by 
Hale and Keyser 1998), it is natural to assume that for the low merge position for subjects 
corresponding to a stage-level interpretation of the adjective, there is an adjectival 
copular light verb v[BE], in addition to the light verbs introduced above, which mediates 
between an adjective with a stage level interpretation and its argument, as in (90). 
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(90)      vP 
      ru  
    DP      v' 
   4  ru  
    ...     v    √SOFT 
      [BE]  
If the light verb v[STATE] attaches to the root in place of the adjectival copular light verb 
(and moreover makes the subsequent attachment of the copular light verb impossible), 
then a stage level interpretation for this adjectival predicate is rendered impossible, as 
well.  The only remaining position in which a subject may be introduced is the higher 
one, corresponding to an individual level interpretation of the adjective.105 
 This analysis also appears to be correct for Pima verbs which receive extent 
readings with the –s suffix, many of which involve spatial location or motion along a path 
and do not take an object or internal argument.  Interpretations of this sort were discussed 
in section 4.1.1; an example of such a verb in Pima is him ‘to go (walking, on foot)’ 
(repeated from (62)). 
(62) a. Muula  'a-t           'uug  voog  gahi      hii. 
  mule     AUX-PFV  high  road   across  go:PFV 
  The mule went across the bridge. 
 b. Hodai  voog  'o              'am   gahi      him-s     'uug  voog  veco. 
  rock     road  3:SUB:IMP  DXF  across  go-PASR  high  road  under 
  The paved road goes under the bridge. 
The use of this verb without the –s suffix in (62)a involves motion of the referent of the 
subject DP, and this motion may involve a particular manner (here, walking) and may 
instantiate a particular path (here, across the bridge).  Because this predicate receives a 
stage level interpretation, Diesing’s theory predicts that the subject should occur within 
                                                 
105 Adjectives and the Pima resultatives will be discussed further in the section on 
resultatives with target state interpretations. 
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the verb phrase, which I am assuming here corresponds to its introduction by a light verb 
like v[AGENT].  The use of this verb with the –s suffix, in contrast, involves an individual 
level interpretation, which in Diesing’s theory corresponds to the subject DP being 
merged higher than the verb phrase; this position is still available to license an argument 
even if the only light verb present is v[STATE] (which is expressed by the –s suffix).  The 
occurrence of this verb with an extent reading in (62)b does not involve motion (and so 
cannot straightforwardly involve a manner of motion), but does involve a path of a 
particular type.106  In this case, it is the referent of the subject DP itself – the paved road, 
not its motion – which instantiates this path, and as predicted, this is a property of an 
individual, not a stage.  If the manner specification of the verb were completely 
irrelevant, then all verb roots that involve a similar path should be substitutable in all 
contexts when suffixed with the –s.  Interestingly, this is not the case, since while hims is 
appropriate for extent readings of roads, trails, and the like, mels (from the verb med: ‘to 
run (or to go in a wheeled vehicle)’) is preferred for extent readings of rivers and streams. 
 Gawron (2005) examines verbs in English that have both a path of motion reading 
and an extent reading, and proposes the representation in (91)c as a general meaning for 
the verb zigzag with a motion reading (91)a and an extent reading (91)b.  A parallel 
analysis for the Pima motion verb him is given in (92). 
(91) a. The mountain goat zigzagged from the valley floor to the ridge. 
 b. The road zigzagged from the valley floor to the ridge. 
 c. [[ zigzagS ]]  = λe [ ∃π [ path'S(e)= π ∧ zigzag-shape(π) ] ] 
(92)  [[ √HIMS ]]  = λe [ ∃π [ path'S(e)= π ∧ walking'(e) ] ] 
                                                 
106 Motion in a metaphorical sense or motion of a perspective point may appear to be 
involved, and may be why Talmy (1996) refers to cases of this type as ‘fictive motion’. 
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Here, the variable e ranges over eventualities (including both events and states), while π 
ranges over spatiotemporal paths.  The predicate path' is indexed to a particular axis S, 
which may be a spatial or temporal axis (provided by the context or by adjunct phrases).  
Informally, path'S(e)= π is true just in case the spatiotemporal extent of the eventuality e, 
evaluated with reference to the axis S, is the path π.107 
 Other aspects of Gawron’s proposal would need further work to be applied to 
Pima, such as how manner might be evaluated for a stative eventuality in an extent 
reading such that the verb him ‘to go (on foot)’ is preferred for roads and med: ‘to run, to 
drive’ is preferred for rivers.  For the present discussion, however, we can assume that 
since the verb root makes no reference to nominal arguments, any such argument must be 
added by some other element, such as a light verb.  Sentence (93) shows a structure for 
stage level motion uses. 
(93)      vP 
     ru  
    DP      v' 
   4  ru  
     ...     v    √ZIGZAG 
      [GO]  
Here, a light verb GO is assumed to introduce the verb’s argument.108  If the v[STATE] light 
verb expressed by –s attaches to a root in place of v[GO] in (93), the stage-level external 
argument that it introduces would not be present, either.  Interpreting Diesing (1992) to 
mean that subjects of individual level predicates are merged above the level of a light 
                                                 
107 For Gawron’s formal definition of the path' operator, see Gawron (2005). 
108 A light verb GO is used here, rather than the agentive light verb seen earlier.  The 
semantic formulation of the agentive light verb in (87) is undesired both because it 
introduces causation and because agentive entailments are not desired for motion (since 
non-agents may move). 
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verb, predicates like him-s should only be able to occur with a subject if the predicate is 
interpreted as individual level, yielding the extent interpretation of sentences like 
(62)b.109 
4.3.3.3 Target state resultatives 
 The structure-building approach provides a nice explanation of the interpretation 
of the resultative suffixes on adjectives, path verbs, and verbs which specify only a 
change of state with no associated event type; all these classes of resultatives receive 
derived stative interpretations.  The analysis becomes more complicated when 
resultatives with target state interpretations are considered, however; these are verbs 
similar to the German verb aufpumpen which was discussed in the context of Kratzer’s 
analysis of the German state passive.  Pima verbs which receive this interpretation 
include dagkuan ‘to wipe clean’, mulin ‘to break by bending’, helig ‘to spread out (on a 
line)’, vakuan ‘to clean by bathing’, and viitkuan ‘to roll up (e.g., cloth)’. 
 The comment which was made in the discussion of the verb aufpumpen in section 
4.3.1 was that this verb specifies both the target state that results from some event as well 
as the type of event that results in that state.  The representation of the root aufpump- was 
given in (36)a, repeated here 
(36) a. [[ aufpump- ]]  = λx λs λe [event(e) ∧ pump(e) ∧ cause(s)(e) ∧ inflated(x)(s)] 
                    (Kratzer 2000: (12)) 
                                                 
109 To be complete, this analysis should also specify the semantic interpretation of 
subjects of individual level predicates.  One possibility is that the spatiotemporal extent 
of the referent of the subject of an individual level predicate instantiates an eventuality 
which fills e in (91).  Where the meaning of a verb root does not include a path, but 
instead only an event type, the referent of the subject must similarly instantiate an 
eventuality which is of that event type, thus leading to conclusions like the presence of a 
speech impediment in (67)d, for example, with the verb root gikuj ‘to whistle’. 
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It was suggested earlier that portions of this representation could correspond to 
syntactically distinct elements: the predicate pump(e) could correspond to a syntactic 
element which is expressed with the phonological features pump-, and the predicate 
inflated(x)(s) could correspond to a syntactic element which is expressed in this context 
with the phonological features auf-.  It was also mentioned earlier that the predicate 
event(e), which is intended to force the eventuality which fills the variable e to be an 
event proper, is actually unnecessary, since pump(e) will have the same effect. 
 The general framework within which this structure-building analysis is being 
proposed assumes a syntactic decompositional analysis of event structure – that syntactic 
structure encodes the same information that Pustejovsky’s lexical conceptual structures 
(and other such theoretical constructs) do.  Since verbs of the aufpumpen type have the 
same event structure as do verbs with resultative secondary predicates – a type of event 
which results in a state – these two verb types will be represented with the same syntactic 
structure.  I will therefore adopt the analysis of resultative secondary predication given in 
Embick (2004).  Embick’s proposal is shown in (94), extended to the verb aufpumpen. 
(94)      vP 
       ei 
    DP       v' 
   4   ei   
   (O)  v        aP 
     2    5   
     √PUMP  BECOME  √INFLATED       (after Embick 2004: (36)) 
The lexical root which specifies the type of event that results in the target state (√PUMP) 
combines with a light verb by what Embick calls DIRECT MERGE, an operation which 
merges two syntactic atoms into a single head, and which is interpreted semantically in a 
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different way than the interpretation normally associated with complement-taking 
(namely, function application).  The interpretation which Embick associates with the 
syntactic structure of direct merge is given in (95)a.  An alternative proposal utilizing 
eventuality arguments and a representation parallel to Kratzer’s representation of 
aufpump- is given in (95)b. 
(95) a. λP [ λx [ BY(ROOT, BECOME(P(x))) ] ]     (modified from Embick 2004: (49b))110 
  b. λP [ λx [ λs [ λe [ ROOT(e) ∧ cause'(s)(e) ∧ P(x)(s) ] ] ] ] 
On Embick’s analysis in (95)a, a root which is directly merged with a light verb BECOME 
(whose interpretation fills the position of ROOT in the representation) specifies a ‘means’ 
by which the property P (which is provided by the resultative secondary predicate 
through function application) comes to hold of the individual x; Embick uses the two-
place relation BY to express this meaning, citing Dowty 1979 and Parsons 1990 for 
discussion of this relation.  This meaning is entirely parallel to that of (95)b, however, 
with cause' in place of the BY relation, and where the root specifies an event type which 
results in the target state given by P.  Assuming that the meaning of the root √PUMP is an 
event type pump(e) and that the interpretation in (95)b is associated with direct merge of 
the root and the light verb, the representation in (94) will yield a meaning for aufpump- 
which is identical to Kratzer’s proposed representation (36), with the absence of event(e). 
 This analysis can be carried over directly for Pima verbs like  dagkuan ‘to wipe 
clean’.  If the verb dagkuan specifies both a manner (wiping, movement along a surface) 
                                                 
110 As mentioned in the discussion of Embick’s proposal in section 3.2.2, he labels his 
light verb FIENT rather than BECOME because he does not wish to associate this predicate 
with a telic interpretation, as is typical for most formulations of a light verb BECOME.  
Since telicity is not the main issue here, and since the label FIENT is less easily 
understood, I am using the label BECOME for this light verb. 
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and a resulting state (that the surface become clean), it would also be given the structure 
in (94).  This vP has a semantic representation with two open eventuality arguments, 
however.  An agentive light verb therefore may not attach to the vP of (94), since this 
light verb requires its complement to have a single open eventuality argument; it is also 
reasonable to assume that tense morphemes may only operate on representations with a 
single open eventuality argument.  I will therefore make use of Kratzer’s (2000) proposal 
of an eventizer and a target stativizer to reduce the number of eventuality arguments to 
one.  Her representations for these are repeated below from section 3.2.1. 
(37)  Eventizer:    λR λe ∃s R(s)(e) 
   Target stativizer:  λR λs ∃e R(s)(e) 
The target stativizer will attach above the lowest vP, and is realized (when no other light 
verb occurs higher) by the –s suffix.  Sentence (96) is built from the structure in (97). 
(96)   Gegosdakud:  'o               dagkui-s. 
   table               3:SUB:IMP  wipe.clean-PASR 
   The table is wiped clean. 
(97) a.    vP2 
      ei  
    v2        vP1 
  [TGST]     ei  
      DP       v'1 
     4   ei   
     (O)  v1        aP 
       2    5   
    √DAGKUAN  BECOME     √KEEG 
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  b. Constant expressions: 
   [[ √DAGKUAN ]]  =  λe [ wipe'(e) ] ] 
   [[ [aP √KEEG ] ]]  =  λx [ λs [ clean'(s) ∧ in'(x,s) ] ]111 
  [[ v[TGST] ]]    =  λR [ λs [ ∃e [ R(s)(e) ] ] ] 
  c. Calculations: 
   [[ v1 ]]  = λP [ λx [ λs [ λe [ wipe'(e) ∧ cause'(s)(e) ∧ P(x)(s) ] ] ] ]  (from (95)b) 
   [[ v'1 ]]  = λx [ λs [ λe [ wipe'(e) ∧ cause'(s)(e) ∧ clean'(s) ∧ in'(x,s) ] ] ] 
   [[ vP1 ]]  = λs [ λe [ wipe'(e) ∧ cause'(s)(e) ∧ clean'(s) ∧ in'(O,s) ] ]  
  [[ vP2 ]]  = λs [ ∃e [ wipe'(e) ∧ cause'(s)(e) ∧ clean'(s) ∧ in'(O,s) ] ] 
The representation of the vP2 has the semantic properties that are observed for verbs like 
dagkuis: they are temporally stative (which is predicted, since the vP is a predicate of 
states) and receive a target state interpretation (thus, subsequent temporal modifiers will 
be predicated of the state, rather than the causing event), and require that the target state 
result from some event (here, an event of wiping). 
 When this verb occurs in an eventive use, as in (98), the agent-introducing light 
verb attaches after the eventizer has attached to (94), yielding the derivation seen in (99). 
(98)  Marcus  'o               dagkuan      heg  gegosdakud: 
                 3:SUB:IMP  wipe.clean  DET  table 
   Marcus is wiping the table clean. 
                                                 
111 The aP involving the root √KEEG is involved in the derivation of the adjective keeg 
‘clean’, which expresses the intended target state of the verb dagkuan ‘to wipe (clean)’.  
This representation for adjectives will be discussed in the following section. 
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(99) a.    vP3 
      ei  
    DP       v'3 
   4   ei  
   (A)     v3        vP2 
       [AGENT]    ei  
        v2        vP1  
       [EVENT]    ei 
           DP       v'1 
          4   ei   
          (O)  v1        aP 
            2    5   
         √DAGKUAN  BECOME     √KEEG 
  b. Constant expressions: 
   [[ v[EVENT] ]]   =  λR [ λe [ ∃s [ R(s)(e) ] ] ] 
   [[ v[AGENT] ]]   =  λP [ λy [ λe [ ∃e' [ P(e') ∧ cause'(e,e') ∧ agent'(e,y) ] ] ] ] 
                     (to be revised) 
  c. Calculations: 
   [[ vP1 ]]  = λs [ λe [ wipe'(e) ∧ cause'(s)(e) ∧ clean'(s) ∧ in'(O,s) ] ] (from (97)c) 
   [[ vP2 ]]  = λe [ ∃s [ wipe'(e) ∧ cause'(s)(e) ∧ clean'(s) ∧ in'(O,s) ] ] 
   [[ v'3 ]]  = λy [ λe [ ∃e' [ [ ∃s [ wipe'(e') ∧ cause'(s)(e') ∧ clean'(s) ∧ in'(O,s) ] ] 
        ∧ cause'(e,e') ∧ agent'(e,y) ] ] ] 
   [[ vP3 ]]  = λe [ ∃e' [ [ ∃s [ wipe'(e') ∧ cause'(s)(e') ∧ clean'(s) ∧ in'(O,s) ] ] 
        ∧ cause'(e,e') ∧ agent'(e,A) ] ] 
As with the passive resultative in (97), the eventizer is required to enable higher structure 
to attach.  This also produces a predicate with the desired temporal properties: it is 
eventive by virtue of being a predicate of an event (since the highest eventuality involves 
an agent).  It should be apparent, however, that the representation of the light verb v[AGENT] 
is still problematic: there are two cause' predicates when there should be only one.  This 
problem will be resolved when v[AGENT] is reformulated in the following section. 
 The possessive resultative dagkuakc ‘keep wiped clean’ is derived parallel to (98), 
though the target stativizer is required rather than the eventizer. 
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(100)  Marcus  'o               dagkua-kc            heg  gegosdakud:. 
                 3:SUB:IMP  wipe.clean-POSR  DET  table 
   Marcus keeps the table wiped clean. 
(101) a.    vP3 
      ei  
    DP       v'3 
   4   ei  
   (A)     v3        vP2 
       [MAINT]    ei  
        v2        vP1  
       [TGST]    ei 
           DP       v'1 
          4   ei   
          (O)  v1        aP 
            2    5   
         √DAGKUAN  BECOME     √KEEG 
  b. Constant expressions: 
  [[ v[MAINT] ]]    = λP [ λy [ λe [ P(e) ∧ maintain'(e,y) ] ] ] (to be revised) 
  c. Calculations: 
   [[ vP2 ]]  = λs [ ∃e [ wipe'(e) ∧ cause'(s)(e) ∧ clean'(s) ∧ in'(O,s) ] ] (from (97)c) 
   [[ v'3 ]]  = λy [ λe [ [ ∃e' [ wipe'(e') ∧ cause'(e)(e') ∧ clean'(e) ∧ in'(O,e) ] ]  
        ∧ maintain'(e,y) ] ] 
  [[ vP3 ]]  = λe [ [ ∃e' [ wipe'(e') ∧ cause'(e)(e') ∧ clean'(e) ∧ in'(O,e) ] ] 
         ∧ maintain'(e,A)] 
The representation in vP3 has the properties that are observed for possessive resultative 
verbs like daguakc ‘keep wiped clean’: it is temporally stative (since its open eventuality 
argument e ranges over states, as required by the predicates clean', in', and maintain'), 
and the target state results from an event of wiping.  The target stativizer is required here 
in order for the light verb v[MAINT] to attach, though since there is no –s suffix present 
overtly, I assume that this suffix is not realized when other light verbs attach above it.112 
                                                 
112 It must be the target stativizer which attaches here, and not the eventizer (which is 
apparently null everywhere), since the eventizer would cause wipe' and maintain' to be 
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 Before concluding the discussion of this verb type, it should be noted that some 
verbs which pattern this way, including dagkuan ‘to wipe (clean), may in other contexts 
appear not to lexicalize a target state, but only a manner, in contrast to the German verb 
aufpumpen.  It is useful at this point to reconsider the example of scrubbed mentioned in 
section 3.3.5, in which the participle of a verb which apparently specifies only the event 
type (without a target state) can nevertheless be interpreted as if it did lexicalize a target 
state – thus with a meaning identical to scrub clean – if doing so is the only way to 
interpret an expression involving the verb.  The example context is as a target state 
passive resultative, repeated below. 
(59) a.? When I came back the next day, the tub was still scrubbed. 
Since the interpretation which scrubbed receives in such cases is identical to the 
interpretation of scrubbed clean, the participle scrubbed must also include a resultative 
secondary predicate with the meaning of clean, but which is not realized by any overt 
phonological material; the same may be true for some verbs in Pima.  The derivation 
would then proceed exactly as in (97). 
 If this target state interpretation is available for verbs like scrub, however, it goes 
against a generalization made by Rappaport Hovav and Levin (1998) that each subevent 
in the event structure of a clause must be associated with overt phonological material.  An 
explanation for this generalization might also explain why instances where scrubbed 
receives a target state interpretation are only marginally acceptable, or require a rich 
context in order to sound acceptable.  Similarly, a number of Pima verbs which pattern as 
                                                                                                                                                 
predicated of the same eventuality argument, resulting in inconsistency since wipe' 
requires an event and maintain' requires a state. 
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target state resultatives also do not have phonological material that clearly names an 
event and phonological material that names a target state; this includes even dagkuis 
‘wiped (clean)’, for which a structure was shown in (97).113  Many of these apparent 
target state passives in Pima may therefore involve coercion to make a verb which should 
only allow a post-state interpretation interpretable in a context which should only allow a 
target state interpretation. 
 Another potential problem with the analysis presented in this section is that 
Kratzer (2000) observes that German verbs with a resultative secondary predicate only 
receive a post stative interpretation, not a target state interpretation as would be predicted 
if resultative secondary predication was given the analysis discussed in this section.  
Verbs in Pima like dagkuan ‘wipe (clean)’ are acceptable with adverbials like still, 
however, which is indicative of a target state interpretation rather than a post state 
interpretation.  The problem may lie with Kratzer’s empirical claim, however, and not 
with this analysis.  Details involving post stative interpretations will be discussed in 
section 4.3.3.5. 
4.3.3.4 Morphological causatives 
 A number of problems were also seen in the previous section not with the analysis 
of the resultative morphemes themselves, but with the formulation of the agent-
introducing light verb v[AGENT].  As formulated thus far, the semantic representation of 
v[AGENT] also introduces lexical causation.  The behavior of Pima resultative suffixes on 
                                                 
113 The verb dagkuan ‘to wipe’ in fact is morphologically complex, but in a different way 
than is indicated in (97); dag- indicates an action with the hands, and –kuan indicates an 
action along a surface.  They may properly be analyzed as involving the combination of a 
root and a light verb, but not necessarily the same kind that is proposed in (94) and (97). 
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adjectives, however, and particularly on the morphological causative verbs that are 
derived from such adjectives, motivates a different formulation of this morpheme. 
  Most adjectives in Pima do not require any additional morphology to occur 
predicatively, but keeg ‘clean’ (and a few others) must occur with a suffix, realized as –aj 
for this adjective (glossed below as VB); I interpret this to mean that this light verb v[BE] is 
typically not associated with phonological features in Pima, but for several roots, 
including √KEEG, this head is expressed by a non-null vocabulary item.  Uses of this 
adjectival root √KEEG in prenominal and predicative position are shown in (102). 
(102) a. M-a-n-t                          ñei         heg  s-keeg   gegosdakud:. 
  COMP-AUX-1s:SUB-PFV  see:PFV  DET  S-clean  table 
  I saw a clean table. 
 b. Gegosdakud:      'o                s-keeg-aj. 
  table                    3:SUB:IMP  S-clean-VB 
  The table is clean. 
 c. 'Oidag  'o               s-keeg-s. 
   field    3:SUB:IMP  S-clean-PASR 
  The field is (permanently) clean (i.e., clear, barren). 
 A detailed proposal for the structure associated with predicate adjectives is 
presented in (103).  This is the structure from which sentence (102)b would be built.  
Again, I follow Hale and Keyser (1998) in assuming that for syntactic reasons, adjectival 
roots cannot take a nominal argument directly but must combine with a light verb in 
order to be predicated of a DP; thus, predicate adjectives pattern like external predication. 
(103) a.     vP 
      ru  
  DP      v' 
  4  ru  
  (O)  v   √KEEG 
      [BE] 
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 b. Constant expressions 
  [[ √KEEG ]]  = λs [ clean'(s) ] 
  [[ v[BE] ]]   = λP [ λx [ λs [ P(s) ∧ in'(x,s) ] ] ]114 
 c. Calculations 
  [[ v' ]]    = λx [ λs [ clean'(s) ∧ in'(x,s) ] ] 
  [[ vP ]]   = λs [ clean'(s) ∧ in'(O,s) ] 
Here, as before, I use O to represent the referent of the subject DP (assuming that the DP 
is a referring expression). 
 When the passive resultative suffix –s attaches directly to the root, as in (102)c, 
only an individual level interpretation for the predicate is allowed – presumably for the 
reason given in the previous section, that the subject must then be merged at a higher 
structural position associated with an individual level interpretation of the predicate. 
 The attachment of the –s to the causativized form of this adjective, however, 
motivates a revision of the above analysis regarding causation and the external argument. 
(104) a. Marcus  'o               keeg-cud     heg  gegosdakud:. 
                3:SUB:IMP  clean-CAUS  DET  table 
  Marcus is cleaning the table. 
 b. Gegosdakud:  'o                keeg-cud-s. 
  table                3:SUB:IMP  clean-CAUS-PASR 
  The table is cleaned. 
In the eventive causative sentence (104)a, the object which is clean – which fills the same 
role as the object that is introduced by the copular light verb in (103) – is still present; I 
therefore conclude that the light verb which introduced this argument in (102)b is still 
present in (104), even though it is not phonologically realized.  While the causative suffix 
                                                 
114 I follow Parsons (1990) in using in'(x,s) to introduce the argument of which the state s 
holds; this means that the state s is true of the individual x.  There appears to be no 
semantic reason why hidden' and clean' should differ in this way, so I interpret this to be 
part of the categorical distinction between verbs and adjectives (encoded in the semantic 
representation). 
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–cud is also present in (104)b, however, the causer argument is not.  There is still an 
element of causation that is present, however: the passive resultative in (104)b is 
interpreted as a resultative proper, rather than a derived stative, meaning that some event 
results in the state of the table being clean.  Recall from section 4.1 that this is the 
interpretation which results when the -s is attached outside of a verbalizing morpheme 
like the causative.  Since on the structure-building analysis the –s does not result in 
deletion of any meaning, we are forced to conclude that the –cud suffix is associated only 
with the introduction of this causing event, and that some other phonologically unrealized 
morpheme must be responsible for the introduction of the causer argument in (104)a; in 
(104)b, the –s presumably obviates its attachment. 
 This sort of split between the introduction of a causing eventuality and an 
argument that is involved in that eventuality has already been proposed for a number of 
languages by Pylkkänen (2002).  We may therefore refine the analysis presented 
previously by positing distinct causative and agent-introducing morphemes, as shown 
below; (105) shows the structure from which the eventive causative of (104)a is built. 
(105) a.      voiceP 
    ru  
   DP   voice' 
  4  ru  
  (A) voice     vP2  
     [AGENT] ru  
          v2     vP1  
        [CAUSE] ru  
          DP      v'1  
         4  ru  
         (O)     v1    √KEEG 
           [BE] 
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 b. Constant expressions 
  [[ √KEEG ]]    = λs [ clean'(s) ] 
  [[ v[BE] ]]     = λP [ λx [ λs [ P(s) ∧ in'(x,s) ] ] ] 
  [[ v[CAUSE] ]]    = λP [ λe [ ∃e' [ P(e') ∧ cause'(e,e') ] ] ] (Pylkkänen 2002:76)115 
  [[ voice[AGENT] ]]  = λx [ λe [ agent'(e,x) ] ]116   (Pylkkänen 2002:79) 
 c. Calculations 
  [[ vP1 ]]   = λs [ clean'(s) ∧ in'(O,s) ]     (=(103)c) 
  [[ vP2 ]]   = λe [ ∃e' [ clean'(e') ∧ in'(O,e') ∧ cause'(e,e') ] ] 
  [[ voice' ]]  = λx [ λe [∃e' [ clean'(e') ∧ in'(O,e') ∧ cause'(e,e') ∧ agent'(e,x) ] ] ] 
  [[ voiceP ]]  = λe [∃e' [ clean'(e') ∧ in'(O,e') ∧ cause'(e,e') ∧ agent'(e,A) ] ] 
For the stativized causative in (104)b, the light verb from section 4.3.3 realized by the –s 
suffix would attach in place of the agentive voice head, resulting in a predicate whose 
semantic representation is as in (106), essentially the same as vP2 of (105)c.117 
(106)  [[ (O) keeg-cud-s ]] = λe [ ∃e' [ clean'(e') ∧ in'(O,e') ∧ cause'(e,e') ] ] 
The absence of any further specification of the higher eventuality argument e 
(corresponding to the causing eventuality) would allow it to range over either states or 
events; this is not sufficient, however, to create a predicate which is always temporally 
stative.  A predicate whose eventuality argument ranges over states would have this 
                                                 
115 Pylkkänen’s causative morpheme includes existential quantification of the target state.  
If it did not, then the eventizer and target stativizer of the previous section could also be 
used here to select which eventuality tense will modify, though this would result in target 
state interpretations for such forms, rather than only post state interpretations. 
116 While the roots and light verbal heads seen so far merge by means of a rule of 
function application, voice heads generally merge by means of a rule of event 
identification or event modification; for the formulation of such a rule, see Heim and 
Kratzer (1998). 
117 Now that nominal- and eventuality-introducing morphemes have been distinguished, 
the agent-introducing head has been labeled voice; this distinction loosely follows 
Pylkkänen (2002).  The maintainer-introducing morpheme has also been labeled as voice.  
It would be possible to label all nominal-introducing morphemes as voice and all 
eventuality-introducing morphemes as v (or to distinguish all morphemes which combine 
by event identification, for instance), though the only eventuality-introducing morpheme 
is the causative, and by this criterion, the morpheme currently labeled v[STATE] would not 
fit in either category, though intuitively it seems to form an opposition to voice[AGENT]. 
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property, but restricting the causing eventuality e to states does not fit the data in Pima; 
verbs like keegcuds are stative even when this causing eventuality is taken to be an event 
proper.  To derive a predicate which is temporally stative from a predicate of events like 
(106) would require an aspectual operator like the post stativizer proposed by Kratzer 
(2000), reproduced in (107)a (originally from (37)); in fact, Kratzer claims that a post 
state reading is the only reading available to state passives of causativized adjectives in 
German and English, like geleert ‘emptied’.  The semantic representation of keegcuds, 
derived by combining (106) with the post state operator of (107)a, is shown in (107)b. 
(107) a. [[ Aspect[PERF] ]]   = λP λt ∃e [P(e) ∧ τ(e) < t] 
 b. [[ Aspect[PERF]P ]] = λt [ ∃e[ ∃e'[ clean'(e') ∧ in'(O,e') ∧ cause'(e,e') ] ∧ τ(e) < t ] ] 
In words, this means that the running time of the causing event e occurred before some 
other time t, which would remain to be further modified by higher tense operators. 
 The light verb v[MAINT] which is expressed by the –(k)c suffix would attach to the 
vP2 from (105) in exactly the same way as the voice head that introduces the agent, 
likewise requiring causation and the external argument to be introduced by distinct 
heads.118  This is shown schematically in (109) for the sentence in (108). 
(108)  Gegosdakud:  'a-ñ                keeg-cud-c. 
  table                AUX-1s:SUB  clean-CAUS-ST 
  I keep the table cleaned. 
                                                 
118 As with the agent-introducing head, the head which introduces the maintainer must 
combine with its complement by event identification or event modification. 
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(109) a.   voiceP 
   ru  
   DP   voice' 
  4  ru  
  (A) voice     vP2  
     [MAINT] ru  
          v2     vP1  
        [CAUSE] ru  
          DP      v'1  
         4  ru  
         (O)     v1    √KEEG 
           [BE] 
 b. Constant expressions (new relative to (105)) 
  [[ voice[MAINT] ]]   = λy [ λe [ maintain'(e,y) ] ] ] (revised from (89)b) 
 c. Calculations 
  [[ vP2 ]]  = λe [ ∃e' [ clean'(e') ∧ in'(O,e') ∧ cause'(e,e') ] ] (from (105)c) 
  [[ v'3 ]]   = λy [ λe [ ∃e'[clean'(e') ∧ in'(O,e') ∧ cause'(e,e') ∧ maintain'(e,y) ] ] ] 
  [[ vP3 ]]  = λe [ ∃e' [clean'(e') ∧ in'(O,e') ∧ cause'(e,e') ∧ maintain'(e,A) ] ] 
The final representation for keegcudc, corresponding to vP3 in (109)c, does not require 
the post stativizer of (107)a in order to be temporally stative.  If the predicate maintain' 
requires that its eventuality argument range over states only, then the temporal stativity of 
the overall predicate is guaranteed, since a predicate of states is necessarily temporally 
stative. 
  The semantic representations of the stativized predicates in (107) and (109) make 
mention of two eventualities, one of which causes the other.  This initially appears to be 
the desired result, since both of these forms were claimed earlier in this chapter to be 
resultatives proper, lacking derived stative readings; this is also the pattern of data 
claimed by Kratzer (2000) for German and English causativized adjectives.  We will see 
in the next section, however, that this empirical claim may not be correct.  Such forms 
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may involve a kind of target state reading, for which the precise representations here will 
pose problems.  First, however, we must reconcile the changes made by splitting voice 
and causation with the initial analysis given for the Pima resultatives –s and –(k)c on 
lexical causative verbs like 'eestod: ‘to hide’. 
 We may compare [[keeg]cud]c, where the –(k)c attaches outside a morphological 
causative suffix, with the analysis of ['eesto]kc given above in section 4.3.3.  The 
semantic representations of these verbs are repeated in (110). 
(110) a. [[ [voiceP 'eestokc] ]]   = λe [ hidden'(O,e) ∧ maintain'(e,A) ]  (from (89)c) 
 b. [[ [voiceP keegcudc] ]]  = λe [ ∃e' [ clean'(e') ∧ in'(O,e') ∧ cause'(e,e') ∧ 
            maintain'(e,A) ] ]    (from (109)c) 
Apart from the difference in argument-taking ability between hidden' and clean', these 
representations differ in the presence of cause' and in the eventuality that maintain' is 
predicated of.  In the analysis of –s and  –(k)c presented in section 4.3.3, these resultative 
suffixes attached directly to the root √'EESTOD: in place of the voice head that introduced 
both causation and the agentive external argument.  Now that causation and the agentive 
external argument are introduced by distinct heads, however, the possessive resultative 
might in principle attach directly to the root in place of the causative light verb, or might 
attach after the causative light verb but in place of the agent-introducing voice head.  
There are several reasons to conclude that in fact the –(k)c suffix always attaches outside 
of a causative light verb, however, with a revised representation for (110)a as in (111). 
(111)  [[ [voiceP 'eestokc] ]]   = λe [∃e' [hidden'(O,e') ∧ cause'(e,e') ∧ maintain'(e,A) ] ] 
 First, there is an asymmetry in the behavior of the –s and –(k)c suffixes which 
disfavors attaching the possessive resultative –(k)c directly to a strictly state-denoting 
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root.  While the passive resultative –s may attach to the apparent adjectival form of a 
word like keeg ‘clean’ (i.e., without the copular –aj present, thus forcing an individual 
level interpretation), the possessive resultative -(k)c may not, as seen in (112).119 
(112) a. 'Oidag  'o               s-keeg-s. 
   field    3:SUB:IMP  S-clean-PASR 
  The field is (permanently) clean (i.e., clear, barren). 
 b. * 'Oidag  'a-ñ                s-keeg-c. 
      field     AUX-1s:SUB  S-clean-POSR 
  (‘I keep the field clean’, intended, but bad with any meaning) 
Adjectives like keeg ‘clean’, moik ‘soft’, toa ‘white’, and ko'ok ‘painful’ do not license 
the –(k)c suffix, and, interestingly, neither do many non-positional stative verbs like 
kee'id ‘hate’ and maac ‘know’, even though the –s suffix attaches to all these forms; in 
contrast, the –(k)c suffix may attach to any of these when they are causativized.  The 
possessive resultative –(k)c suffix in fact is sometimes associated with a causative 
interpretation even when no overt causative is present, as in (113) (repeated from (77)). 
(113) a. Juupin  'o                heg  kanaho. 
  sink      3:SUB:IMP  DET  boat 
  The boat is sinking.  
 b. Kii      damhod:ag  'o                juupin-c      heg  Marcus. 
  house  ceiling         3:SUB:IMP  sink-POSR    DET   
  The ceiling has Marcus hunched over. 
The root involved in the verb juupin ‘to sink’ presumably involves motion along a path, 
and in fact patterns like other motion verbs with the –s suffix, yielding only nominal and 
extent interpretations.  The affixation of the –(k)c suffix to the apparent bare verb is 
                                                 
119 In (112)b, the copular light verb which is normally expressed as –aj in predicative uses 
of this adjective must still be present, since it is the only possible way to introduce the 
object; the object cannot be merged in the position that the subject of an individual level 
predicate would occupy, since there is another argument in this clause that must occupy 
the subject position.  This light verb is presumably silent. 
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accompanied by the introduction of (stative) causation: it is an inherent property of the 
ceiling – its low height – that is responsible for Marcus’s condition of being hunched 
over.  The generalization about where the –(k)c suffix may attach, then, is that it may 
only attach to a word that involves causation.120 
 Secondly, the eventuality which the maintain' predicate is predicated of in (110) 
is different in the two cases: in the lexical causative 'eestokc ‘keep hidden’ in (110)a, the 
eventuality which the maintainer maintains is the target state of the verb; in the 
morphological causative keegcudc ‘keep cleaned’ in (110)b, the eventuality which the 
maintainer maintains is the eventuality which causes the target state (presumably 
restricted to states by maintain').  For this reason, a parallel structure where maintain' 
modifies the causing eventuality seems better in both cases, as in (110)b and (111). 
 A third argument appears at first to be an argument in favor of assigning distinct 
structure to lexical causatives and morphological causatives, as in (110), but in fact 
supports a uniform structure when the empirical generalization concerning derived stative 
interpretations of Pima possessive resultatives is refined.  One way that the two verbs 
represented in (110) were claimed to differ is in terms of an entailment of an event of the 
inception of the target state: the generalization made in section 4.2.2 was that since 
keegcudc includes an overt verbalizing affix (i.e., the -cud suffix), it should only have an 
interpretation as a resultative proper, not as a derived stative, while 'eestokc, which does 
not include an overt verbalizing affix, should have a derived stative interpretation, the 
same pattern seen with the passive resultative.  If the presence of a causative light verb is 
                                                 
120 That is, I assume that a phonologically null causative is present in cases like (113)b. 
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what produces the entailment of inception of the state, we would expect that the 
possessive resultative suffix –(k)c should attach to √'EESTOD: without such a causative 
light verb intervening. 
 We have now seen, however, that the causative light verb as formulated here does 
not require an event of the inception of the state.  An eventuality in which an agent 
participates is necessarily an event proper, as indicated by the association between 
stativity and the lack of agency seen in section 2.1, and a causing eventuality which is an 
event proper does involve the inception of the target state.  The general causative 
morpheme of Pylkkänen (2002), however, which does not introduce an agent, can be 
associated with either an eventive or a stative causing eventuality, and a stative cause 
need not involve the inception of the target state, just that one state is responsible for the 
existence of the target state.  The maintain' predicate introduced by the possessive 
resultative is only defined when the eventuality that it takes as its argument ranges over 
states, so the only interpretation available with the –(k)c suffix is one of stative causation, 
thus producing an interpretation without an entailment of the inception of the target state 
– just as for a derived stative interpretation.121 
 In fact, this interpretation of the generalization that was made in section 4.2.2, that 
the presence of an overt verbalizing affix is associated with an entailment of an event of 
the inception of the target state, while accurate for the cases involving the passive 
resultative suffix –s, is not accurate for the possessive resultative suffix –(k)c.  The proper 
                                                 
121 Recall that in order to guarantee a stative interpretation with the meaning contributed 
by the passive resultative –s, a post-state operator was needed, as well.  This analysis will 
be shown in section 4.3.3.5 to make incorrect predictions. 
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use of keegcudc ‘keep clean’ requires that something be responsible for the current clean 
state of the direct object, but this something may involve merely the maintenance of a 
pre-existing clean state; it is because of some other state that the clean state holds, as in 
(114), inspired by Scotchguard. 
(114)  'Iks    keeg-cud-akud:    'o                keeg-cud-c           heg   'iks. 
  cloth  clean-CAUS-INST  3:SUB:IMP  clean-CAUS-POSR  DET  cloth 
  The fabric treatment (lit. ‘the cloth cleaner’) keeps the fabric clean. 
Although there is an entailment of a causing eventuality (such as the existence or 
presence of a substance like Scotchguard), it does not require an event of the inception of 
the target state; the cloth need not have been dirty before the fabric treatment began to 
keep it clean.  In an entirely parallel way, then, 'eestokc ‘keep hidden’ may be analyzed 
as involving stative causation which does not require a change of state, though it does 
entail that some eventuality is causally related to the target state, such as the spatial 
location or orientation of an object that is doing the hiding. 
 We should therefore revise the semantic and syntactic analysis for 'eestokc to be 
as in (115), exactly parallel to the morphological causative case, with voice and causation 
separated into two syntactic heads. 
(115) a.      voiceP 
   ru  
   DP   voice' 
  4  ru  
  (A) voice     vP  
     [MAINT] ru  
          v   ROOTP  
        [CAUSE] ru  
         √'EESTOD:    DP  
              4  
              (O) 
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 b. Constant expressions 
  [[ √'EESTOD: ]]   = λx [ λs [ hidden'(x,s) ] ] 
  [[ v[CAUSE] ]]    = λP [ λe [ ∃e' [ P(e') ∧ cause'(e,e') ] ] ] 
  [[ voice[MAINT] ]]  = λy [ λe [ maintain'(e,y) ] ] ]  
 c. Calculations 
  [[ ROOTP ]]  = λs [ hidden'(O,s) ] 
  [[ vP ]]   = λe [ ∃e' [ hidden'(O,e') ∧ cause'(e,e') ] ] 
  [[ voice' ]]   = λy [ λe [ ∃e' [ hidden'(O,e') ∧ cause'(e,e') ∧ maintain'(e,y) ] ] ] 
  [[ voiceP ]]  = λe [ ∃e' [ hidden'(O,e') ∧ cause'(e,e') ∧ maintain'(e,A) ] ] 
What distinguishes the lexical and morphological causatives like 'eestod: ‘to hide’ and 
keegcud ‘to clean’ in terms of whether the causative is realized by phonological features 
is therefore just whether the causative light verb takes a root as its complement or another 
light verb.  If the causative is adjacent to a root, the vocabulary item which realizes the 
causative morpheme has no phonological expression.  (See Embick 2003 for arguments 
that the root-adjacent/non-root-adjacent distinction can determine distinct sets of 
vocabulary items for competition.) 
 The intent of this analysis was to predict the distribution of derived stative 
interpretations better than a deletion analysis (section 4.3.2) and the analysis proposed by 
Kratzer (2000) (discussed in sections 3.2.3 and 4.3.1).  For her, event entailments are 
naturally present on all post state participles and on all target state participles whose 
corresponding verb forms lack a stative reading, and all other participial forms that 
receive a derived stative interpretation must have their meaning idiomatically specified.  
On the analysis presented in this section, all post state participles lack a derived stative 
interpretation (like Kratzer), as do all target state participles which involve a causing 
eventuality that is restricted to events proper; this restriction may result either from a 
restriction on its event type (for example, if it is an event of wiping) or from a restriction 
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on the event’s participants (for example, if it includes an agent or an instrument).  Some 
of the possessive resultatives just discussed are caused by some eventuality, but remain 
stative because the causing eventuality is itself a state, and thus also lack an entailment of 
the inception of the target state.  All other derived statives simply do not involve a 
causative morpheme, as seen in section 4.3.3.122 
4.3.3.5 Post state resultatives 
 A structure-building analysis of resultatives with post-state interpretations may 
follow exactly the analysis of Kratzer (2000).  Wherever the highest eventuality argument 
of a predicate does not range over states alone (as is required by a predicate like hidden' 
or maintain'), and where a target state argument, if present, has been closed off by some 
other morpheme (such as the causative), only the aspectual post-stativizer will produce a 
predicate that is temporally stative.  This should therefore be the interpretation that is 
associated with Pima verbs like gaswua ‘to comb’, which specify only an event type but 
not a resulting target state, and keegcuds ‘to be cleaned’, whose target state argument is 
made inaccessible for further aspectual and temporal modification by the existential 
quantifier within the causative. 
  There is a problem with claiming that all such resultatives have only a post state 
interpretation, however, one that arises in both the structure-building analysis as well as 
                                                 
122 An additional comparison may be made with the analysis proposed by Embick (2004), 
which would likewise fall into the structure-building category.  To summarize his 
analysis, an event entailment is present everywhere that the aspectual head which he 
takes to form the resultative dominates a projection which is verbal in category.  If this 
verbal projection is associated with the introduction of causation, or even with the 
existential closure of a state argument which might specify a resulting state, his 
predictions would agree with those made here.  See section 4.3.3.5 for discussion 
regarding existential closure of the resulting state argument, however. 
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Kratzer’s (2000) analysis of German: a post state is not the interpretation that certain 
resultatives of this type receive, and the argument that higher operators are predicted to 
modify (by the semantic representation) is not the argument that they actually modify. 
 The application of the post stativizer, as discussed above, is the only way seen so 
far to derive a temporally stative predicate from a predicate whose only open eventuality 
argument ranges over events.  The verb gaswua ‘to comb’ illustrates this in (116).   
(116) a. Jason  'o               gaswua  heg  'e-mo'o. 
              3:SUB:IMP  comb     DET  ¬1:POS-hair 
  Jason is combing his hair. 
  b. Jason  mo'o  'o                hekiu    gaswua-s. 
              hair    3:SUB:IMP  already  comb-PASR 
   Jason’s hair is already combed. 
Since gaswua specifies a type of event and takes a direct object, but does not specify a 
target state, the root √GASWUA has the formulation seen below; (117) shows its eventive 
use (116)a, and (118) shows the passive resultative (116)b. 
(117) a.   voiceP 
    ru  
   DP   voice' 
  4  ru  
  (A) voice   ROOTP   
     [AGENT] ru  
       √'GASWUA    DP  
            4  
            (O) 
 b. Constant expressions 
  [[ √GASWUA ]]   = λx [ λe [ comb'(x,e) ] ] 
  [[ voice[AGENT] ]]  = λy [ λe [ agent'(e,y) ] ]    (Pylkkänen 2002:79) 
 c. Calculations 
  [[ ROOTP ]]    = λe [ comb'(O,e) ] 
  [[ voice' ]]     = λy [ λe [ comb'(O,e) ∧ agent'(e,y) ] ] 
  [[ voiceP ]]    = λe [ comb'(O,e) ∧ agent'(e,A) ] 
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(118) a.    AspP 
    ru  
   Asp   ROOTP   
    [PERF]   ru  
      √'GASWUA    DP  
           4  
           (O) 
 b. Constant expressions 
  [[ Aspect[PERF] ]]    = λP [ λt [ ∃e [ P(e) ∧ τ(e) < t ] ] ] 
 c. Calculations 
  [[ ROOTP ]]    = λe [ comb'(O,e) ] 
  [[ AspP ]]    = λt [ ∃e [ comb'(O,e) ∧ τ(e) < t ] ] 
This representation for gaswuas (the representation for AspP in (118)c) predicts that 
sentence (116)b with gaswuas should be true if there is an event e which is an event of 
combing the object O, and the running time of that event τ(e) is before a reference time t.  
Although Pima sentences are not marked for tense, we may assume that unless other 
morphemes are present, this time t is interpreted as the utterance time – so an event of 
combing must have occurred before the utterance time.  This appears to be the 
interpretation that such sentences receive. 
 The problem can be seen, however, with a verb like keegcuds, whose semantic 
representation is shown in (119) (repeated from (107)). 
(119)  [[ [AspP keegcuds] ]] = λt [ ∃e[ ∃e'[clean'(e') ∧ in'(O,e') ∧ cause'(e,e') ] ∧ τ(e)<t ] ] 
The temporal reference to the resulting state (the argument of clean') is quite indirect, 
mediated by a causing eventuality e and a time t.  In certain contexts, however, the 
resulting state e' appears to be modified directly.  This would pose no problem if the 
modifiers attach at a point where this eventuality argument is still open, such as before 
the causative –cud attaches to keeg, but there are instances where this cannot be the case.  
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For comparison, where the passive resultative –s occurs on roots like √'EESTOD:, any 
higher modifiers do operate directly on the target state, given by e, since that is the only 
eventuality argument available for modification; recall (88), repeated as (120)(120). 
(120)  [[ [vP 'eestos] ]]  = λe [ hidden'(O,e) ]   (e is restricted to states proper by hidden') 
 Consider first the case of keegcuds (119) with no other temporal or aspectual 
modification, as in sentence (104)b.  If the time t in (119) is taken to be the utterance 
time, then the running time of the causing event e is claimed to be before the utterance 
time.  The time at which the caused state e' holds, however, is after the causing 
eventuality e has completed (this can be shown by the actual truth conditions for the 
predicate cause' as, for example, given by Dowty 1979; see footnote 101).  The temporal 
relationship between the utterance time t and the caused eventuality e' (i.e., the state of 
being clean) is therefore underdetermined: the clean state e' may be assumed through 
real-world knowledge to hold at some non-momentary interval which begins after the 
conclusion of the causing event e, and the time t is also after the causing event e, but 
nothing specifies whether the resulting state e' must still hold at the time t.  It is possible 
that the state holds at the utterance time, but it is not required by this representation.  The 
truthful utterance of the verb keegcuds is therefore predicted not to depend on the 
relationship between the resulting state and the utterance time, though perhaps there 
might be a conversational implicature in the present tense that the state holds at the 
moment of utterance – and as an implicature, it should be cancellable.123 
                                                 
123 This implicature might be present for Gricean reasons since, if the speaker merely 
wanted to say that the event occurred in the past, he or she could have used an eventive 
construction.  Since the –s on this verb expresses an aspectual head (an operator relating 
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 This is not the interpretation that speakers give to this verb, however; it does seem 
to matter whether the target state holds at the utterance time (or at some other 
contextually-determined reference time, if other modifiers like tako ‘yesterday’ are 
present).  Consider the following context: the speaker knows that a cleaning event went 
on in the past, resulting in the table being in a clean state.  The speaker also knows that 
since that time, the clean state has ceased to hold; the table is no longer clean.  The 
speaker cannot truthfully say sentence (121)a; this sentence does not have the feeling of 
being technically truthful but misleading, as it might have if it merely violated a 
conversational implicature, but is judged to be flatly untrue.  This can be seen in (121)b, 
where a contradiction (indicated by @) results from explicitly denying the potential 
implicature in the second clause. 
(121) a.  Keeg-cud-s          'o                heg  gegosdakud:. 
   clean-CAUS-PASR  3:SUB:IMP  DET  table 
   The table is cleaned. 
 b.@ Keeg-cud-s           'o               heg  gegosdakud:,  shaba hemuc  heg   
   clean-CAUS-PASR  3:SUB:IMP  DET  table               but     now      DET 
     gegosdakud:  pi      keeg-aj. 
     table               NEG  clean-VB 
  @ The table is cleaned, but now the table is not clean.124 
If the speaker wishes to communicate that the table was in a state of being clean before 
the utterance time, but is not clean at the utterance time, a suffix must be added to the 
verb, as in (122). 
                                                                                                                                                 
the causing event to a time), it is not clear what would make the state more relevant than 
the event in this case. 
124 The English gloss is also marginal and contrasts with a similar sentence where the first 
clause is a present perfect: 9The table has been cleaned, but now the table is not clean. 
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(122)  Keeg-cud-s-kahim         'o               heg  gegosdakud:,  shaba  hemuc  heg   
  clean-CAUS-PASR-PDUR  3:SUB:IMP  DET  table                but     now      DET  
    gegosdakud:  pi      keeg-aj. 
    table               NEG  clean-VB   
  ‘The table was cleaned, but now the table is not clean.’ 
 Although Pima does not mark tense, the –kahim suffix which was mentioned 
earlier in the description of the Pima resultatives (appearing as –ahim or –dahim on 
eventive predicates) has an interpretation which in some cases resembles a complex past 
tense, and in other cases resembles a continuative or progressive (Fitzgerald 2004 
discusses a number of interpretations associated with this and similar suffixes, which she 
analyzes as being grammaticalizations from the verb him ‘to go’).  An example of this 
suffix on an eventive verb with a similar past durative interpretation is shown in (123). 
(123)   Harold  'o                ko'i-him   heg  sho'o. 
                 3:SUB:IMP  eat-PDUR  DET  grasshopper 
   Harold was eating grasshoppers. 
Although it is glossed in (122) and (123) as simply PDUR, its meaning appears to be more 
complex than that.  It is only licensed on verbs which denote an eventuality that may take 
place over a non-momentary interval of time; verbs which denote an instantaneous event 
may not occur with this suffix – or rather, when they do, they are reinterpreted as 
involving an eventuality which takes place for some interval of time.  In the sentences 
seen here, however, this suffix is also associated with an assertion that this interval of 
time occurred before the moment of utterance, as in the context given for (122), which is 
an assertion shared by a simple past tense.125 
                                                 
125 Other interesting properties of this suffix include that a verb with this suffix may only 
occur with an imperfective sentential auxiliary.  Where this suffix occurs on a telic 
predicate, the durative interval that is asserted by the derived predicate does not include 
 191
 According to the semantic representation of keegcuds in (119), the temporal 
interpretation of the resulting state of being clean should not vary if other morphemes 
alter the interpretation of the reference time t.  If the contribution (or part of the 
contribution) of the –kahim suffix is to assert that the reference time t is located before 
the utterance time, this would not yield the interpretation that keegcudskahim appears to 
have in (122) – yet the reference time t is the only element of the representation of 
keegcuds that a higher modifier may modify.  Instead, what the –kahim suffix appears to 
do when it attaches to keegcuds is to assert that the state of being clean – the target state 
of the causative verb keegcud – held for some interval of time before the utterance time.  
According to the structure building analysis of resultatives given here, this sort of 
interpretation is predicted to be possible only if –kahim were to attach before the 
causative –cud existentially closes the target state variable, yet the surface order of 
morphemes shows the causative –cud and post stativizer –s attaching before –kahim.  
There does not appear to be any way to derive the observed meaning for keegcudskahim 
‘was (in a state of being) cleaned’ on the analysis proposed here. 
4.3.3.6 Potential solutions to the problems with post-state interpretations 
 If existential closure of the target state by the causative is taken to be the source of 
the problem, we might propose removing this portion of the meaning of the causative 
                                                                                                                                                 
the climax.  Like past tense in English, it also results in an implicature that the interval of 
time occupied by the event or state denoted by the base predicate does not continue at the 
present time; this is shown to be an implicature rather than an assertion because it is 
cancellable.  This –kahim is probably not a single suffix, since both –k and –ahim occur 
independently.  While the precise meaning of –k is not clear in Pima, it has been analyzed 
as related to stativity (see Mathiot 1973 and Saxton 1982 for analyses in two varieties of 
Tohono O'odham), and –kahim is the form of this suffix which consistently occurs on 
stative predicates, such as adjectives and all those derived by the –s and –(k)c suffixes. 
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morpheme; the causative would introduce a causing event, as in (124), and a separate 
morpheme would close one or the other of the two open eventuality arguments – 
conceivably the target stativizer or eventizer that we have already proposed. 
(124)  [[ v[CAUSE] ]] = λP [ λe' [ λe [ P(e') ∧ cause'(e, e') ] ] ] (potential reformulation) 
If this formulation of the causative were used to derive a causativized adjective like 
keegcud, the target stativizer, rather than the post stativizer, could be the interpretation of 
the –s to derive a stative form keegcuds; this form would then receive a target state 
interpretation, with the target state variable open for modification by the –kahim suffix. 
 If the same causative were involved in the derivation of German causativized 
adjectives, like leeren ‘to empty’, however, these forms as well would be predicted to 
have target state interpretations.  Since the participial forms of these verbs are claimed by 
Kratzer not to be acceptable with immer noch ‘still’, she concludes that they cannot have 
a target state interpretation, but only a post state interpretation.  A meaning for the 
German causative as in (124) would make an incorrect prediction, according to Kratzer. 
 Since the parallel cases of causativized adjectives in Pima do not have the 
semantics predicted by Kratzer’s post stativizer, we might therefore propose, extending 
Pylkkänen (2002), that languages may vary with respect to causation and agentivity in 
several different respects: they may vary in whether the morpheme which introduces the 
causing eventuality is bundled into a single syntactic head with the morpheme which 
introduces an agent involved in that eventuality (which is her proposal for English), and 
they may vary in whether the morpheme which introduces the causing eventuality is 
bundled with a morpheme which existentially closes the caused eventuality (which is 
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needed to match Kratzer’s claims for German, and which she extends to English as well, 
but makes incorrect predictions for Pima). 
 A number of speakers of German and English, however, find target state 
interpretations for causativized adjectives acceptable, judging not by the felicity of immer 
noch or still, but by the context in which such forms may be used, just as was noted for 
the Pima verb keegcuds in (121)b.  For instance, consider the contexts in which it is 
acceptable to utter the following German and English sentences. 
(125) a. Der  Briefkasten  ist       geleert. 
  DET  mailbox       BE:3s  empty:CAUS:PPRT 
  ‘The mailbox is emptied.’ 
 b. The table is cleaned. 
The semantics of Kratzer’s post stativizer predicts that these sentences with geleert 
‘emptied’ and cleaned should be true in the present tense as long as an event of emptying 
or cleaning, respectively, has gone on prior to the moment of utterance, even if the 
mailbox is not currently empty or the table is not currently clean.  This is the case 
because the truth of the post stativized forms merely requires that an emptying or 
cleaning event have gone on in the past, regardless of whether the condition of the 
mailbox and the table at the conclusion of that event persists to the moment of utterance.  
In fact, Kratzer explicitly states that this is the correct prediction. 
(126) Take (23) as an illustration. 
(23)  Das  Gebäude  ist  geräumt. 
   The  building   is   evacuated 
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As a target state passive, (23) implies that there are currently no tenants 
in the building.  When understood as a [post state] passive, (23) does not 
have that implication.  (23) could be uttered truthfully by a police 
officer who is reporting the successful evacuation of the building to his 
supervisor at a time when tenants have moved back in again.  What the 
officer reports is merely that the job assigned to him is done. 
                    (Kratzer 2000: 395) 
A small number of speakers of German and English were informally surveyed to see if 
the sentences in (125) and others like them, which are claimed by Kratzer to have only a 
post state interpretation, could in fact be used in a context where a post state 
interpretation (but not a target state interpretation) would be true, as in (121).  None of 
the speakers felt that these sentences would be true in that context; the target state 
specifying the condition of the mailbox and the table is still relevant in the present tense, 
which appears to mean that these predicates still have some kind of target state 
reading.126  There is no other means to derive a resultative with a target state 
interpretation from a predicate whose only open eventuality argument ranges over events 
without resorting to deletion of semantic structure (i.e., non-monotonic semantic 
operations), and so the only possible option within this system is to remove existential 
closure of the caused eventuality from the meaning of the causative, even in German and 
English.  Some unknown (possibly pragmatic) factor must be responsible for the 
marginality of resultatives like geleert and cleaned with adverbials like immer noch and 
                                                 
126 The same is true of state passives of verbs with resultative secondary predicates, like 
the English hammered flat; the condition of the metal at the moment of utterance is still 
relevant for the evaluation of a present tense sentence like The metal is hammered flat, 
which in Kratzer’s system is also claimed to have only a post state interpretation, where 
the condition of the metal at the moment of utterance should be irrelevant.  Thus, treating 
verbs with resultative secondary predicates the same syntactically as verbs which 





  This chapter began with a description of two resultative suffixes in Pima which 
had been described by Saxton (1982) as a passive/active pair, differing in the presence or 
absence of the verb’s agentive external argument.  The discussion in this chapter has 
shown that the differences between the passive resultative and the possessive resultative 
in Pima are not limited to argument-taking properties.  The passive resultative –s is 
associated with at least three interpretations (a post state resultative or perfect in verbs 
like gaswuis ‘be combed’, a target state resultative in verbs like dagkuan ‘be wiped 
clean’, and a derived stative in verbs like 'eestos ‘be hidden’), differing in their event 
structure (e.g., the availability of a target state) and their entailments (e.g., an event of the 
inception of the target state).  The possessive resultative –(k)c is associated with a single 
interpretation where the external argument maintains the direct object in the target state 
provided by the morphological base, not requiring an event of the inception of the target 
state. 
 Three logically possible types of analysis were considered to produce these 
interpretations: one in which all derived stative interpretations (the most difficult to 
account for compositionally) were simply listed in the lexicon as idioms, one in which 
semantic composition was non-monotonic (allowing the deletion of components of the 
meaning of eventive verbs to produce the derived statives), and one which assumed 
monotonicity of semantic composition to produce all forms.  The latter analysis was 
presented in most detail, and it became clear that such an analysis would require a very 
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high degree of complexity and abstraction, imposing restrictions on the way that certain 
arguments (at least agents or external arguments, and similarly “maintainers” introduced 
by the –(k)c suffix) were introduced, forcing a particular representation for the causative 
morpheme, and requiring a number of abstract aspectual morphemes which were 
frequently not associated with phonological material.  Nevertheless, if monotonicity is to 
be maintained and if the criticisms of the listed-meaning approach are considered serious, 
there appears to be no other way to derive the range of meanings needed – and in fact the 
structure-building approach accounts for some of the non-resultative interpretations of the 
–s suffix quite nicely. 
 One objection to the structure-building approach as presented here might be that 
the –s suffix, in particular, must express at least three different abstract morphemes: a 
light verb whose meaning is (nearly) nothing (127)a, a target stativizer which attaches to 
constituents with two open eventuality arguments and selects the target state for 
modification by higher operators (127)b, and a post stativizer which is properly an 
aspectual morpheme (127)c. 
(127) a.  [[ v[STATE] ]]   = λP [ λe [ P(e) ] ]127 
  b.  [[ v[TGST] ]]   = λR [ λs [ ∃e [ R(s)(e) ] ] ] 
  c.  [[ Aspect[PERF] ]]  = λP λt ∃e [P(e) ∧ τ(e) < t] 
There are semantic and grammatical properties that are shared by all instances of the –s 
suffix, as discussed in section 4.1, and a satisfying analysis of this suffix, in which it 
really could be referred to as the “same” suffix, would provide some common feature in 
                                                 
127 Once again, this morpheme may not be completely devoid of meaning, but may 
introduce a restriction, perhaps via a presupposition, that the eventuality argument in 
question ranges over states. 
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each of these contexts such that a single vocabulary item (to use the framework of 
Distributed Morphology) would be inserted to express all three of these abstract 
morphemes.  The property of temporal stativity, as defined in chapter 2, would be a good 
candidate for this; other morphemes with the same property may be characterized by 
other features, as well (thus explaining why the –s does not appear on every predicate that 
is temporally stative).  Any analysis of the Pima –s, however, must deal with its apparent 
range of interpretations, and the potentially stipulative nature of this common-feature 
analysis should not be cause to reject it outright. 
 The other side of the structure-building analysis involved a number of 
assumptions about the semantic representation of the linguistic objects to which these 
resultatives attached.  It was assumed, following Kratzer (1996, 2000) and others, that the 
agent of a verb – the external argument – was not an argument of the verb root itself; this 
was useful in accounting for the absence of agents in both the passive and possessive 
resultatives.  The verbal and adjectival roots to which the resultative suffixes attached 
also differed in the number and type of arguments that they took: some roots took a single 
eventuality – either a state or an event – as an argument (√DAGKUAN, √KEEG); others took 
an eventuality of some kind and a nominal argument (√GASWUA, √'EESTOD:); roots that 
were implicated in certain motion verbs involved an eventuality and a path, indexed to an 
axis (√HIMS).  A large part of the explanation of the different interpretations of the –s 
suffix in particular rested on these assumptions concerning the interpretation of roots. 
 To argue most forcefully that the Pima resultative suffixes do in fact have the 
analysis that is proposed here, independent evidence would be needed to show that these 
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roots have the interpretations that were assumed; the analysis of the resultatives would 
then be supported when the predicted meanings for these roots in combination with the 
resultatives are shown to agree with the observed meanings.  On the other hand, if the 
analysis of Pima resultatives is taken to be accurate, then it can provide a diagnostic for 
determining the meanings of roots; if the evidence from resultative alternations agrees 
with evidence from other types of alternations, an ontology of root meanings may be 
established.  This type of work, in the spirit of Levin’s (1993) catalog of verb properties 
and verb classes of English, would provide a very interesting area for cross-linguistic 
comparison if careful, extensive work could be done in a number of typologically varied 
languages.  Resultatives and similar phenomena in these languages could provide a rich 
source of information on the semantic representation of roots. 
 Adopting this proposal for Pima as well as for German, English, and Chichewa 
(and possibly others with passive resultatives) does not mean that the resultatives in these 
languages are identical except for the phonological features; even with the same analysis, 
these languages may differ in a number of ways.  Morphosyntactically, the morphemes in 
these languages may differ in their status as a free morpheme, as a prefix or suffix, or as 
some type of process morpheme – as may be the case, for example, with Chickasaw Y-
and G-grade verb forms that receive stative interpretations (Munro and Willmond 1994), 
which involve nonconcatenative morphological changes in the derived form.  Languages 
may also differ in the interpretations that are available to resultative or resultative-like 
morphemes; even in the languages discussed here, Pima was seen to allow more 
interpretations of the passive resultative suffix –s than were available for resultatives in 
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German and English, and the Chichewa stative was seen to allow fewer interpretations 
even than German and English.  Further, the truth conditions of predicates in different 
languages may vary in ways that were not explored at all in this dissertation; there is no 
reason that hidden' in English and hidden' in Pima, for instance, should be true in all of 
the same contexts – though their status as translation equivalents indicates that their truth 
conditions must be fairly similar. 
 Instead, what I have proposed in the structure-building approach is a common 
algebra for determining the meaning of resultatives and their associated eventive verbal 
forms.  This common algebra is intended to explain the typological similarities among 
resultatives that are present in the papers in Nedjalkov (1988), for instance.  Any analysis 
of resultatives must address this cross-linguistic pattern in some way. 
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5. Conclusion 
 This dissertation began by examining the descriptive and formal distinction 
between predicates that are stative and those that are not, a distinction which is 
commonly made in the tradition of lexical aspect or Aktionsart.  In chapter two, it was 
claimed that stativity as a temporal property is equivalent to having the Subinterval 
Property (8) down to single points or instants of time; a predicate may be temporally 
stative in this sense for one of two reasons: (1) because it takes as argument an 
eventuality which is a state (and presumably all states – i.e., as cognitive objects – have a 
property like this, which is passed on by a homomorphic mapping to the predicates – i.e., 
the linguistic objects – which take states as an argument); or (2) because it has been 
aspectually modified in some way such that the derived predicate has this property, as 
with the progressive and the perfect.  A number of syntactic and semantic reflexes of the 
Subinterval Property were presented, as well as a means for determining the reason 
behind the temporal stativity of a predicate. 
 This chapter also presented evidence that many, if not all, predicates have an 
eventuality argument, as proposed within the neo-Davidsonian tradition (e.g., Parsons 
1990), which is filled by either an event or a state of some kind.  Although events and 
states may differ in their properties, and although there may be distinct kinds of states 
(e.g., Davidsonian and Kimian states, as proposed by Maienborn 2004a,b), all states 
which are not associated with individual level interpretation appear to be temporally 
modifiable, so constructions which are sensitive to the temporal extent of states should be 
able to detect at least those that are not associated with individual level interpretations. 
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 Chapter three examined some of the stronger evidence (which involved precisely 
this type of temporal modification) for decomposing target states within the meaning of 
eventive verbs, and concluded that properties of temporal modification supported, and 
could be diagnostic of, the presence of a target state within the meaning of certain verbs.  
This chapter also considered several ways to morphologically and semantically derive a 
temporally stative predicate from one that is not, several of which crucially assume that 
such target state decomposition is possible: the non-stative components of meaning may 
be deleted, leaving only a predicate of states (e.g., Dubinsky and Simango’s (1996) 
analysis of the Chichewa stative); both the eventive and stative forms may be derived 
from an abstract base by selecting either an event or a state for temporal modification 
(e.g., Kratzer’s (2000) target state passive); an aspectual modifier may be added to 
produce a predicate that is temporally stative (e.g., Kratzer’s (2000) post state passive); or 
the stative forms may in fact not be derived semantically, but may have their meaning 
listed lexically.  The properties of the statives derived by these methods are predicted to 
differ, and so all of these methods may not be appropriate to derive statives in a particular 
language; theoretical considerations may also make several of these unavailable – such as 
monotonicity of semantic derivation (i.e., that meaning cannot be deleted), or the 
assumption that listing meanings of derived forms should be a last-resort. 
 The last chapter offered a detailed look at two resultative suffixes in Pima, which 
were argued to provide additional support for a decompositional approach to the meaning 
of eventive verbs.  The passive resultatives of several classes of Pima verbs were seen to 
have interpretations which are very similar to the interpretations available for resultatives 
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in Chichewa and German/English (which were discussed in chapter three), though in 
certain contexts the Pima resultatives also have interpretations that the Chichewa and 
German/English resultatives do not have.  Pima possessive resultatives were also seen to 
have several interpretations, depending on the meaning of the morphological base.  Some 
of the interpretations of these resultatives may be derived straightforwardly from the 
meaning of the morphological base, but others – particularly the derived stative 
interpretations – pose problems for a straightforward analysis, since there appear to be 
elements of the meaning of the base that are not preserved in the derived form.   
 There are three logically possible ways (that were seen in chapter 3) to derive 
stative predicates from eventive predicates.  In accounting for the Pima resultatives, the 
most economical of these appears to be a structure-building account, where both eventive 
verbs and the resultatives which appear to be derived from them are in fact derived from 
a common root, whose meaning includes only the meaning that these two types of verbs 
have in common – namely, that some state holds. 
 The superiority of the structure-building analysis depends on a number of other 
assumptions concerning the meaning of several types of verbs (as well as assumptions 
concerning syntactic expression of the stage level / individual level difference); the 
conclusion that the structure-building analysis is in fact best could be verified by finding 
additional evidence supporting the meaning representation that was assumed here for the 
range of verbs in Pima.  Alternatively, future work might support a different 
representation for these roots and other constructions – hopefully leading to a better 
understanding of the semantics of these resultatives, as well. 
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Appendix: Pima resultatives data 
 This appendix summarizes a portion of the data which was used obtained in the 
course of this dissertation research.  It lists information on the words and interpretations 
that were obtained from native speakers of Pima.  While it does not list all the 
information about every verb that was studied (such as the interpretation of various 
temporal modifiers, the availability of different aspectual forms, and the like), it is 
intended to give an idea of the range of verbs (and other categories) that the Pima 
resultatives occur on.  In some cases words are listed as being nonexistent or not having 
some interpretation; this is not equivalent to the absence of a word or interpretation from 
the list, however.  Although in many cases we did not discuss particular interpretations 
because they were clearly unacceptable, the absence of a word or interpretation may also 
indicate that we did not have time to discuss that word or that interpretation of a word. 
 The first table lists a number of Pima verbs and adjectives, their meaning, and the 
interpretation(s) that result when the passive resultative suffix –s occurs on that base.  
Two comments are in order in interpreting this list, however.  The first is that regular 
phonological patterns sometimes obscure the morphological relationships between words.  
One case of regular phonological change is the change of a final /a/ to /i/ before a suffix 
like the –s, as can be seen in melckua ‘to run into, run over’ and melckuis ‘be run into or 
run over’.  In a number of other cases, the –s suffix appears to attach to a base which is 
shorter than, or sometimes simply not identical to, the unsuffixed form.  This indicates 
that the –s suffix may apparently attach to either the imperfective form of a verb or to the 
perfective form; the perfective typically lacks a final consonant (or a final vowel and 
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consonant) relative to the imperfective.  One example is the verb naatog ‘to make ready, 
prepare (transitive)’, which appears to allow the –s suffix to attach to both the 
imperfective and perfective forms, naatogs and naatos ‘be made ready’. 
 The other comment is that in some cases the meaning of a suffixed form differs 
from the meaning of the base in a number of ways that are not immediately explained by 
the general interpretation of the –s suffix.  An example of this can be seen with the verb 
moikajid ‘to soften’; when the –s suffix is present, the example sentence which was 
volunteered included a benefactive meaning for moikajids ‘to be softened for’.  Such 
cases may involve additional zero morphemes or may indicate performance errors, 
though a precise account of such cases would require much further work. 
Table 1.  Interpretations of Pima words with the passive resultative suffix –s 
Base category1 meaning 
Suffixed 
form meaning category acceptable
'oam A yellow, brown s'oams be yellowish, brownish Vs ? yes 
'ola N a ball; a puck for field hockey 'olas be round Vs ? yes 
'uug A tall 'uugs be tall Vs ? yes 
gev A, N 
cold, icy (as A, 
with s-); ice (as 
N, no s-) 
sgevs be iced Vs ? yes 
jev A rotten sjevs be rotten Vs ? yes 
jujul A crooked jujuls be crooked Vs yes 
keeg A clean, nice, good, beautiful skeegs 
be clear 
(permanently) Vs yes 
                                                 
1 The categories listed here are generally similar to those used in Saxton, Saxton, and 
Enos (1983): A = adjective; N = noun; V = intransitive verb; Vt = transitive verb (i.e., 
one which takes two nominal arguments); Vdt = ditransitive verb (i.e., one which takes 
three nominal arguments); Vr = reflexive verb (i.e., one which necessarily occurs with 
one nominal argument and a reflexive marker).  Other category suffixes further specify 
aspectual and argument-taking properties of verbs: ben = the verb takes one additional 
benefactive argument; comp = the verb takes a finite complement clause; inf = the verb 
takes a non-finite complement clause; loc = the verb takes a locative phrase (either an 
adverb or a postpositional phrase); s = the verb is stative (i.e., the verb occurs only in the 
imperfective aspect).  A question mark indicates where category data is unclear. 
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keegaj Vs to be clean, nice, good, beautiful skeegajs be kept nice Vs ? yes 
ko'ok A spicy, painful sko'oks be painfully spicy Vs ? yes 
moik A soft moiks 
be soft, be the 
soft kind (or 
‘be soft-ish’?) 
Vs ? yes 
pehegii A easy spehegs be (very?) easy Vs ? yes 
toa A white stoas be whitish Vs ? yes 
vaadag A wet, damp svaadags be wet, damp Vs ? yes 
vijin A wrinkly, twisted (s)vijins be twisted Vs ? yes 
       
       
'aha Vr to arrive, reach 'ais reach, extend to Vts yes 






to put a diaper 




have a diaper 
on 
Vs ? yes 





   'aa'ads be promised to Vts ? yes 
'aag Vt 
to say; to think 
(=say to 
oneself); to sing 
'aagas to tell (indiv. level) Vscomp yes 
'aagid Vdt Vtcomp to tell to 'aagidas be told Vscomp yes 
'aagidamk Vdts to like to tell to s'aagidams 
like to tell 
(unspecified as 
to the recipient) 
Vts ? yes 
   s'aagidamks something that is told; gossip N yes 
'ebkiod Vt to scare, frighten 'ebkios be haunted Vs yes 
'elid Vcomps to want 'elids intentions N yes 
'eñgad:ad Vt 
to put clothes 
on, to dress 
(from 'eñiga N 
‘clothes’) 
'eñigad:ads be dressed, have clothes on Vs yes 
   'eñigad:ads a dressed thing N yes 
'eestod: Vt to hide 'eestos be hidden Vs ? yes 
'iig V 
to fall and 
become 
scattered (like 
leaves or seeds) 
'iigs be fallen, strewn about Vs ? yes 
'iim Vt to greet with a kinship greeting 'iims be related Vs yes 
'o'ohan Vt to write 'o'ohanas be written Vscomp yes 
'o'osmad Vt to splatter 'o'osmads look splattered Vs yes 
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'o'osmagi Vs to have splatter applied 'o'osmags 
look splattery 
(natural, not a 
result) 
Vs yes 
'oid Vt to follow 'ois a following N yes 
'oidam Vcomp to think 'oidams thoughts N yes 
'oohod Vt 




s'oohods be about to reject Vt yes 





'u'a Vt to carry 'u'as carrier (nickname) N yes 





bidhun Vt to plaster, put plaster on bidhuns be plastered Vs yes 
bihug V 





bihugs be hungry Vs yes 
bihugim V to get hungry bihugims be hungry Vs yes 
cemaitcud Vtben to bake (a cake) for cemaitcuds 
bake cakes 
(habitually) Vs ? yes 
ceeg Vt to find ceegs be found Vrs ? yes 
ceegid Vdt to show ceegidas 
be shown to; to 
show to (indiv. 
level) 
Vdts yes 
   ceegids show to (indiv. level) Vdts ? yes 
ceek Vt to put or place to'as be placed (pl argument) Vs ? yes 
cikpan V, Vt to work (on) cikpans be worked on Vs yes 
cindat Vt to kiss cindats a lip print N yes 





cu'a Vt to grind cu'as be ground Vs yes 
   cu'is be ground Vs yes 
   cu'amuñs be ground Vs yes 
cuuk 2 Vt to carry piggy-back cuuks 
carry on one's 
back Vts yes 
da'a 1 V to fly, jump, take off da'is 
be thrown, 
scattered; fly Vs yes 
da'a 2 Vs to be greedy, stingy (with s-) sda'is 
a greedily-kept 
thing N yes 
dagkuan Vt to drop; to wipe dagkuis be wiped Vs yes 
   dagkuans be wiped Vs yes 
daha V to sit dahas sit (indiv. level) Vs yes 
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dakosh Vt to put a muzzle on dakoshs be muzzled Vs ? yes 
   dakoshs  N no 
gantan V Vt to scatter; to be scattered sgantañs be scattered Vs ? yes 
gaswua Vt to comb gaswuas be combed Vs yes 
   gaswuis be combed Vs yes 
ge'eda V to become big ge'edas be inflated, made bigger Vs yes 
   ge'es   no 
geesh V to fall gees be fallen Vs ? yes 
gikujk V Vt 
to whistle (a 
tune); to be 
whistling 
gikujks whistler (a nickname) N yes 
   gikujs   no 
golvin V to dig golvins be dug up Vs ? yes 
ha'adkat Vr 
to open one's 
mouth wide; 
gape 
ha'adkats a gap, an open space N yes 





Vrs ? yes 
   hains 








cause to gather 
hemapads be gathered Vs ? yes 
hevagid Vt to smell s-hevags be stinky Vs ? yes 
hiashp Vt 
to bury; to cover 
with dirt (from 
hia N ‘sand, 
dirt’) 
hiashs be buried Vs ? yes 
hidod: Vt to cook, prepare (food) hidod:s be cooked Vs ? yes 
hidod:cud Vtben to prepare (food) for hidod:cuds 
have (food) 
prepared for Vtben ? yes 
   hidod:cuds food prepared for N no 
him V to go hims go (indiv. level) V ? yes 
himcud Vt to make go; move himcuds 
be made to go 
(indiv. level) Vs ? yes 
hipshun Vt to spray hipshuns be sprayed Vs ? yes 
   hipshuns a spraying N ? yes 
hivig Vts to trust hivigs a trusted one N yes 
hivigid Vdt Vtinf to lend; allow hivigdas be allowed Vs ? yes 
hiviumn Vt to shave  hiviumnas be shaved Vs ? yes 
ho'igid Vts 
to pity (without 
s-, ‘to pray’); to 
like? 
s-ho'igids like Vts yes 
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hoat V 
to make a basket 
(from hoa N 
‘basket’) 
hoats be basket-like (of a location) Vs ? yes 
hobinod: Vt to wrap hobins be wrapped in Vs ? yes 
hukshan Vt to scratch hukshans be scratched Vs yes 
hukshp Vt 
to hook or snag, 
put a hook on or 
in, or put on a 
hook 
hukshs be hooked, snagged Vs yes 
    keep hooked, snagged Vts yes 
huktsh Vt to scratch huktshs be scratched Vs yes 
jivia V to arrive jivias 




jujulcud Vt to make crooked jujulcuds make crooked (habitually) Vts ? yes 
juupin V to sink juupins a depression, sunken area N yes 
   juupins be sunken Vs yes 
kaipig Vt to remove seeds from kaipigs be (de-)seeded Vs ? yes 
keliv Vt to decob (corn) kelivs be decobbed Vs ? yes 
   kelivs a backwards person N yes 
kee'id Vt to hate skee'ids hate Vts ? yes 
keega V to become clean keegas 
be cleared 
(necessarily a 








keegcdas be cleaned Vs yes 
   keegcuds / keegcdas N bad  
keesh Vt to erect, stand up keeshs be set up Vs yes 
ki'ikkash Vt to bite ki'ikkas a bite mark N yes 
kuvijk Vt 
to be domed, 
peaked (with -k, 
imperfective 




kuvijks be domed Vs ? yes 
   kuvijks a dome N yes 
kuup Vt to close, block kuups be closed Vs ? yes 
kuupi'ok Vt to open kuupi'oks be open Vs ? yes 
   kuupi'os be open Vs ? yes 
ma'ishp Vt to cover, cover up ma'ishs be covering Vs ? yes 
   ma'ishps be covering Vs yes 
matog Vt to take apart, disassemble matogs 
be 
disassembled Vs ? yes 
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maac 1 Vts Vcomps to know smaacs know of Vts ? yes 
maak Vdt to give to maaks inheritance, gift N yes 
   maaks be given, have been given Vs ? no 
maawua Vt to feel, to cop a feel maawuas be feeling Vts ? yes 
med: V to run  mels 
run (indiv. 
level, as a 
river) 
Vs ? yes 
mehid Vt to burn, burn up mehids be burned up Vs yes 
mei V to burn smeis be burned Vs yes 
melckua Vt to run into, run over melckuis 
be run into, run 
over Vs ? yes 
   melckuis 
something 
which is run 
into 
N yes 
melnogi V to turn while moving melnogs 





moikajid Vt to soften moikajids 
soften (s.t.) for 
(s.o.) (adds a 
benefactive 
sense?) 
Vdt ? yes 
namk Vt to meet nams meet (indiv. level) Vts yes 
naatog Vt to make ready, prepare naatogs be made ready Vs ? yes 
   naatos be made ready Vs ? yes 
nod: V to turn nod:s turn to the side (indiv. level) Vs ? yes 
nod:agid Vt to turn; to make dizzy, crazy nod:ags 
turn to the side 
(indiv. level, as 
a road) 
Vs ? yes 
   nod:ags 
be turned, 
crazy, dizzy, 
high on drugs 
Vs yes 
nolavt Vdt to buy from nolavs a purchase N yes 
ñe'e Vt to sing ñeis (of a song) be sung Vs yes 
ñeickua Vt to push ñeickuis be (have been?) pushed Vs yes 
   ñeickuans be (have been?) pushed Vs yes 
ñuukud Vt 









to make bread 




(in a certain 
location) 
Vs yes 
pi'ata V to disappear, vanish pi'atas 
erased, no 
longer there Vs ? yes 
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pikcelid Vt to take a picture of pikcelidas 
depict (indiv. 
level) Vts ? yes 
piintogid Vt to paint piintogs be painted Vs yes 
shoñckua Vt to chop down, knock down shoñckuis 
be chopped 
down Vs yes 
shuudagi Vs N to be full of water; water shuudags 
be watery, be 
filled with 
water 
Vs ? yes 
tatcua Vts to want tatcuas a desire N yes 
taamhogid Vts to be a nuisance to staamhogs 
nuisance 
existing (in a 
location) 
Vs ? yes 
taatam Vt to touch taats be (have been) touched Vs ? yes 
   taats a touched one N yes 
   taatams touch (indiv. level) Vts ? yes 
toskua V to swell up toskuas be swollen Vs yes 











vakuan Vt to wash; to baptize vakuans be washed Vs ? yes 
vattok V ? 






existing (in a 
certain 
location) 
Vs ? yes 
vattot V 










vaak 2 Vt to put on (clothing) vaaks to have on Vts yes 
via 1 Vt to wear out sviis to be worn out Vs yes 
vid:ut Vt to turn, flutter (as by the wind) vid:us 
be turned (in a 
certain 
direction) 
Vs ? yes 
viitkuan Vt to roll up viitkuanas to be rolled up Vs ? yes 
vo'o Vs 
to be lying flat 
(in a specified 
location) 





vohis to be burned Vs yes 
   vohids   no 
voson Vt to sweep vosons (of an area) to be swept Vs yes 
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vood Vt to lay down flat vois 
to be lain down 
(indiv. level 
only?) 
Vs ? yes 
   voods   no 
voolakud:t V 






existing (in a 
location?) 
Vs ? yes 
   voolakud:ts a ballcourt N yes 





vuushañ V to come out, appear vuushs 
be coming out 
(i.e., to be 
sticking out) 
Vs ? yes 
       
       
'e'ejk V creak 'e'ejks   no 
'eestocud Vtben 
to hide for (from 
'eestod: N ‘to 
hide’) 
'eestocuds   no 
gikuid Vt whistle at gikuids   no 
halivua Vr to skip along halivuas   no 
kiit V 
to make a house 
(from kii N 
‘house’) 
kiits   no 
mavgid V gesture, wave mavgids   no 
maas Vt to look (a certain way), look like maass   no 
ñeid Vt to see; to read ñeids   no 
tonod: V shine tonod:s   no 
 Table 2 below lists data for the possessive resultative suffix –(k)c similar to what 
was listed above.  A major complication in obtaining data on the –(k)c suffix is that it is 
frequently homophonous or nearly homophonous with two other possible morphological 
parses: verbs with truncated forms of several causative suffixes (–jid and –cud, which are 
truncated to be –j and –c, respectively), and verbs with the clausal conjunction –(k)c.2  
Since truncated forms of these suffixes occur only in the perfective aspect and the –(k)c 
suffix only occurs in the imperfective aspect (where aspect is indicated by the second 
position auxiliary), the aspect of a sentence distinguishes “true” instances of the –(k)c 
                                                 
2 The clausal conjunction –(k)c ‘and’ shows the same phonological pattern as the 
possessive resultative suffix –(k)c. 
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suffix.  Similarly, verbs with the clausal conjunction –(k)c must be followed by another 
clause.  Where a form below is marked as being unacceptable, therefore, this should be 
taken to mean that it is unacceptable to interpret it as the –(k)c suffix, though a 
homophonous (or near-homophonous) form may have an interpretation involving one of 
the other causative suffixes or the clausal conjunction. 
Table 2.  Interpretations of Pima words with the possessive resultative suffix –(k)c 
Base category meaning 
Suffixed 
form meaning category acceptable
'atoshad:ad Vt 
to put a diaper 
on (s.o.) (from 
'atosha N 
‘diaper’) 
'atoshad:akc to have a diaper put on Vts yes 
'atoshat Vt 
to make a diaper 
(on s.o.) (from 
'atosha N 
‘diaper’) 
'atoshatc to have a diaper on Vts yes 
'aa'ad Vdt to promise (s.t.) to (s.o.) 'aa'adc 
to keep 
promised Vdts yes 
'aagidamk Vdts to want to tell to s'aagidamc to want to tell (s.t.) to (s.o.) Vdts ? yes 
'ebkiod Vt to scare, frighten 'ebkiodc to keep scared Vts yes 
 'eñgad:ad Vt 
to put clothes 
on, dress (from 
'eñga N 
‘clothes’) 
'eñigad:adc to keep dressed Vts yes 
'eestocud Vtben to hide for 'eestocudc to keep hidden for Vtbens yes 
'eestod: Vt to hide 'eestokc to have hidden Vts yes 
'eestojid Vtben to hide for 'eestojidc to keep hidden for Vtbens yes 
'iim Vt to greet (with a kinship term) 'iimc to be related to Vts yes 
'o'osmad V to splatter (intr) 'o'osmadc to keep (s.t.) splattering Vts yes 
 'oama V 
to become 
brown, yellow 
(from 'oam A 
‘brown, yellow’) 
'oamakc 
to have a 
browned/brown
ish look? 
Vs ? yes 
'oid Vt to follow 'oidc to keep following Vts yes 
'oidamk Vts to want to follow ? 'oidamc 
to want to 
follow Vts yes 
'u'a Vt to carry 'u'akc to bring, to have carried Vts ? yes 
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behe Vt to get, catch bekc to be holding; to claim Vts yes 
   'u'akc to be holding (pl obj) Vts yes 
bidhun Vt to plaster; put plaster on bidhunc 
to keep 
plastered Vts yes 
ceka Vt to put on (footwear) cekakc 
to be wearing 
(footwear) Vts yes 
ceegid Vdt to show ceegidc to be showing Vdts ? yes 
ceek Vtloc to put (in a location) cekc 
to have (s.t.) 
put (in a 
location) 
Vtlocs yes 
   to'akc 
to have (s.t., 
plural) put (in a 
location) 
Vtlocs yes 
cindat Vt to kiss cindatc to keep kissing Vts yes 
cuuk 2 Vt to carry piggy-back cuukc 
to have carried 
piggy-back Vts yes 
dagkuan Vt to drop; to wipe dagkuakc to keep wiped clean Vts yes 
dakosh Vt to muzzle; to put a muzzle on dakoshc 
to keep 
muzzled Vts yes 





daash Vt to place, appoint to office daashc keep put/placed Vts yes 
gaswua Vt to comb gaswuakc to keep combed Vts yes 
ge'eda V 
to become big 







   ge'ekc   no 
gevshp Vt 
to pin down, 







golvin V Vt to dig golvinc to keep (s.t.) dug out Vts yes 
ha'adkat Vr to open one's mouth ha'adkatc 
to have one's 
mouth open Vrs yes 
hagtog Vt to melt hagtogc 
to keep s.t. 




hain Vt to break, crack, shatter hainc 








   haikc 






he'edkat Vr to smile he'edkatc to be smiling Vrs yes 
helig Vt to spread (s.t.) out heligc 
to have/keep 




cause to gather 
hemapadc to have gathered Vts yes 
hevagid Vt to smell (tr) hevagidc to keep smelling Vts yes 
hiashp Vt 
to bury; to cover 
with dirt (from 
hia N ‘dirt’) 
hiashpc to have/keep (s.t.) buried Vts yes 
   hiashc to have/keep (s.t.) buried Vts yes 
hidod: Vt to cook, prepare (food) hidod:c 
to have (s.t.) 
cooked Vts yes 
hidod:cud Vtben to prepare for hidod:cudc 




hivig Vt to trust hivigc to keep trusted Vts ? yes 
hiviumn Vt to shave (tr) hiviumnakc to keep (s.t.) shaved Vts yes 
hukshan Vt to scratch hukshanc to keep scratched  no 
   hukshanc to hook, snag?  yes 
hukshp Vt 
to hook or snag 
(s.t.), put a hook 
on or in, or put 






huktsh Vt to scratch huktshc keep scratched  yes 
jujul A crooked, bent jujulc to keep crooked Vts yes 
juupin V to sink juupinc to have stooped over Vts yes 
kaipig Vt to remove seeds from kaipigc 
to keep seeds 
out of Vts yes 
keishp Vt to stand on keishpc to keep (s.t.) stepped on Vts yes 
keliv Vt to remove (corn) from the cob kelivc 
to keep 
decobbed Vts yes 
keega V 
to become clean, 
nice, good, 
beautiful (from 
keeg A ‘clean, 
nice, good, 
beautiful’) 
keegakc to keep clean Vts yes 
   keegc   no 
 215
keegcud Vt 
to make clean, 
nice, good, 
beautiful 
keegcudc to keep cleaned Vts yes 
keesh Vt to erect, stand up keeshc to have erected (sg obj) Vts yes 
   cuucuakc to have erected (pl obj) Vts yes 
kud:ut Vt to bother kud:utc to keep bothered Vts yes ? 












to put a dome on 
kuvijkc 











ma'ishp Vt to cover, cover up ma'ishc 
to have/keep 
covered Vts yes 
   ma'ishpc to have/keep covered Vts yes 
matog Vt to take apart, disassemble matogc 
to have taken 
apart Vts yes 
mavgid Vt to wave mavgidc to keep waving Vts yes 
maak Vdt to give to maakc to have/keep given to Vdts yes 
   maakc a gift, inheritance N yes 
maascud Vdt 
make (s.t.) look 
like (s.t.), make 









maawua Vt to feel, cop a feel maawuakc 
to have one's 
hand in Vts yes 
mehid Vt to burn, burn up mehidc keep burning Vts yes 
   mehikc keep burning Vts yes 
melckua Vt to run down, run into melckuakc 
to keep run-
down, run-into Vts yes 
melcud Vt to make run; to drive melcudc 
keep (s.t.) 
running Vts yes 
melnogi V to turn (while running) melnogc 
to have (s.t.) 
turned Vts yes 
moikajid Vt to make soft moikajidc to keep (s.t.) soft for Vtbens ? yes 
naggia Vs Vt to hang naggiakc to be hanging Vrs yes 
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naad Vt 
to light (a 
candle, light, 
fire) 
naandakc to keep (fires, lights) lit Vts yes 
naatog Vt to make ready, prepare naatogc to have ready Vts yes 
ñeickua Vt to push ñeickuakc to keep pushed Vts yes 





totsid Vt to spook, surprise totsidc 
to keep (s.o.) 
surprised Vts yes 
toobin Vt to twist toobinc to have/keep twisted Vts yes 
   toobc to have/keep twisted Vts ? yes 
vakuan Vt to wash; to baptize vakuanc 
keep washed, 
have washed Vts yes 
vattot V 




vattotc to have/keep shaded Vts yes 
vaadagid Vt to dampen vaadagikc to keep damp Vts yes 
vaak 2 Vt to put on (clothing) vaakc 
to have put-on, 
be wearing Vts ? yes 
via 1 Vt to tear, wear out sviakc to keep torn Vts yes 
vid:ut Vt 
to turn (s.t.), 
flutter (as by the 
wind) 
vid:ukc to keep turned sideways Vts yes 
    to be turned Vs yes 
vijiñid Vt to make wrinkled vijiñidc 
to keep 
wrinkled Vts yes 
viitkuan Vt to roll up viitkuanc to have rolled up Vts yes 
vo'o Vs 
to be lying flat 
(in a specified 
location) 
vo'okc to have (s.t.) lying flat Vts yes 
voson Vt to sweep vosonc to keep swept Vts yes 
vood Vt to lay (s.t.) down flat voodc 
to have lain 
down Vts yes 
voopoid Vdt to take away from, deprive of voppoidc 
to keep taking 
away from Vdts yes 
   voppoikc to keep taking away from Vdts yes 
       
       
'e'ejk V to creak 'e'ejkc   no 
'ibhuiñ Vt to make breathless 'ibhuinc   no 
'iig V 
to fall and 
become 
scattered (like 
leaves or seeds) 
'iigc   no 
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'oohod Vt to reject; divorce (in perfective) s'oohodc   no 
cikpan V to work cikpanc   no 
cu'a Vt to grind cu'ikc   no 
gatwuid Vt to shoot gatwuidac   no 
   gatwuidakc   no 
   gatwuikc   no 
gikujk V Vt 
to whistle (a 
tune); to be 
whistling 
gikujkc   no 
giidahim V to go scouting giidahimc   no 
ha'icug Vloc 
to exist (in a 
specified 
location) 
ha'icugc   no 
halivua Vr to skip halivuakc   no 
hehhem V to laugh hehhemc   no 
heubgid Vt Vr to make cool; rest (reflexive) heubgidc   no 
hipshun Vt to spray hipshunc   no 
kee'id Vt to hate skee'idc   no 
ki'ikkash Vt to bite ki'ikkashc   no 
   ki'ikkakc   no 
kiit V to make a house kiitc   no 
ko'ok A painful sko'okc   no 
lial N money lialc   no 
maac 1 Vt to know smaacc   no 
maas Vt to look (a certain way), look like maasc   no 
med: V to run melc   no 
   med:c   no 
moik A soft moikc   no 
moika V to become soft moikakc   no 
nod:agid Vt to turn; to make dizzy, crazy nod:agc   no 
ñe'e V to sing ñe'ekc   no 
ñea 1 V to wake up ñeakc   no 
ñeid Vt to see; to read ñeidc   no 
paant V 
to make bread 
(from paan N 
‘bread’) 
paantc   no 
   paantakc   no 
shaashañ V to groan shaashañc   no 
shoak V to cry shoakc   no 
tatcua Vt to want tatcuakc   no 
taamhog V to be a nuisance taamhogc   no 
toa A white stoakc   no 
tonod: V to shine tonod:c   no 
vaila Vr to dance vailakc   no 
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